Report a vulnerability privately →

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability). The report is visible only to you and the maintainers until a fix ships. Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

This is the only reporting channel. There is deliberately no email address here: a private advisory thread gives you a durable record, a CVE path, and coordinated disclosure controls that an inbox does not.

Expect an acknowledgement within 3 working days and an assessment within 10 working days. Coordinated disclosure is the default; we will agree a date with you before publishing.

Until the first tagged release, main is the only supported version.

SDIP parses untrusted binary input. A SEG-Y file is a header-length-prefixed binary format from an arbitrary source: a tape transcription, a contractor deliverable, a partner exchange, an email attachment. A malformed or deliberately hostile file must produce a clean, typed error — never a crash, an unbounded allocation, or a write outside the output path.

The binding rules (specification §11.4):

• Header-declared lengths and counts are validated against actual file size before allocation. A trace count or sample count read out of a header is attacker-supplied until it has been reconciled with the file on disk.
• Output paths are confined. No path is ever derived from file content. A textual header, a survey name, or a field value must not reach a filesystem path.
• A fuzz corpus for the header parser is part of the test suite. Tracked as D8 in OPEN_DEBTS.md — it is not built yet, and that debt is open against public release.

In scope

• Crashes, hangs, or unbounded memory growth from a crafted SEG-Y or MDIO store
• Path traversal or arbitrary write from any input, including store metadata
• Any way to make sdip certify issue an EQUIVALENT verdict for a store that is not equivalent — this is the highest-severity class in the project, because the certificate is the product
• Any way to make a gate pass on a corrupted store (SP11, gate G7)
• Deserialisation issues reachable from store metadata

Out of scope

• Vulnerabilities in upstream multidimio, segy, zarr, or xarray — report those to their maintainers; tell us too if SDIP's usage widens the impact
• Resource exhaustion from a legitimately enormous but well-formed survey
• Anything requiring the operator to set a barred environment variable (§9.1); those are barred and sdip doctor fails on them

A forged or wrongly issued Equivalence Certificate is a security issue, not merely a correctness bug. The certificate is what a downstream consumer trusts instead of re-verifying the data themselves. Treat a way to produce a false EQUIVALENT verdict as you would treat an authentication bypass.