A session in Claudux is an interactive shell as the user the service runs as, with a Claude Code account token attached. Anyone who reaches a session can run commands on that machine. Treat access to the interface as access to the account it runs under.

Please report through GitHub's Report a vulnerability button on the Security tab of the repository, which opens a private advisory. Public issues are the wrong place for anything that gives access to a shell.

Expect an answer within a week. This is a spare-time project, so there is no fix deadline to promise — what you will get is a decision, and credit in the advisory unless you would rather not have it.

• Getting past the login: reaching /api/*, the static files or the terminal WebSocket without a valid session
• Account tokens leaking out of ~/.claudux/accounts.json, the token handoff files or a session's screen
• Command injection through project paths, session names or file paths
• Cross-site requests that a browser sends with the user's cookie

• An installation running with AUTH_ENABLED=false. That switch says the network in front of it authenticates instead; without such a layer, Claudux is open by configuration, not by defect.
• Whatever a signed-in user does. They already have a shell.
• The window before the first password is set. A fresh installation is claimed by its first caller, and it listens on every interface, which is why the README says to sign in before anything else reaches the port.

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