test(ksef): de-flake aes-cipher wrong-key spec

libs/integrations/ksef/src/infrastructure/crypto/__tests__/aes-cipher.spec.ts

@@ -31,9 +31,27 @@ describe('aes-cipher', () => {
     expect(() => encryptAesCbc('x', key, new Uint8Array(8))).toThrow(KsefSessionCryptoException);
   });
 
-  it('should throw KsefSessionCryptoException when decrypting with the wrong key', () => {
-    const ciphertext = encryptAesCbc('secret', key, iv);
+  it('should never recover the plaintext when decrypting with the wrong key', () => {
+    // CBC has no key verification: a wrong key usually fails PKCS#7 padding
+    // validation (throws), but ~0.4% of random keys yield accidentally valid
+    // padding and return garbage instead. Both outcomes are legal (#1538).
+    const plaintext = 'secret';
+    const ciphertext = encryptAesCbc(plaintext, key, iv);
     const wrongKey = new Uint8Array(randomBytes(KSEF_AES_KEY_BYTES));
-    expect(() => decryptAesCbc(ciphertext, wrongKey, iv)).toThrow(KsefSessionCryptoException);
+    let result: string | undefined;
+    try {
+      result = decryptAesCbc(ciphertext, wrongKey, iv);
+    } catch (err) {
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(KsefSessionCryptoException);
+      return;
+    }
+    expect(result).not.toBe(plaintext);
+  });
+
+  it('should throw KsefSessionCryptoException when the ciphertext length is not a multiple of the block size', () => {
+    // decipher.final() always throws on a truncated ciphertext, so this covers
+    // the wrapping path of decryptAesCbc deterministically.
+    const truncated = encryptAesCbc('secret', key, iv).slice(0, -1);
+    expect(() => decryptAesCbc(truncated, key, iv)).toThrow(KsefSessionCryptoException);
   });
 });