ci: add supply-chain-lint gate - #73
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rafalry merged 2 commits intoJul 14, 2026
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…(public repo) [PSEC-5231] Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
laf-rge
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Jul 14, 2026
rafalry
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July 14, 2026 18:41
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Summary
Adds the fleet-standard
supply-chain-lintgate, part of closing thegate:supply-chain-lintfinding category from the weekly repo-security-lint sweep (PSEC-5231).What it does
supply-chain-lintscans vendored GitHub Action definitions (action.yml/action.yamland sibling.shscripts) for runtime supply-chain risks — runtime installs that bypass lockfiles (npm install,npx,curl | bash), and unpinned versions (@latest,--no-lockfile).xpub-tool is a public repo, so it must not reference (or hold credentials for) the private
swan-bitcoin/actionsrepo. Following thecheck-linear-linkprecedent (#72), the action is vendored into the repo at.github/actions/supply-chain-lint/— a verbatim copy ofswan/supply-chain-lintfromswan-bitcoin/actions@63912e4(action.yml,supply-chain-lint.sh, built-in allowlist). It is a self-contained bash composite with no transitiveuses:refs, so the copy has no external references to pin. The workflow checks out the repo (SHA-pinnedactions/checkout) and runs the local action.The scanner deliberately skips
.github/, and this repo's vendored actions all live there — so the lint scans 0 files today and passes as a no-op (verified locally). It acts as a tripwire for any vendored action added outside.github/later.Verification
Ran the vendored script locally against the branch worktree:
Scanning 0 files... No supply chain violations found.Thegate:supply-chain-lintcheck inrepo-security-lintgreps workflows for the action ref — this workflow satisfies it; the next weekly fleet sweep will confirm.Pre-existing issue (not addressed here)
.github/workflows/dependency-review.ymlon master still references the private mirror (swan-bitcoin/actions/...@master), which cannot resolve from this public repo — it fails at workflow-prep on every PR (all runs since 2026-06-26 failed with zero jobs). It needs the same public-repo treatment (SHA-pinned upstreamactions/dependency-review-action; theanalyze-dependency-changesjob has transitive mirror refs — PSEC-4907 precedent). Tracked in PSEC-5231's Linear thread.🤖 Generated with Claude Code