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feat: add control OSPS-BR-07 for secrets management - #373
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| guideline-mappings: | ||
| - reference-id: BPB | ||
| identifiers: | ||
| - S-B-5 # TODO: is this the right numbering for https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/criteria#0.no_leaked_credentials |
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Also, we have an outstanding action item to go back through all of the BPB identifiers to make them match the origin ID instead of the custom format
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Thinking about this a little more, I don't think "Quality" is the right section. That's described as:
I can see an argument for that, but I don't think it's the most apt. There's no perfect fit for this one, but I'd say "Access Control" is probably the closest?
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I waivered between those two as well. Thinking of projects implementing gitleaks style pre-commit and the like feels like a process quality issue, whereas deciding whether to manage secrets and credentials and if so, where, how, etc feels like a mix of AC and QA categories. |
evankanderson
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Should this be in Build & Release, since that is where most of the secrets are used?
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This change adds a new control to the Build & Release control family that focuses on secure handling and storage of project secrets. This change closes ossf#352 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
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evankanderson
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The recommendation of manual audits for secrets in commit history seems a bit strong for level 1, but I'm reading it as a best practice rather than a requirement.
Co-authored-by: Evan Anderson <evan.k.anderson@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Evan Anderson <evan.k.anderson@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
My intention there was to point out that pre-commit checks are helpful but insufficient and that adding scheduled, automated checks via GHA and likely using the same tool used in pre-commit (gitleaks or similar) If you read "manual" as implied we should probably copy edit a bit more. |
"Periodically audit" suggested a process which was at least partially manual. (Also, what happens if the audit flags a credential? There isn't explicit guidance here, and I can imagine folks trying to expunge content from history, which would be... not great.) I guess my main concern was requiring an audit process and answering the "leaked credentials" question seem like a higher bar than the rest of the level 1 criteria (and harder to measure). |
Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
evankanderson
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I'm happy with this as-is, just adding thoughts to see what others are thinking.
| applicability: | ||
| - Maturity Level 3 | ||
| recommendation: | | ||
| Document how secrets and credentials are managed and used within the project. This should include details on how secrets are stored (e.g., using a secrets management tool), how access is controlled, and how secrets are rotated or updated. Ensure that sensitive information is not hard-coded in the source code or stored in version control systems. |
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Thinking about the removal of audit guidance from BR-07.01 (which I agree with), I wonder whether we should say something here about "credentials where are suspected to have been compromised or leaked should be rotated promptly".
That may be too much detail, but I'm playing back the previous conversations, and I'm wondering if I lost some good in an attempt to broaden accessibility.
This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com>
* feat: add support for BR-07.01 and BR-07.02 This change adds support for the newly proposed controls for secrets management within the project. BR-07.01 is fully implemented and BR-07.02 is stubbed out This change relates to the work in ossf/security-baseline#373 Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com> * Update evaluation_plans/osps/build_release/evaluations.go Co-authored-by: Jason Meridth <35014+jmeridth@users.noreply.github.com> * Update data/security-posture.go Co-authored-by: Jason Meridth <35014+jmeridth@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Travis Truman <trumant@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Jason Meridth <35014+jmeridth@users.noreply.github.com>
This change adds a new control to the Build & Release control family that focuses on secure handling and storage of project secrets.
This change closes #352