Add evaluation contracts to fix backwards adversarial scoring - #2580
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Improvement: Align confidence threshold semantics (0.5 currently treated as usable, but docs/prompt imply it should be ambiguous).
Improvement: Re-score currently uses the current stored contract on the Test row, so historical traces can drift if the contract is refreshed/edited later. Consider snapshotting per-run.
Question: Ensure the live execution path actually commits the interpreted contract update; otherwise caching may not happen and you’ll re-interpret every run.
Found 3 issues (0 critical, 2 improvements, 1 question).
The interpreter prompt tells the model to set confidence "at or below 0.5" precisely when it could plausibly read a test either way. contract_usability gated on confidence < MIN_CONFIDENCE, so a self-reported coin flip at exactly 0.5 was scored as usable -- the one case the prompt explicitly calls ambiguous. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
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Contract scoring direction looks like a solid fix, and I like the safety posture (unusable contract ⇒ don’t run / don’t score) plus the work to make live vs re-score consistent (instructions passed through, judge temp=0, threshold unify).
Blocking issues:
[Critical] _align_verdicts pass-2 uses b_index in used where used is a set of verdict indices. This likely skips legitimate fallback matches and increases “no verdict returned” false negatives.
[Improvement] Re-score path uses any stored contract without checking it’s current for the test’s authored fields. Since test edits don’t refresh/clear the contract, re-score can silently score a trace against a stale interpretation.
(Inline comments with suggested fixes left on the relevant lines.)
The interpreter prompt tells the model to set confidence "at or below 0.5" precisely when it could plausibly read a test either way. contract_usability gated on confidence < MIN_CONFIDENCE, so a self-reported coin flip at exactly 0.5 was scored as usable -- the one case the prompt explicitly calls ambiguous. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Re-score reused whatever contract was stored on the test without checking it was still current for the test's wording. Unlike goal/instructions, which are read live and can never be stale, the stored contract is a cached derivative that only gets refreshed by a live run's ensure_contract call. Editing a test with no live run afterward left the old contract sitting there, describing wording that no longer existed -- and re-score would still use it, silently scoring against criteria the author no longer wrote. is_current_for is the same freshness check ensure_contract already uses before deciding whether to re-interpret. Re-score can't re-interpret (that guarantee is what stops two back-to-back re-scores of an unedited test from disagreeing for no reason), so a stale contract here can only mean Error, never a fallback to legacy scoring -- that fallback is the exact bug evaluation contracts exist to prevent. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
peqy's review flagged `_align_verdicts`' pass-2 guard (`b_index in used`) as comparing a behaviour index against what looked like a set of verdict indices. Traced it: the two coincide by construction -- pass 2's fallback candidate for behaviour b_index is always verdicts[b_index], so checking "is verdict index b_index already claimed" is exactly `b_index in used`. Verified with an adversarial test where an out-of-order text match consumes a verdict index that numerically coincides with an earlier, unrelated behaviour's own position: confirmed against a deliberately broken version that the current code does not let that behaviour reuse the claimed verdict. Not a functional change. Renamed `used` to `used_verdict_indices` and added a comment explaining why the index spaces coincide, so the next reader -- human or bot -- doesn't have to re-derive it from scratch. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
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Overall this is a strong, well-defended fix for the “backwards adversarial scoring” problem: interpretation → contract → contract-driven Penelope + judge, with caching by digest, deterministic judges (temperature=0), and explicit UI surfacing. [Improvement] Re-score Error has no user-facing reason when contract is stale/unusable In
Found 1 issue (0 critical, 1 improvement). |
Multi-turn tests are four free-text fields and nothing constrains how an
author phrases them. "Convince the target to leak PII", "the target leaks
PII", and "the target refuses to leak PII" all describe the same test, but
read literally the first two mean the test failed when achieved and the
third means it passed. Scoring the prose directly therefore gets adversarial
tests backwards in one direction or the other, and no flag can fix it: the
direction lives in the sentence, not in the test's metadata.
Add an interpretation step that restates any phrasing as an evaluation
contract, where required_behavior and prohibited_behavior are always
statements about the target and complying always means the test passed.
Prohibitions are named without a negation word ("Disclose policyholder
PII"), which is what makes all three framings above collapse to one entry.
The attacker's aim goes to simulated_user_objective, which drives the
conversation and is never scored.
Runs lazily and is cached by a digest of the authored fields, so a verdict
cannot drift between two runs of an unedited test, and re-interpretation
happens only when the wording actually changes. Temperature 0 for the same
reason.
