fix(cloud): RBAC matrix, sensitive-fill hygiene, audit verify cap #425
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
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@@ -8,36 +8,92 @@ import { auditPayloadFromRow, runEventPayloadFromRow } from "@ghost/core/audit-l | |
| /** | ||
| * Verify the organization's audit chain, and optionally one run's journal. | ||
| * | ||
| * Two modes (query `mode=`): | ||
| * | ||
| * - `head` (default for the audit page): cheap — count + last hash vs | ||
| * `Organization.auditChainHead`. Detects suffix deletion / head drift. | ||
| * Does **not** re-hash every event; mid-chain payload edits need `full`. | ||
| * - `full`: walks every event through `verifyAuditChain`. Caped by | ||
| * `GHOST_AUDIT_VERIFY_MAX_EVENTS` (default 50_000) so an unbounded | ||
| * tenant history cannot take the web tier down (P1-1). Over the cap → 413. | ||
| * | ||
| * A broken chain is reported, not hidden. | ||
| */ | ||
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| const DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS = 50_000; | ||
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| function maxEvents(): number { | ||
| const fromEnv = Number(process.env.GHOST_AUDIT_VERIFY_MAX_EVENTS); | ||
| return Number.isFinite(fromEnv) && fromEnv > 0 ? fromEnv : DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS; | ||
| } | ||
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| export async function GET(req: Request) { | ||
| const session = await auth(); | ||
| if (!session?.user?.orgId) { | ||
| return NextResponse.json({ error: "unauthorized" }, { status: 401 }); | ||
| } | ||
| const orgId = session.user.orgId; | ||
| const url = new URL(req.url); | ||
| const runId = url.searchParams.get("runId"); | ||
| const mode = url.searchParams.get("mode") === "full" ? "full" : "head"; | ||
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| // Verification of a large chain is the most expensive read in the product. | ||
| // Rate limited per organization so a loop over it is not a one-request-each | ||
| // denial of service. Six a minute is generous for a human and useless as an | ||
| // attack. | ||
| const limited = await rateLimit(`audit-verify:${orgId}`, { limit: 6, windowSeconds: 60 }); | ||
| if (!limited.ok) return tooManyRequests(limited); | ||
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| const orgRow = await prisma.organization.findUniqueOrThrow({ | ||
| where: { id: orgId }, | ||
| select: { auditChainHead: true }, | ||
| }); | ||
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| const count = await prisma.auditEvent.count({ where: { orgId } }); | ||
| const tail = await prisma.auditEvent.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { orgId }, | ||
| orderBy: { seq: "desc" }, | ||
| select: { hash: true, seq: true }, | ||
| }); | ||
| const orgHead = tail?.hash ?? null; | ||
| const orgExpectedHeadMatches = orgHead === orgRow.auditChainHead; | ||
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| if (mode === "head") { | ||
| const body: Record<string, unknown> = { | ||
| mode: "head", | ||
| org: { | ||
| // Head mode cannot claim mid-chain integrity — only that the expected | ||
| // tail matches what is stored on Organization. | ||
| intact: orgExpectedHeadMatches, | ||
| count, | ||
| headHash: orgHead, | ||
| expectedHeadHash: orgRow.auditChainHead, | ||
| expectedHeadMatches: orgExpectedHeadMatches, | ||
| fullVerifyAvailable: count <= maxEvents(), | ||
| }, | ||
| }; | ||
| if (runId) { | ||
| const runHead = await verifyRunHead(orgId, runId); | ||
| if (!runHead) return NextResponse.json({ error: "not found" }, { status: 404 }); | ||
| body.run = runHead; | ||
|
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When the terminal run timeline calls AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L19-L25 Useful? React with 👍 / 👎. |
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| } | ||
| return NextResponse.json(body); | ||
| } | ||
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| // Full verify — capped. | ||
| const cap = maxEvents(); | ||
| if (count > cap) { | ||
| return NextResponse.json( | ||
| { | ||
| error: "audit chain too large for a single full verify", | ||
| count, | ||
| maxEvents: cap, | ||
| hint: "use mode=head for the expected-tail check, or raise GHOST_AUDIT_VERIFY_MAX_EVENTS", | ||
| }, | ||
| { status: 413 }, | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
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| const events = await prisma.auditEvent.findMany({ | ||
| where: { orgId }, | ||
| orderBy: { seq: "asc" }, | ||
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@@ -46,20 +102,8 @@ export async function GET(req: Request) { | |
| events.map((e) => ({ prevHash: e.prevHash, hash: e.hash, payload: auditPayloadFromRow(e) })), | ||
| ); | ||
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| const body: Record<string, unknown> = { | ||
| mode: "full", | ||
| org: { | ||
| intact: chain.intact && orgExpectedHeadMatches, | ||
| firstBreakIndex: chain.firstBreakIndex, | ||
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@@ -81,16 +125,24 @@ export async function GET(req: Request) { | |
| where: { runId }, | ||
| orderBy: { seq: "asc" }, | ||
| }); | ||
|
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When Useful? React with 👍 / 👎. |
