SwarmBar is pre-release and moves fast. Only the latest commit on main is supported with security fixes. There is no parallel maintenance of older builds.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repo instead. It opens a private draft advisory visible only to the maintainer until a fix is ready. This applies especially to anything touching:

• The loopback hook server and its per-install token (SwarmBar/Monitors/HookServer.swift, SwarmBar/Settings/HookToken.swift). It listens on 127.0.0.1:48620 and can hold a Claude Code permission prompt open, so anything that lets an unauthenticated caller plant a row, resolve a decision, or exhaust the connection budget matters here.
• The approve and deny paths (SwarmBar/Store/TerminalFocuser.swift). These drive real terminals. A bug that sends the wrong keystroke can approve a command the user denied, which has happened before and is the reason the on-screen selector is read and re-confirmed rather than assumed.
• Inline reply delivery, which types user text into a live coding session via bracketed paste. Anything that could break out of the paste or submit unverified content belongs here.
• AppleScript construction (SwarmBar/Store/AppleScriptLiteral.swift). User-influenced text is interpolated into script source, so escaping failures are injection.
• Config file writes (SwarmBar/Settings/IntegrationManager.swift, IntegrationTransforms.swift). These edit real dotfiles under the user's home directory, resolve symlinks, and shell-quote installed paths.

You should receive an initial response within a few days. Confirmed vulnerabilities will be credited in the fix's release notes unless you would prefer to stay anonymous.

SwarmBar runs entirely on your own machine. There is no SwarmBar-operated backend, no account, and no telemetry. It makes exactly one network call, an unauthenticated request to the GitHub releases API, and only when you press Check for updates in Settings. Nothing is checked on launch or on a timer.

Worth knowing about the threat model, since it is unusual for a status bar app:

• The App Sandbox is off. Monitors need to read agent state directories across the home directory, which the sandbox does not permit. This is a deliberate tradeoff for a personal tool and is listed for revisiting before any wider distribution.
• SwarmBar reads agent transcripts. Those contain whatever you and your agents discussed, including anything sensitive in a prompt or a tool result. Nothing is transmitted, but it is held in memory and rendered in the popover.
• Builds are not yet signed or notarized. Until they are, verify what you are running by building from source.

Findings in macOS itself or in the agent tools SwarmBar watches should generally be reported upstream, but flag them here too if you are not sure.