Please email hunterjsb@gmail.com with the subject line SECURITY: pmt. Do not open a public GitHub issue for vulnerabilities. Encrypt sensitive report content if possible.

You can expect:

• Acknowledgement within 72 hours.
• An initial assessment within 7 days.
• A fix-or-mitigation plan communicated back to you before any public disclosure.

The pmt monorepo ships three deployable components. Different threat models apply to each:

In scope:

• JWT validation bypass or forgery against the /clob, /gamma, /chain, or /clob/ws/{channel} routes.
• Tenant-rate-limit bypass (per-tenant or system-wide).
• Header smuggling that lets a client forge Polymarket auth (e.g. injecting POLY_* headers that bypass our forwarding policy).
• JWKS-cache poisoning or amplification attacks.
• Request body / response body injection.
• DoS attacks that don't require holding a valid JWT (cost-amplification).

Out of scope for now (documented gaps, not vulnerabilities):

• The /chain/* route forwards arbitrary JSON-RPC bodies to the upstream Polygon RPC. Method allowlisting is not implemented; the route assumes the holder of a valid JWT is trusted (today: single-tenant).
• WebSocket connections are rate-limited at upgrade time only; frames sent after a successful upgrade are not metered.

In scope:

• Credential leakage from PolymarketAPI (private key, Cognito credentials, cached CLOB API creds at ~/.cache/pmt/).
• Order-flow vulnerabilities (price/size manipulation through the CLI's argument parsing, particularly pmt buy/sell).

Out of scope:

• Use of a hot wallet private key in .env is a known operational pattern; rotate frequently.

The control plane binds 127.0.0.1:7531 by default and is not intended to be exposed beyond localhost. Reports against the engine assume it is listening on a routable interface.

Older versions are not patched. Subscribe to GitHub releases for upgrade notifications.