fix(chat): render inline base64 data-URI images from omni model responses

static/js/markdown.js

@@ -36,8 +36,20 @@ function linkHtml(text, url) {
   return `<a href="${escapeHtml(safeUrl)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">${safeText}</a>`;
 }
 
+// Strict inline-image data URI: raster formats only (no SVG, which can carry
+// script), base64 payload only — no quotes, angle brackets, or nested URLs —
+// so the value is inert as an <img src>. Omni backends (e.g. Lemonade) return
+// generated images embedded in the assistant text as
+// ![generated image](data:image/png;base64,...). Same shape chatRenderer.js
+// accepts for tool screenshots and display images.
+const SAFE_DATA_IMAGE_RE = /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp);base64,[a-z0-9+/=\s]+$/i;
+
 function imageHtml(alt, url, title) {
-  const safeUrl = safeLinkUrl(url);
+  let safeUrl = safeLinkUrl(url);
+  if (!safeUrl) {
+    const raw = String(url || '').trim();
+    if (SAFE_DATA_IMAGE_RE.test(raw)) safeUrl = raw;
+  }
   if (!safeUrl || safeUrl.startsWith('#')) return escapeHtml(alt || '');
   const safeAlt = escapeHtml(alt || '');
   const safeTitle = title ? ` title="${escapeHtml(title)}"` : '';
@@ -124,6 +136,14 @@ function _cleanAllowedHtmlOnce(htmlString) {
       // Neutralize javascript:/vbscript:/data: in URL-bearing attributes.
       // Strip control/space chars first so e.g. "java\tscript:" can't slip by.
       if (_ALLOWED_HTML_URL_ATTRS.has(name)) {
+        // Exception: <img src> may carry the strict base64 raster data URI
+        // that imageHtml emits for inline generated images (omni models).
+        // The anchored regex admits no SVG, no quotes/brackets, base64
+        // payload chars only, so the value stays inert across re-parses.
+        if (name === 'src' && el.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'IMG'
+            && SAFE_DATA_IMAGE_RE.test(attr.value)) {
+          continue;
+        }
         if (name === 'srcset' ? _isDangerousSrcset(attr.value) : _isDangerousUrl(attr.value)) {
           el.removeAttribute(attr.name);
         }

tests/test_markdown_dom_xss_helpers.py

@@ -36,3 +36,18 @@ def test_email_rich_body_render_path_reuses_raw_html_sanitizer():
     assert "sanitizeAllowedHtml," in markdown_src
     assert "markdownModule.sanitizeAllowedHtml(t)" in email_body_helper
     assert "return t;" not in email_body_helper
+
+
+def test_markdown_raw_html_sanitizer_img_data_uri_exception_is_strict():
+    """The <img src> exception for inline generated images (issue #5436) must
+    stay anchored to the base64 raster form and must not weaken the general
+    data:/javascript: strip for every other URL-bearing attribute."""
+    src = (_REPO / "static" / "js" / "markdown.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    # Strict pattern: raster formats only (no SVG), base64 payload chars only.
+    assert r"/^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp);base64,[a-z0-9+/=\s]+$/i" in src
+    # Exception is scoped to src on IMG elements and the anchored pattern.
+    assert "name === 'src' && el.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'IMG'" in src
+    assert "SAFE_DATA_IMAGE_RE.test(attr.value)" in src
+    # The general scrub for all other URL-bearing attributes is unchanged.
+    assert "name === 'srcset' ? _isDangerousSrcset(attr.value) : _isDangerousUrl(attr.value)" in src

tests/test_markdown_rendering_js.py

@@ -256,3 +256,56 @@ def test_dotted_python_import_paths_are_not_autolinked(node_available):
     assert 'href="https://imblearn.com' not in html
     assert 'href="https://sklearn.me' not in html
     assert 'href="https://example.com/docs"' in html
+
+
+# 1x1 transparent PNG — the smallest valid base64 raster payload.
+_TINY_PNG_B64 = (
+    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mP8"
+    "z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+)
+
+
+def test_inline_data_uri_image_renders_as_img(node_available):
+    # Omni backends (e.g. Lemonade Server) embed generated images in the
+    # assistant text as ![generated image](data:image/png;base64,...). The
+    # image pass used to reject every data: URL, so the user saw only the
+    # literal alt text "generated image" (issue #5436).
+    html = _run_markdown_case(
+        f"Here you go:\n\n![generated image](data:image/png;base64,{_TINY_PNG_B64})"
+    )
+
+    assert f'<img src="data:image/png;base64,{_TINY_PNG_B64}"' in html
+    assert 'alt="generated image"' in html
+    assert ">generated image<" not in html
+
+
+def test_svg_data_uri_image_stays_alt_text(node_available):
+    # SVG can carry script — never allowed inline, even as an image.
+    html = _run_markdown_case(
+        "![generated image]()"
+    )
+
+    assert "<img" not in html
+    assert "generated image" in html
+
+
+def test_non_image_data_uri_stays_alt_text(node_available):
+    html = _run_markdown_case("![payload](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD4=)")
+
+    assert "<img" not in html
+    assert "payload" in html
+
+
+def test_javascript_url_image_stays_alt_text(node_available):
+    html = _run_markdown_case("![click](javascript:alert(1))")
+
+    assert "<img" not in html
+    assert "javascript:" not in html
+    assert "click" in html
+
+
+def test_http_image_still_renders(node_available):
+    html = _run_markdown_case("![photo](https://example.com/a.png)")
+
+    assert '<img src="https://example.com/a.png"' in html
+    assert 'alt="photo"' in html