Every release artifact is published with a SLSA build-provenance attestation, generated in .github/workflows/release.yml with actions/attest-build-provenance. The attestation is signed through Sigstore; its signer identity is this repository's own release workflow. The release pipeline re-verifies the attestation before publishing, so a tag never publishes an unverified artifact.

To verify a downloaded release artifact yourself, pin verification to the signing workflow:

gh attestation verify research-harness-template-<version>.tar.gz \
  --repo modeled-information-format/research-harness-template \
  --signer-workflow modeled-information-format/research-harness-template/.github/workflows/release.yml

--repo scopes trust to this repository; --signer-workflow additionally pins trust to the specific workflow that produced the attestation — the certificate identity is .../.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag> (the gh attestation verify output shows this full ref-suffixed identity). Verifying with both is the strict check; --repo alone would accept an attestation from any workflow in the repository. A non-zero exit status means verification failed — do not trust the artifact.

The release process itself — the audit-gated, attested cutover this repository follows — is the org release runbook; see org governance & release runbooks for that plus the related branch-protection, Dependabot auto-merge, and labels runbooks.

Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories. Please do not open a public issue for an undisclosed vulnerability.