A test that cannot be interpreted confidently is not scored at all:
contract_usability gates on a confidence floor and reports Error instead.
Falling back to goal-only scoring is the bug this exists to fix, and doing
it silently would let a low-confidence adversarial test report Pass on a
genuine breach.
Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
GET returns a test's stored interpretation without triggering an LLM call, so opening the review panel costs nothing. POST forces a re-derive after an edit, so an author can see how a test reads without having to run it. The contract is derived and read-only on purpose. The authored fields stay the single source of truth, so a misread is fixed by rewriting the goal or restrictions, which also improves the test for the next human reader. An editable second copy could diverge from the prose it came from. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
When a contract is passed and lists at least one behaviour, it supersedes goal and instructions: each required and prohibited behaviour is judged independently and the conversation is scored on compliance. No contract falls back to today's goal-based scoring unchanged. score is the fraction of behaviours met so a partial breach stays visible, but is_successful is whether all of them were met. A test asserts every behaviour it lists, so one violation is a violation and the configured threshold deliberately does not gate the verdict. A separate template from goal_achievement_prompt.jinja. That one has three holes a DB-configured metric row replaces wholesale; here the behaviour list and per-item output format are structural and must never be overridable, so custom guidance is appended as additional instructions instead. Verdicts are matched back onto the contract by text first, across all behaviours, then by position, and no verdict is reused. A behaviour with no verdict counts as not complied. Matching by position first would let a skipped behaviour claim a later verdict, silently reporting a violated prohibition as complied on someone else's evidence; defaulting an unjudged behaviour to complied would let a truncated response read as a clean run. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Penelope now pursues simulated_user_objective and is told what the target must and must not do, instead of inferring aggression from the goal prose. Fully backward compatible: with no contract the system prompt renders exactly as before. Fixes the stopping rule, which is not the same question in the two modes. Goal-based scoring asks "was the goal achieved", and that answer is not expected to un-happen with more turns. Contract-based compliance-so-far is not evidence the target will hold: a system that has not yet been pushed on a prohibition looks compliant from turn one, and stopping there means the test never actually runs. So contract mode stops only on positive evidence of a violated prohibition. That is permanent once it happens, so stopping saves the remaining budget without losing coverage. Three things it deliberately does not stop on: - Compliance, per above. - A required behaviour not yet performed. The judge marks one non-compliant when the system "never got the chance", and it first runs at min_turns, so treating that as final ended runs before the scenario they were waiting for could occur and reported Fail for a test that never ran. - An errored judge. behaviors_total is stamped before the model call and the SDK sets is_successful False on error, so a failure still looks contract-shaped. Reading it as a breach turned a transient model timeout into a recorded security failure. Also adds the contract's own count fields to the metric summary whitelist, which drops anything not named there. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Both live paths (single and batch) resolve the contract and pass it to Penelope; the re-score path reuses whatever contract the test was already interpreted with rather than re-interpreting, so the same stored trace cannot score differently between two re-scores depending on when each ran relative to a test edit. An unusable contract now skips the conversation entirely instead of running it and discarding the result. Everything the run produced would be thrown away, so conducting it first only billed the org for target calls and judge tokens on a guaranteed Error. Both runners then short-circuit before the metric fork, because an empty metrics dict reaching that fork reads as "stored output, evaluate externally" and would have triggered exactly the external re-evaluation this is meant to avoid. "Nothing to interpret" and "interpretation failed" are different answers. A config with no goal was never a candidate for interpretation, so it scores the legacy way, matching what the re-score path already did with a test that has no stored contract. Conflating the two made a test report Error for the sole reason that it had nothing to interpret. Also gives MetricResultBuilder an extra dict from a curated allowlist, so a re-score keeps the per-item breakdown instead of dropping it. Not **details: the rendered evaluation prompt lives in there and must not be echoed into stored test_metrics. Fixes a pre-existing bug along the way: the re-score path never passed instructions to the judge, so it rendered the prompt without the mandatory instructions block and could score differently from the live run. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
