fix: reject symlinks during persona memory bulk sync#91
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PersonaBackend.push_all walked local_root with path.is_file(), which follows symlinks — a symlink planted in the synced memory dir (e.g. via prompt-injection shell access) would have its target read and uploaded to the persona blob, exfiltrating arbitrary file contents (SSH keys, tokens) into cloud storage. push_one already resolves + containment-checks, and pull_all rejects traversal-shaped keys; push_all was the one sync path with no guard. Reject all symlinks explicitly and add the same resolve/relative_to containment check, making the three sync methods consistent. Ports an unmerged fix from the retired pre-rename entraclaw repo.
brandwe
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Jun 26, 2026
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Summary
PersonaBackend.push_allnow rejects symlinks underlocal_rootand records them as errors, instead of silently following themresolve()+relative_to(root)containment check on each uploaded path, matching the guards already present inpush_oneandpull_alllocal_rootis not uploadedThe gap
push_alliteratedlocal_root.rglob("*")and filtered withpath.is_file()— which follows symlinks. A symlink planted in the synced memory dir (~/.claude/projects/<slug>/memory/) would pass the filter, andpath.read_text()would read the symlink target and upload it to theclaude_memory/blob prefix.That is a silent exfiltration path on an automated background sync: e.g. prompt-injection with shell access runs
ln -s ~/.ssh/id_rsa .../memory/notes.md, and the next sync ships the private key to cloud storage.The sibling methods were already hardened —
push_oneresolves and containment-checks its path, andpull_allrejects traversal-shaped keys.push_allwas the only sync path with no symlink/containment guard; this closes that inconsistency.Severity
Defense-in-depth. Exploitation requires something able to write into the memory dir (injection-driven shell, or a misbehaving hook), so it is not a standalone RCE — but it is a silent, automated channel that turns local file-write into cloud exfiltration, which is squarely in scope for this project.
Provenance
Ports an unmerged fix originally written on the retired pre-rename
entraclawrepo, adapted to the currententrabotmodule path.Validation
uv run --python 3.12 --extra dev python -m pytest tests/storage/test_persona.py -q— 19 passed (incl. new symlink test)uv run --python 3.12 --extra dev ruff check src/entrabot/storage/persona.py tests/storage/test_persona.py— cleanNote:
ruff format --checkreports pre-existing drift intest_persona.pyoutside this change; left untouched to keep the diff minimal (consistent with #87).