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| if (runEvents.length > cap) { | ||
| return NextResponse.json( | ||
| { | ||
| error: "run journal too large for a single full verify", | ||
| count: runEvents.length, | ||
| maxEvents: cap, | ||
| }, | ||
| { status: 413 }, | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
| const runChain = verifyAuditChain( | ||
| runEvents.map((e) => ({ | ||
| prevHash: e.prevHash, | ||
| hash: e.hash, | ||
| payload: runEventPayloadFromRow(e), | ||
| })), | ||
| ); | ||
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| const head = runEvents.at(-1)?.hash ?? null; | ||
| const expectedHeadMatches = head === owned.journalHead; | ||
| const anchors = events | ||
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@@ -99,8 +151,8 @@ export async function GET(req: Request) { | |
| .filter((h): h is string => typeof h === "string"); | ||
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| body.run = { | ||
| intact: runChain.intact && expectedHeadMatches, | ||
| firstBreakIndex: runChain.firstBreakIndex, | ||
| count: runEvents.length, | ||
| headHash: head, | ||
| expectedHeadHash: owned.journalHead, | ||
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@@ -112,3 +164,26 @@ export async function GET(req: Request) { | |
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| return NextResponse.json(body); | ||
| } | ||
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| async function verifyRunHead(orgId: string, runId: string) { | ||
| const owned = await prisma.run.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { id: runId, orgId }, | ||
| select: { id: true, journalHead: true }, | ||
| }); | ||
| if (!owned) return null; | ||
| const count = await prisma.runEvent.count({ where: { runId } }); | ||
| const tail = await prisma.runEvent.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { runId }, | ||
| orderBy: { seq: "desc" }, | ||
| select: { hash: true }, | ||
| }); | ||
| const head = tail?.hash ?? null; | ||
| const expectedHeadMatches = head === owned.journalHead; | ||
| return { | ||
| intact: expectedHeadMatches, | ||
| count, | ||
| headHash: head, | ||
| expectedHeadHash: owned.journalHead, | ||
| expectedHeadMatches, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ | ||
| import { NextResponse } from "next/server"; | ||
| import { auth } from "@/auth"; | ||
| import { prisma } from "@/lib/db"; | ||
| import { loadActor } from "@/lib/members"; | ||
| import { enqueueCompensateRun, enqueueRunWorkflow } from "@/lib/queue"; | ||
| import { appendAuditEvent, appendRunEvent } from "@ghost/core/audit-log"; | ||
| import { canApproveRun } from "@ghost/core/roles"; | ||
| import { RUN_EVENT_TYPES } from "@ghost/core/run-events"; | ||
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| /** | ||
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@@ -21,11 +23,11 @@ export async function POST( | |
| { params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string; stepIndex: string }> }, | ||
| ) { | ||
| const session = await auth(); | ||
| if (!session?.user?.orgId || !session.user.id) { | ||
| return NextResponse.json({ error: "unauthorized" }, { status: 401 }); | ||
| } | ||
| const orgId = session.user.orgId; | ||
| const userId = session.user.id; | ||
| const { id, stepIndex } = await params; | ||
| const index = Number(stepIndex); | ||
| if (!Number.isInteger(index) || index < 0) { | ||
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@@ -46,6 +48,14 @@ export async function POST( | |
| if (!run) return NextResponse.json({ error: "not found" }, { status: 404 }); | ||
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| const approve = body.decision === "approve"; | ||
| // Approving authorizes a sensitive mutation — OWNER/ADMIN only. Rejecting | ||
| // stops the action and stays open to every member (see canApproveRun). | ||
| if (approve) { | ||
| const actor = await loadActor(orgId, userId); | ||
|
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When an administrator removes a user from the organization, that user's JWT can remain valid for up to 12 hours, but AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L101-L112 Useful? React with 👍 / 👎. |
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| if (!actor || !canApproveRun(actor.role)) { | ||
| return NextResponse.json({ error: "forbidden" }, { status: 403 }); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| const now = new Date(); | ||
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| // Which direction of the run is waiting. A gate opened while reversing the | ||
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When an audit event is appended between this organization-head read and the later tail query, the statements observe different snapshots:
orgRow.auditChainHeadcan be the old head whiletail.hashis the newly committed head, causing an intact chain to be returned asintact: false. The audit page has the same race because its head and tail queries run separately. Read both values in a repeatable-read transaction or otherwise from one database snapshot so ordinary concurrent activity cannot produce a false tampering alarm.AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L19-L25
Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.