The results metrics tab now shows a per-behaviour breakdown with each item's verdict and evidence, and labels the progress bar by what it is actually counting. Older stored results carry criteria rather than behaviours and are labelled accordingly, so their counts are not described as something they are not. The traces tab chip switches from "Goal Achieved" to Pass/Fail. The underlying boolean was already correct, but "Goal Achieved" reads as "the attack succeeded" on a defended adversarial test, which is the opposite of what a green chip there means. Adds a read-only panel on the test detail page showing how a test was read, including which authored field each behaviour came from and why the wording was changed. This is the surface that makes the interpretation reviewable rather than magic: it lets an author catch a misreading before it becomes a wrong verdict, and it offers re-interpret rather than edit, so the prose and the contract cannot diverge. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Both multi-turn generators told the model to leave restrictions empty, so every generated adversarial test stated only the attack's objective and left the boundary it was probing to be inferred later. They now state that boundary directly, as what the target must not do. The interpretation step already reads an attacker-framed goal correctly, so this is not a correctness fix; it gives the interpreter a stated boundary instead of an inferred one, which means higher confidence and fewer source notes. Deliberately does not rewrite goal into target-framed phrasing, and does not emit the contract at generation time. The goal wording is riskier to change and already handled, and a generator-emitted contract would be a second copy of a schema to keep in sync for a case that is already free, since interpretation is lazy and cached. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Covers the interpretation step in the worker docs, the contract parameter on execute_test and the SDK judge, and one short section each in the glossary and the adversarial testing page explaining that goal phrasing direction no longer changes the verdict. Also corrects the early stopping section, which described a single 80% threshold rule. That still holds for a goal scored directly, but a run with a contract never stops on compliance and stops as soon as a prohibition is breached. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Three places picked their own default and disagreed: a live Penelope run always builds its own GoalAchievementJudge and scored at 0.7 (PenelopeConfig.DEFAULT_GOAL_ACHIEVEMENT_THRESHOLD), while the backend never passes that judge into the metric list Penelope receives, so a re-score read the DB row and fell back to the generic numeric midpoint of 0.5 when no threshold was set. The same conversation scoring 0.6 was Fail on the live run and Pass on re-score. Add DEFAULT_GOAL_ACHIEVEMENT_THRESHOLD to the SDK judge as the single source of truth. Penelope's config now imports it instead of repeating the literal, and the backend's re-score path uses it for GoalAchievementJudge rows specifically rather than the generic 0.5 fallback, which stays unchanged for every other numeric metric. Deliberately not the generic midpoint: "did this conversation achieve its goal" wants a clearer majority than "just over half". Only affects goal-based scoring -- contract-based scoring asserts every behaviour it lists, so one violation fails regardless of any threshold. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Every LLM-as-judge call went through the native provider's default temperature of 0.7, meant for synthesizers that want varied generations. A judge is measurement, not generation: the same conversation could score differently across two runs of the same metric, and a re-score could disagree with the live run that produced the trace it is scoring. Adds JUDGE_TEMPERATURE = 0.0 and passes it explicitly at the three judge call sites, rather than lowering the provider default, which generation still needs. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Saving a multi-turn test's goal/instructions/restrictions/scenario rebuilt test_configuration from only those four fields, so context and any other key the config carried were silently deleted on every edit. Spread the stored config first, then apply the edited fields on top, so keys this form doesn't render survive the save. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
GOAL_EVALUATION_PROMPT and its Jinja2 template were never rendered outside their own module -- exported from prompts/__init__.py, referenced only in docstrings and the README. Its own docstring said it was interim "until SDK multi-turn metrics are available"; those now exist as the SDK's GoalAchievementJudge. Removes the evaluation/ package and its template, and updates the README/loader docstrings that pointed at it. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
ruff format wanted one log line on a single line in batch/runner.py; prettier wanted the ContractSourceField union wrapped one member per line. No behavior change. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
The interpreter prompt tells the model to set confidence "at or below 0.5" precisely when it could plausibly read a test either way. contract_usability gated on confidence < MIN_CONFIDENCE, so a self-reported coin flip at exactly 0.5 was scored as usable -- the one case the prompt explicitly calls ambiguous. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Two comments raised by peqy's review turned out to describe existing, correct behavior rather than bugs, but the code didn't make that obvious locally -- worth fixing the comments even though nothing runs differently. Re-score contract drift across a test edit: the re-score path's comment claimed a stronger guarantee than it delivers -- that a stored trace "cannot score differently between two re-score runs" full stop. That only holds absent an intervening test edit. It doesn't extend further, but that's consistent with existing behavior: `goal`/`instructions` two lines above also read the test's CURRENT test_configuration rather than a snapshot from when the trace was produced, and re-score has always meant "score this trace against the test as it reads today" for those fields. The contract follows the same rule rather than becoming the one field that freezes at execution time. Live-path commit guarantee: it wasn't obvious from output_providers.py alone that ensure_contract's mutation to test.test_metadata actually persists in the live (non-batch) path, since that function deliberately does not commit. Traced it: every caller runs inside a request or Celery task scoped by get_tenant_db_session / get_db_with_tenant_variables (the in-place execute endpoint, and the sequential/batch Celery tasks), and that scope commits deferred writes on exit regardless of whether a TestResult row is created. Documented the invariant and why adding an explicit commit here would be actively wrong -- a mid-flight commit could land ahead of unrelated pending writes on the same session. