fix: credit no-token exec (FG-001) and author-association guards (FG-016)#24
Merged
Merged
Conversation
…016)
Two more mitigation-aware downgrades, from prt-hunt triage false positives:
- FG-001 Pwn Request: when the job executing fork code has empty
permissions (`permissions: {}` — no GITHUB_TOKEN) AND references no
secrets, fork code runs but there's nothing to exfiltrate, so it isn't
a secret-stealing pwn request. Downgrade to info. (Self-hosted host
risk, if any, is still covered by FG-009.) Jobs with a scoped token
(e.g. pull-requests: write) are unaffected and stay elevated.
- FG-016 Local Action After Untrusted Checkout: when the job's `if:`
restricts execution to trusted authors (MEMBER/OWNER/COLLABORATOR) or
excludes forks, an external fork can't reach the local action.
Downgrade to info. Also teach hasAuthorAssociationGuard the
`contains(fromJSON('["MEMBER",...]'), author_association)` allowlist idiom.
Verified on the source repos: ionos-cloud/cluster-api-provider-proxmox
FG-001 (permissions:{} + pre-screen) and redwoodjs/agent-ci FG-016
(author-association gate) drop critical -> info, while real findings
(Dev-Card scoped-token pwn, Letta self-hosted, msviderok compromised
action) stay critical.
FG-022 was left unchanged: it correctly flags a real compromised action
(actions-cool/issues-helper, May 2026 campaign) even when SHA-pinned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Two mitigation-aware downgrades surfaced by triaging the targeted
pull_request_targethunt — both cases where a real defensive control existed that the rules didn't credit.permissions: {}(noGITHUB_TOKEN) and references no secrets, fork code runs but there's nothing to steal, so it isn't a secret-exfil pwn request → info. Jobs with a scoped token (e.g.pull-requests: write) are unaffected. Self-hosted host risk, if any, remains covered by FG-009.if:restricts execution to trusted authors (MEMBER/OWNER/COLLABORATOR) or excludes forks, an external fork can't reach the local action → info. Also taughthasAuthorAssociationGuardthecontains(fromJSON('["MEMBER",...]'), author_association)allowlist idiom.Verified on source repos
ionos-cloud/cluster-api-provider-proxmoxFG-001 (permissions:{} + pre-screen): critical → inforedwoodjs/agent-ciFG-016 (author-association gate): critical → infoNot changed
FG-022 was left alone — it correctly flags
actions-cool/issues-helper(a real May-2026 supply-chain compromise) even when SHA-pinned, because that campaign retargeted every ref. Verifying the catalog before "fixing" a correct rule caught this.Fixtures + tests added for both downgrades; full suite, gofmt, vet, self-scan clean.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code