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[WIP] Remediate selected batch of 13 units
Remediate reachable critical batch: command injection, SSRF/TLS, secret exposure, PII leakage, and x/text CVE
Jun 22, 2026
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This PR addresses the selected reachable security batch (13 units) across AI/CVE/CWE/DLP/secret families in production handlers, including upgrading
golang.org/x/textfrom a vulnerable version and hardening multiple request-to-sink paths.Dependency remediation (CVE)
golang.org/x/textfromv0.3.7tov0.3.8ingo.mod/go.sum.Command execution hardening (CWE-78 / taint-to-exec)
DiagnosticPingnow validateshostand executespingwith fixed argv (exec.Command("ping", "-c", "1", host)), removing shell invocation.Outbound fetch controls (CWE-918 / CWE-319 / error disclosure)
FetchToolnow enforces URL parsing,httpsscheme, hostname validation, and allowlisted destinations.AI endpoint data-flow hardening (AI family + error disclosure)
question/task.PII and secret exposure remediation (DLP + secret)
SupportExport.CloudTokensno longer returns credential material from env; it returns only configuration state (configured/not-configured).Example of the command-injection remediation pattern now used: