Remove client code for APIs the product never calls

.env.example

@@ -7,17 +7,6 @@
 NAC_RAPIDAPI_KEY=
 NAC_RAPIDAPI_HOST=network-as-code.nokia.rapidapi.com
 
-# --- Bearer for passthrough/ endpoints ---------------------------------------
-# There are two ways; fill in one:
-#  (a) write the ready-made access token you got from the portal directly
-NAC_OAUTH_TOKEN=
-#  (b) or provide the client-credentials details — the probe obtains the token itself.
-#      Copy the TOKEN_URL value from the application settings in the Nokia portal.
-NAC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=
-NAC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=
-NAC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=
-NAC_OAUTH_SCOPE=
-
 # --- Probe settings -----------------------------------------------------------
 # Check the portal documentation for which test numbers are defined on the SIMULATOR plan;
 # write one of them here. If empty, +99999000001000 is tried.

DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md

@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ nac.reachability("+99999000001000")
 nac.congestion_query("+99999000001000")
 nac.geofence_subscribe("+99999000001000", lat=25.38, lng=51.49, radius_m=500,
                        sink="https://example.com/webhooks/geofence", types=["org.camaraproject.geofencing-subscriptions.v0.area-entered"])
-nac.qod_create("+99999000001000", profile="QOS_E", duration_s=600, app_server_ipv4="203.0.113.10")
+nac.qod_create("+99999000001000", app_server_ipv4="203.0.113.10", qos_profile="QOS_E", duration_s=600)
 nac.location_retrieve("+99999000001000", max_age_s=60)   # after escalation only — the one call that returns a coordinate
 ```
 
-Deliberately unused: SIM/Device Swap, the KYC family, Number Verification. HeatShield measures exposure; it does not
-establish identity, and calling those would violate data minimisation.
+Deliberately absent: SIM/Device Swap, the KYC family, Number Verification. HeatShield measures exposure; it does not
+establish identity, and calling those would violate data minimisation — so the client does not contain them. The
+9 Sep 2026 probe that also tried them can be re-run exactly from tag `v0.1-hackathon`.

README.md

@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ All six are called by the prototype through a single entry point (`packages/nac_
 | **Location Retrieval** | Where to send the medic — **after escalation only**, once, coarsened to three decimals before it enters the ledger. The only API here that returns a coordinate, so the most tightly gated. |
 
 **Network Slicing** is a separate Nokia product on the roadmap. It is marked `# MOCK:` in `packages/agent/policy.py`
-and is **not** presented as live. Deliberately unused: SIM/Device Swap, the KYC family, Number Verification —
+and is **not** presented as live. Deliberately absent: SIM/Device Swap, the KYC family, Number Verification —
 HeatShield does not establish identity, it measures exposure, and calling those would violate data minimisation.
+The operator client contains only the calls the product makes.
 
 ## Running it
 
@@ -194,6 +195,11 @@ Location Verification radius scan in
 [`evidence/partial-scan-20260909-124602.json`](evidence/partial-scan-20260909-124602.json), and the
 endpoint-by-endpoint record in [`docs/api-availability.md`](docs/api-availability.md).
 
+The 9 Sep 2026 live probe in `evidence/` was run with `tools/verify_live.py` at tag
+[`v0.1-hackathon`](https://github.com/kutsibalci/heatshield/tree/v0.1-hackathon). That version also probed APIs
+the product never calls (KYC, SIM swap, number verification); those have since been removed from the codebase, so
+their results in the evidence file are historical. The probe can be re-run exactly from that tag.
+
 **On WBGT — and this is the biggest gap in the prototype.** The product does not measure WBGT, it consumes it.
 Today it consumes it **from outside**: the value is pushed in by `POST /v1/sites/{site_id}/wbgt` and the ledger
 records it as `source: meteorology-feed`. **No weather provider is integrated.** There is no code in this
@@ -309,7 +315,7 @@ modes need no credentials at all — the demos and the full test suite run with
 ## Status and what comes next
 
 - **13 Sep 2026** — prototype submitted. **21 Sep 2026** — Demo Day: presented live to the jury as one of
-  ten finalists. Results pending.
+  ten finalists.
 - **Next, in this order:**
   1. Measure what Quality on Demand actually adds on the escalation path — the jury asked, and we have not
      measured it yet. Until then it stays what it is today: outside the verification budget and outside the

apps/simulator/main.py

@@ -55,102 +55,13 @@ def _phone(body: dict) -> str:
     return p
 
 
-def _require_bearer(request: Request):
-    # Passthrough APIs require Bearer in live; the simulator only warns (mandatory with SIM_STRICT_AUTH=1).
-    if os.environ.get("SIM_STRICT_AUTH") == "1" and not request.headers.get("authorization", "").startswith("Bearer "):
-        raise HTTPException(401, {"code": "UNAUTHENTICATED", "message": "a Bearer token is required"})
-
-
-PT = "/passthrough/camara/v1"
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/number-recycling/number-recycling/v0.2/check")
-def number_recycling(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.number_recycling(_phone(body), body.get("specifiedDate"))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/call-forwarding-signal/call-forwarding-signal/v0.3/call-forwardings")
-def call_forwardings(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.call_forwardings(_phone(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/call-forwarding-signal/call-forwarding-signal/v0.3/unconditional-call-forwardings")