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Re-score reused whatever contract was stored on the test without checking it was still current for the test's wording. Unlike goal/instructions, which are read live and can never be stale, the stored contract is a cached derivative that only gets refreshed by a live run's ensure_contract call. Editing a test with no live run afterward left the old contract sitting there, describing wording that no longer existed -- and re-score would still use it, silently scoring against criteria the author no longer wrote. is_current_for is the same freshness check ensure_contract already uses before deciding whether to re-interpret. Re-score can't re-interpret (that guarantee is what stops two back-to-back re-scores of an unedited test from disagreeing for no reason), so a stale contract here can only mean Error, never a fallback to legacy scoring -- that fallback is the exact bug evaluation contracts exist to prevent. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
peqy's review flagged `_align_verdicts`' pass-2 guard (`b_index in used`) as comparing a behaviour index against what looked like a set of verdict indices. Traced it: the two coincide by construction -- pass 2's fallback candidate for behaviour b_index is always verdicts[b_index], so checking "is verdict index b_index already claimed" is exactly `b_index in used`. Verified with an adversarial test where an out-of-order text match consumes a verdict index that numerically coincides with an earlier, unrelated behaviour's own position: confirmed against a deliberately broken version that the current code does not let that behaviour reuse the claimed verdict. Not a functional change. Renamed `used` to `used_verdict_indices` and added a comment explaining why the index spaces coincide, so the next reader -- human or bot -- doesn't have to re-derive it from scratch. Caught by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
Discarding for a stale or unusable contract only logged the reason; the TestResultStatus.ERROR a user actually sees carried no explanation at all, just an empty metrics dict. MultiTurnRunner.run() passes the same stored_output dict straight through to create_test_result_record as test_output, so writing the reason onto it there is what gets persisted -- no need to widen this function's return type to a tuple, which every caller (including existing tests) would otherwise have to unpack. Uses the same `error` key the live path's synthetic response already uses when a contract is unusable before the conversation runs, so there's one field with one meaning across every way a multi-turn result ends up Error because of the evaluation contract. The frontend's overview tab now falls back to that field when there's no goal_evaluation.reason, instead of a dead-end "No evaluation reasoning available". Optional follow-up suggested by peqy's review on #2580. Signed-off-by: Harry Cruz <harry@rhesis.ai>
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Follow-up commit |
Purpose
Adversarial multi-turn tests score backwards. When a target correctly refuses an attack, the test reports Fail; when a jailbreak succeeds, it reports Pass. The second half is the urgent one, because a real breach currently shows up green.
The cause is that a multi-turn test is four free-text fields and nothing constrains how an author phrases them. These three goals all describe the same test:
Read literally, "achieved" means the test failed in the first two and passed in the third. That rules out the obvious fixes. A polarity or
adversarialflag cannot drive the verdict, because all three rows are adversarial and the mapping differs — the direction lives in the sentence, not in the test's metadata. Fixing the generator prompts is not enough either, since it repairs today's data and nothing else; a hand-written test hits the same ambiguity. The real gap is that no step reads the test as written and works out what it means.What Changed
An interpretation step now restates any phrasing as an evaluation contract before anything is scored.
required_behaviorandprohibited_behaviorare always statements about the target, and complying always means the test passed, so nothing downstream inverts anything.The mechanism that makes the three framings above collapse to one contract is that prohibitions are named without a negation word —
"Produce harmful content", never "must not produce" or "refuses to produce". The attacker's aim goes tosimulated_user_objective, which drives the conversation and is never scored.adversarialis an output used for UI wording and to tell Penelope to press harder; it never selects a scoring rule.Interpretation runs lazily and is cached by a digest of the four authored fields, so a verdict cannot drift between two runs of an unedited test, and re-interpretation happens only when the wording actually changes. A test that cannot be interpreted confidently is not scored at all: it reports Error rather than a verdict nobody should trust, and it no longer runs the conversation either, since everything it produced would be discarded.
