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πŸ”’ Fix Integer Overflow Vulnerability in calloc#18

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security-fix-calloc-overflow-10106695328352122040
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πŸ”’ Fix Integer Overflow Vulnerability in calloc#18
undivisible wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
security-fix-calloc-overflow-10106695328352122040

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@undivisible

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🎯 What: Fixed an integer overflow vulnerability in the calloc function in kernel/libc.in by implementing input validation and overflow detection.

⚠️ Risk: The vulnerability could be exploited by providing excessively large n or size values, leading to integer overflow during n * size calculation. This would result in calloc allocating a buffer much smaller than requested. Subsequent operations assuming the full requested size could write past the allocated memory (heap buffer overflow).

πŸ›‘οΈ Solution: The fix implements multiple layers of protection:

  1. Asserts that both n and size are non-negative, as Int is a 64-bit signed integer.
  2. Checks if n == 0 or size == 0 and returns malloc(0) early to prevent division by zero during the overflow check.
  3. Asserts that total / n == size after the multiplication to detect any overflow. If an overflow is detected, the kernel halts via panic.

PR created automatically by Jules for task 10106695328352122040 started by @undivisible

Adds validation in `kernel/libc.in` to prevent integer overflow
and negative sizes during memory allocation in `calloc`.

- Asserts `n >= 0` and `size >= 0` to prevent negative values.
- Explicitly handles `n == 0` or `size == 0` by returning `malloc(0)`.
- Calculates `total = n * size` and checks for overflow with `total / n == size`.

Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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undivisible added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 29, 2026
- Fix stray brace in kernel-root.in and remove dead thr_exit return
- Add heap/obj_arena bounds checks (PRs #30, #26)
- Harden malloc/calloc/realloc; replace strcpy with strlcpy; remove strcat
  (PRs #20, #18, #21, #28, #15)
- Split nvme_pci_init, restore e1000_rx_poll, use FS_MAX_FILES constants
  (PRs #14, #17, #16)
- Refresh context.md ponytail index after service-wrapper deletion
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Changes applied directly on main (rebased past shell.in extraction and service-wrapper deletion). Used panic() instead of unreachable()/assert() where the PRs referenced undefined helpers.

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Merged to main in 22933b8. Changes applied directly on main (rebased past shell.in extraction and service-wrapper deletion). Used panic() instead of unreachable()/assert() where the PRs referenced undefined helpers.

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