Fix ignored App options and release 1.1.1

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+* text=auto eol=lf
+
+# Shell scripts run inside Linux containers and must never be checked out with
+# CRLF endings, which would make them unrunnable.
+*.sh text eol=lf

.github/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -87,4 +87,15 @@ jobs:
       - name: Verify image metadata
         run: |
           test "$(docker image inspect automation-inspector:ci --format '{{ index .Config.Labels "io.hass.type" }}')" = "app"
-          test "$(docker image inspect automation-inspector:ci --format '{{ .Config.User }}')" = "inspector"
+
+      - name: Verify the app drops to the unprivileged user
+        run: |
+          test "$(docker run --rm automation-inspector:ci id -un)" = "inspector"
+
+      - name: Verify Supervisor-owned options are readable after the privilege drop
+        run: |
+          docker volume create ai-ci-data
+          docker run --rm --entrypoint sh -v ai-ci-data:/data automation-inspector:ci -c \
+            'printf "{\"refresh_interval\": 987}" > /data/options.json && chown root:root /data/options.json && chmod 600 /data/options.json'
+          test "$(docker run --rm -v ai-ci-data:/data automation-inspector:ci python -c 'from app.settings import Settings; print(Settings.load().refresh_interval)')" = "987"
+          docker volume rm ai-ci-data

README.md

@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ If a refresh fails after a successful run, the report remains available with the
 - No telemetry, analytics, CDN, remote font, or third-party JavaScript.
 - No Home Assistant write/service commands are issued.
 - Home Assistant configuration is mounted read-only.
-- The production container runs as an unprivileged user with `/tmp` on `tmpfs`.
+- The production container drops to an unprivileged user before starting the app, with `/tmp` on `tmpfs`.
 - Direct host-port publication was removed; access is through authenticated, admin-only Ingress.
 - The frontend uses a strict CSP with a per-response nonce and does not use `innerHTML`.
 - API responses use ETags, `nosniff`, a restrictive permissions policy, and no wildcard CORS.

automation_inspector/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 1.1.1 — 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Apply the configured App options again. Supervisor writes `/data/options.json` as root with mode `0600`, so the unprivileged container user could not read it and every option silently fell back to its built-in default. The container now stages a readable copy of the options and then drops privileges, so `refresh_interval`, `request_timeout`, `include_disabled`, `inspect_traces`, and `scan_automations_file` take effect.
+
 ## 1.1.0 — 2026-07-28
 
 ### Added

automation_inspector/Dockerfile

@@ -17,19 +17,25 @@ ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
 	PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
 	PIP_DISABLE_PIP_VERSION_CHECK=1 \
 	PIP_NO_CACHE_DIR=1 \
+	AI_OPTIONS_PATH=/tmp/options.json \
 	HOME=/tmp
 
 WORKDIR /opt/automation-inspector
 
 COPY requirements.txt ./requirements.txt
 RUN python -m pip install --requirement requirements.txt \
+	&& apk add --no-cache su-exec \
 	&& addgroup -S inspector \
 	&& adduser -S -D -H -G inspector inspector
 
 COPY --chown=inspector:inspector app/ ./app/
 COPY --chown=inspector:inspector www/ ./www/
+COPY docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
+RUN chmod 0555 /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
 
-USER inspector
+# The entrypoint starts as root only to stage the Supervisor-owned options
+# file, then execs the application as the unprivileged inspector user.
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 
 EXPOSE 1234
 STOPSIGNAL SIGTERM

automation_inspector/app/__init__.py

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """Automation Inspector application package."""
 
-APP_VERSION = "1.1.0"
+APP_VERSION = "1.1.1"

automation_inspector/config.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: Automation Inspector
-version: 1.1.0
+version: 1.1.1
 slug: automation_inspector
 description: >-
   Audits automation and script dependencies, targets, compatibility, and recent

automation_inspector/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Prepare unprivileged access to the app options, then drop privileges.
+#
+# Supervisor writes /data/options.json as root with mode 0600
+# (supervisor/utils/json.py: write_json_file -> jsonfile.chmod(0o600)), so the
+# unprivileged runtime user cannot read it. Copy it into tmpfs owned by that
+# user instead of relaxing permissions on the Supervisor-managed file.
+set -eu
+
+if [ -f /data/options.json ]; then
+	install -o inspector -g inspector -m 0400 /data/options.json "${AI_OPTIONS_PATH}"
+fi
+
+exec su-exec inspector:inspector "$@"

tests/test_project_contract.py

@@ -47,8 +47,19 @@ def test_dashboard_uses_safe_dom_and_nonce_bootstrap() -> None:
 
 def test_container_is_non_root_and_health_checked() -> None:
     dockerfile = (APP / "Dockerfile").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    entrypoint = (APP / "docker-entrypoint.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
 
     assert "FROM python:3.14.6-alpine3.24" in dockerfile
-    assert "USER inspector" in dockerfile
+    assert "adduser -S -D -H -G inspector inspector" in dockerfile
+    assert 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]' in dockerfile
+    assert "AI_OPTIONS_PATH=/tmp/options.json" in dockerfile
     assert "HEALTHCHECK" in dockerfile
     assert 'io.hass.type="app"' in dockerfile
+
+    # Supervisor writes /data/options.json as root with mode 0600, so the
+    # entrypoint must stage a readable copy before dropping privileges.
+    assert "/data/options.json" in entrypoint
+    assert "exec su-exec inspector:inspector" in entrypoint
+    # read_text normalizes newlines, so assert on raw bytes: CRLF would make
+    # the script unrunnable inside the Alpine container.
+    assert b"\r\n" not in (APP / "docker-entrypoint.sh").read_bytes()