The site is a static web application. It has no backend, no accounts, no cookies and no server-side data, so a vulnerability usually affects only the visitor's own browser. The virtual disk lives in the browser's IndexedDB and only leaves the browser when the visitor exports a file.

• Content-Security-Policy (public/_headers, response header, mirrored as a meta element in index.html): scripts only from the site itself, no inline scripts, object-src 'none', frame-ancestors 'none', Trusted Types (no HTML string can reach the DOM), connections limited to the site and the Tavily search endpoint.
• Security headers (public/_headers): HSTS with preload, X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy and a restrictive Permissions-Policy.
• Sandboxed frames: every <iframe> is sandboxed. The Internet window allows only scripts, same-origin access and forms in the framed third-party site; popups and top-level navigation remain blocked. The PDF viewer of the virtual disk runs fully sandboxed because its blob: URL shares the site's origin.
• Clickjacking guard (src/main.tsx): on top of the headers, the app breaks out of a frame or hides itself while framed, which also covers hosts that do not send them.
• Defensive persistence: every record read back from IndexedDB and every value read back from localStorage is revalidated against the current schema; malformed or tampered records are dropped instead of executed.
• Pinned CI actions: every GitHub Action is pinned by commit SHA, not by a mutable tag.
• Code scanning: CodeQL on every pull request, and an OpenSSF Scorecard run on every push to main.
• No secrets in the site: there is nothing to leak. Search is keyless. The only credential is the deploy token, kept in the production environment of the repository and limited to editing Workers on one account and one zone; the workflow itself only has contents: read.

Please do not open a public issue. Report it privately from the repository's Security tab (Report a vulnerability), or write to nil@nilparra.dev, with the details and, when possible, a minimal reproduction. The site publishes the same contact at https://nilparra.dev/.well-known/security.txt. I read every report and reply as soon as I can. There is no bug bounty.

• The deployed site (https://nilparra.dev/) and this repository.
• The Internet window queries Tavily from the browser; problems with that third-party service are out of scope.
• Client-side storage (IndexedDB, localStorage) is same-origin by definition: an attacker needs script execution on the site first, which is what the controls above prevent. Reports of "anyone can edit their own browser storage" are out of scope unless they lead to execution.

Only the current state of main is supported. There are no maintained release branches.