Drop /redirect-to self-host validation - #9
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… every HTTP client's max_redirects
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The self-host check was cargo-cult. A recursive `/redirect-to → /redirect-to` chain is bounded by every HTTP client's max_redirects setting (Guzzle 5, curl 50, browsers ~20), so the rule prevented no real abuse — just made the endpoint less useful for testing same-host redirect behavior. Scheme allowlist (http/https) and the `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow` response header stay; those carry their weight.