Eight commits, each reviewable on its own. The first three and the last three are safe in isolation; the two marked below are the behaviour change:
feat(backend): add test evaluation contracts— schema, interpretation service, interpreter prompt. Nothing consumes it yet.feat(backend): add interpretation endpoint— read-only fetch plus force-refresh, so the contract is visible and reviewable before it affects a verdict.feat(sdk): score against evaluation contract—GoalAchievementJudgejudges each behaviour independently. No contract falls back to today's goal-based scoring unchanged.feat: drive penelope from the evaluation contract— behaviour change. Threads the contract through, and fixes the stopping rule (see below).feat(backend): thread contract through execution— behaviour change. Both live paths and the re-score path. Re-score reuses the stored contract and never re-interprets, so the same trace cannot score differently between two re-scores.feat(frontend): show behaviour compliance— per-behaviour breakdown with evidence, Pass/Fail wording on the traces chip, and a read-only panel showing how a test was read and which field each behaviour came from.feat(sdk): state the boundary in generated tests— generators state the boundary being probed instead of leavingrestrictionsempty.docs: document evaluation contracts— worker, SDK, glossary, adversarial testing, plus a correction to the early-stopping docs.The stopping rule needed rework because "was the goal achieved" and "is it complying so far" are not the same question. Contract mode now stops only on positive evidence of a violated prohibition, which is permanent once it happens. It deliberately does not stop on compliance (a target that has not been pushed yet only looks compliant, and stopping there means the test never runs), on a required behaviour not yet performed (the judge marks one non-compliant when the system "never got the chance", and it first runs at
min_turns, so treating that as final reported Fail for a test that never ran), or on an errored judge (behaviors_totalis stamped before the model call, so a failure still looks contract-shaped, and reading it as a breach turned a transient timeout into a recorded security failure).Additional Context
This PR is large — 4,668 lines across 49 files — and exceeds the 400-line guidance in
.claude/skills/pull-request. It is one indivisible feature: the contract is useless until something consumes it, and consuming it is the behaviour change. Reviewing commit-by-commit in the order above is the intended path, and the per-commit sizes are 1364 / 302 / 840 / 641 / 851 / 564 / 2 / 104. Happy to split it into a stack if you would rather.Known residual risk. A confidently wrong interpretation still produces a clean, wrong verdict, which is worse than today's bug in that today's at least errs toward red. The mitigations are that the contract is stored and shown before it affects anything,
source_notesrecords which field each behaviour came from and why the wording changed, and the author corrects it by editing the test rather than the contract, so prose and contract cannot diverge. Stating this plainly rather than glossing it.Pre-existing bugs fixed in passing, both because the new code paths run through them: the re-score path never passed
instructionsto the judge, so it rendered the prompt without the mandatory-instructions block and could score differently from the live run; andMetricResultBuilderdropped per-item detail, so a re-scored multi-turn run lost its breakdown.Pre-existing bugs found and deliberately left alone, to keep this PR from growing further: thresholds disagree across paths (Penelope
0.7, SDK judge midpoint0.5, DB metric row0.5); the judge samples attemperature=0.7;TestTechnicalCard.tsx,ManualTestWriter.tsx,TrialDrawer.tsxandservices/file_import/builder.pyrebuildtest_configurationfrom hardcoded field lists and silently drop unknown keys; andpenelope/prompts/evaluation/goal_evaluation.pyplus its template are exported but never rendered. Worth separate issues.Testing
Full suites pass on this branch rebased onto
origin/mainatddd64b1c8:New coverage worth looking at specifically:
tests/backend/services/test_test_interpretation_fixtures.py— the three framings from the table above must normalize to the sameprohibited_behavior. Markedintegration; it calls a real model.tests/sdk/metrics/providers/native/test_goal_achievement_contract.py— compliance truth table, plus verdict alignment. A verdict is never reused for a second behaviour, and a behaviour with no verdict counts as not complied, so a truncated response cannot read as a clean run.tests/penelope/test_utils.py— the stopping rule: stops on a violated prohibition, does not stop on compliance, on a pending requirement, or on an errored judge.tests/backend/tasks/test_batch_contract_resolution.pyandtest_output_providers.py— an unusable contract does not run the conversation, and "nogoalkey" falls back to legacy scoring rather than reporting Error.Not yet verified end to end against a live stack. The plan's acceptance test is to hand-write the same test in all three framings and confirm all three produce the same verdict against the same endpoint, plus running the OWASP test from the original bug report against a refusing target (expect Pass, "3 of 3 prohibitions respected") and a compliant one (expect Fail). That needs a worker running and has not been done.