-def unconditional_cf(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.unconditional_call_forwarding(_phone(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/kyc-tenure/kyc-tenure/v0.1/check-tenure")
-def kyc_tenure(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.kyc_tenure(_phone(body), body.get("tenureDate"))
-
-
-def _snake_fields(body: dict, exclude=("phoneNumber", "ageThreshold", "includeContentLock", "includeParentalControl")) -> dict:
-    import re
-    return {re.sub(r"(?<!^)(?=[A-Z])", "_", k).lower(): v for k, v in body.items() if k not in exclude}
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/kyc-age-verification/kyc-age-verification/v0.1/verify")
-def kyc_age(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.kyc_age(_phone(body), int(body.get("ageThreshold", 18)), **_snake_fields(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/kyc-match/kyc-match/v0.3/match")
-def kyc_match(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.kyc_match(_phone(body), **_snake_fields(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/number-verification/number-verification/v2/verify")
-def number_verify(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.number_verify(_phone(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/sim-swap/sim-swap/v0/check")
-def sim_swap_check(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.sim_swap_check(_phone(body), body.get("maxAge"))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/sim-swap/sim-swap/v0/retrieve-date")
-def sim_swap_date(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.sim_swap_date(_phone(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/device-swap/device-swap/v1/check")
-def device_swap_check(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.device_swap_check(_phone(body), body.get("maxAge"))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/device-swap/device-swap/v1/retrieve-date")
-def device_swap_date(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.device_swap_date(_phone(body))
-
-
-@app.post(f"{PT}/consent-info/consent-info/v0.1/retrieve")
-def consent(request: Request, body: dict = Body(...)):
-    _require_bearer(request)
-    return fx.consent(_phone(body), body.get("scopes") or [], body.get("purpose", ""))
 
 
 @app.post("/device-status/device-reachability-status/v1/retrieve")
 def reachability(body: dict = Body(...)):
     return fx.reachability(_phone(body))
 
 
-@app.post("/device-status/device-roaming-status/v1/retrieve")
-def roaming(body: dict = Body(...)):
-    return fx.roaming(_phone(body))
-
-
 @app.post("/location-retrieval/v0/retrieve")
 def location_retrieve(body: dict = Body(...)):
     return fx.location_retrieve(_phone(body), body.get("maxAge"))
@@ -188,8 +99,6 @@ def delete(sid: str):
 
 
 _sub_routes("/geofencing-subscriptions/v0.3/subscriptions", "geofencing")
-_sub_routes("/device-status/device-reachability-status-subscriptions/v0.8/subscriptions", "reachability")
-_sub_routes("/device-status/device-roaming-status-subscriptions/v0.8/subscriptions", "roaming")
 
 
 # ---- QoD ---------------------------------------------------------------------

docs/api-availability.md

@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@ from the follow-up scans in the same folder. Nothing here is asserted from docum
 | Location Verification | `location-verification/v1` | **200** · well-formed verdict and `lastLocationTime` · `maxAge` is mandatory (422 without it) · in the sandbox the verdict is `FALSE` for every area, including a 200 km circle around the device's own coordinate — put to Nokia | First rung of the cost ladder: a verdict, never a coordinate; loose `maxAge` = cached, strict `maxAge` = fresh fix and liveness probe |
 | Device Reachability Status | `device-reachability-status/v1` | **200** · `reachable: true`, `connectivity: ["SMS"]`, `lastStatusTime` | Silent-device detection inside a breached zone; the status can lag, so a strict-freshness fix overrules it |
 | Congestion Insights | `congestion-insights/v0` | **200** · four-interval forecast, latest `High` at confidence 56 | Cluster test: several devices dark together in a congested cell is a network event, not a medical one |
-| Quality on Demand | `quality-on-demand/v0` | **200** · session opened with `QOS_E`, 600 s, application server `203.0.113.10`; read back from the session list; deleted · `qosStatus` came back `REQUESTED`, not `AVAILABLE` | Guaranteed bandwidth for the medic-to-physician assessment, after escalation |
+| Quality on Demand | `quality-on-demand/v1` | **200** · session opened with `QOS_E`, 600 s, application server `203.0.113.10`; read back from the session list; deleted · `qosStatus` came back `REQUESTED`, not `AVAILABLE` | Guaranteed bandwidth for the medic-to-physician assessment, after escalation |
 | Location Retrieval | `location-retrieval/v0` | **200** · coordinate returned (the sandbox device sits in Budapest) · platform-reported uncertainty radius **1000 m** | Once, after escalation, coarsened to three decimals before it enters the ledger |
 
 **Not called, on purpose:** Network Slicing is a separate Nokia product and appears in the code only as `# MOCK`. SIM and
-Device Swap, KYC and Number Verification establish identity; HeatShield measures exposure and does not need them.
+Device Swap, KYC and Number Verification establish identity; HeatShield measures exposure and does not need them —
+the client no longer contains them at all. The 9 Sep 2026 live probe in `evidence/` was run with `tools/verify_live.py` at tag `v0.1-hackathon`. That version also probed APIs the product never calls (KYC, SIM swap, number verification); those have since been removed from the codebase, so their results in the evidence file are historical.
 
 **Not integrated:** a weather provider. The WBGT value is an input to `/v1/sites/{id}/wbgt`; the demos feed it from the
 scenario. Wiring a meteorological source is roadmap.