KubeClaw is a prototype and a learning project. It has not been security reviewed or audited, and it carries no assurance of any kind. The security model documented on the site describes what the design intends to achieve — treat it as a statement of intent, not a guarantee.

Do not deploy KubeClaw to handle production traffic, real credentials, or third-party data. Assume gaps exist, because they almost certainly do.

None, in the usual sense. There is no maintained release line and no backported fixes. Only main receives changes.

Because this is a prototype rather than deployed software, most findings are best filed as public issues — they are more useful as shared learning than as private disclosures.

Open an issue at github.com/projectious-work/kubeclaw/issues.

If a finding genuinely warrants private handling — for example, it affects someone who has already deployed this, or it involves a leaked credential in the repository history — email bnaard@gmx.net instead.

Please include:

• What the weakness is and where (file, variable, playbook, or template).
• How it could be exploited, concretely.
• Which assumption in the documented design it breaks.

There is no bounty and no guaranteed response time. This is a personal project maintained in spare time.

These are understood and intentional at this stage — reporting them is not necessary, though improving them is welcome:

• Kubernetes firewall rules are deliberately absent. Ports 6443, 10250, 2379–2380, and 30000–32767 are excluded from the Hetzner firewall until the cluster deployment is automated.
• Auto-generated SSH keys live in OpenTofu state. State files therefore contain private keys and must be protected. Custom keys avoid this.
• The root password is set through cloud-init and appears in cloud-init logs on the node. It exists only for emergency web-console access.
• The admin node accepts SSH from anywhere while enabled. It is intended to be temporary — disable it with enable_admin_node = false once the Cloudflare Tunnel works.
• Egress policies are documented but not yet automated. The Cilium FQDN policies live in the deployment guides rather than in applied manifests.
• NAT64 relies on third-party gateways. The default DNS64 resolvers are public services from nat64.net; traffic to IPv4-only destinations transits infrastructure this project does not control.

terraform.tfvars, .aibox-home/, and generated SSH material are gitignored and must never be committed. If you believe a secret has been committed, report it privately using the email above.