π Remove unsafe strcat function#15
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Removed `strcat` function and its tests to prevent potential buffer overflows. Developers should use the safer `strncat` alternative provided by `libc.in`. Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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- Fix stray brace in kernel-root.in and remove dead thr_exit return - Add heap/obj_arena bounds checks (PRs #30, #26) - Harden malloc/calloc/realloc; replace strcpy with strlcpy; remove strcat (PRs #20, #18, #21, #28, #15) - Split nvme_pci_init, restore e1000_rx_poll, use FS_MAX_FILES constants (PRs #14, #17, #16) - Refresh context.md ponytail index after service-wrapper deletion
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Changes applied directly on main (rebased past shell.in extraction and service-wrapper deletion). Used panic() instead of unreachable()/assert() where the PRs referenced undefined helpers. |
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Merged to main in 22933b8. Changes applied directly on main (rebased past shell.in extraction and service-wrapper deletion). Used panic() instead of unreachable()/assert() where the PRs referenced undefined helpers. |
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π― What: The vulnerability fixed is the presence of the inherently unsafe
β οΈ Risk: The potential impact if left unfixed is buffer overflows. Any code using
strcatfunction in the custom libc implementation, which lacks bounds checking.strcatcould potentially write past the end of the destination buffer if the source string combined with the original destination string exceeds the destination buffer's capacity, leading to memory corruption or arbitrary code execution.π‘οΈ Solution: How the fix addresses the vulnerability is by completely removing the
strcatfunction definition and its associated tests, forcing developers to use the saferstrncatalternative which is already implemented inkernel/libc.in.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5313007458290915061 started by @undivisible