feat(control): remote-control policy — gate high-risk actions from remote callers#114
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…mote callers
src/control/policy.ts: ControlPolicy { remoteControl (default true), remoteAdoptExternal (default false) }, persisted to ~/.lisa/control-policy.json, loopback-settable.
server: GET/POST /api/control/policy (POST is loopback-only); a denyRemote() gate on managed start/send/cancel/approve, pty start (+ resumeSessionId ⇒ adoptExternal), pty send/cancel/output/stream, and signal cancel. The Mac owner (loopback) is never gated.
Net effect: a phone (token) can see + control LISA's OWN agents by default, but cannot adopt the user's EXTERNAL sessions until the Mac owner opts in.
Verified: typecheck + build clean; 733 tests pass; live-checked the 403s from a non-loopback LAN IP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
Closes the security gap from #113's follow-ups: a phone holding a valid token could call every control endpoint, including adopting the user's real
claudesessions. This adds a second authorization axis — a Mac-side policy that gates high-risk control actions from remote (non-loopback) callers. The local user (loopback) is never gated.src/control/policy.ts—ControlPolicy:remoteControl(default true) — a remote may control LISA's own agents (managed/pty: start/send/cancel/approve). Lower-risk, LISA-owned.remoteAdoptExternal(default false) — a remote may adopt the user's external sessions (pty/startwithresumeSessionId, i.e.claude --resume). Touches a real transcript → off until the Mac owner opts in.Persisted to
~/.lisa/control-policy.json; tolerant of missing/corrupt files.How
GET /api/control/policy(any authed caller) reports it;POST /api/control/policysets it but only from localhost (like the API-key save).denyRemote(need)helper (loopback ⇒ allow; else consult policy) writes the 403 and short-circuits. Applied to: managedstart/send/cancel/approve; ptystart(→adoptExternalwhenresumeSessionIdis present, elsecontrol),send,cancel,output,stream; andsignalcancel (list stays open — it's telemetry).Verification
npm run typecheck+npm run buildclean; 733 tests / 732 pass / 1 skip / 0 fail (new: 5 policy unit tests).--host 0.0.0.0+ token):GET policy→{remoteControl:true, remoteAdoptExternal:false}POST policyfrom remote → 403; from loopback → 200remoteControl:false: managed/start from remote → 403Follow-ups (unchanged from #113)
Next in queue: roster de-dup (resume-adopt vs claude-code observer) + gated
/api/dispatch/statuslog tail; then the iOS-facing backend (pairing/devices/push) and PWA polish. The native SwiftUI app (ActivityKit/WidgetKit/APNs) will be scaffolded but can't be compiled/verified in this repo.🤖 Generated with Claude Code