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Security: mawlamyinebrake1621/HOM-AIMOS

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Status
Latest attested 1.x release Supported
main Active development; not a stable trust anchor
Untagged copies and pre-release forks Unsupported

Security fixes are applied to the latest attested release. Backports are made only when the affected release remains supported.

Report a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue containing vulnerability details, credentials, memory content, identity certificates, or proof-of-concept exploit material.

Use the repository's Security → Report a vulnerability flow to create a private GitHub Security Advisory. Include:

  • affected release or commit;
  • impacted route, service, migration, or ceremony;
  • reproduction steps and expected impact;
  • whether canonical-memory integrity, confidentiality, identity custody, or availability is affected.

Receipt is targeted within 72 hours and an initial assessment within 14 days. Disclosure timing is coordinated with the reporter after a fix and release path exist.

Security claims

AIMOS is designed to provide:

  • certificate-bound Ed25519 identity for protected operations;
  • method/path/body/nonce-bound request signatures;
  • append-only provenance, request, authorization, credential-use, tool-action, and cognitive-transition evidence;
  • signed, reversible epistemic labels for retained memory evidence;
  • explicit Canary traversal decisions at persistence, model-relay, tool-input, and tool-output boundaries;
  • signed operational red-team manifests, per-case decisions, and terminal or failed campaign evidence;
  • revocation and replay rejection without mutable bypass flags;
  • a restricted database role with no selective memory-deletion authority;
  • signed whole-brain purge as the only erasure ceremony.

The ledger proves integrity and attribution. It does not prove that signed memory content is true. See THREAT-MODEL.md.

Agent-security architecture

HOM-AIMOS treats persistent memory as a security control plane: content that enters memory can influence later prompts, tools, and decisions. Defensive ownership is therefore split across explicit native boundaries:

Boundary Native behavior Honest limit
Epistemic classification Retains content and appends a signed, reversible trust label Classification is evidence, not factual truth
Recall disclosure Verifies provenance, authorization, label state, graph decision, calibration, and final receipt A valid signature cannot make false content true
Canary traversal Detects the generated marker family at PERSISTED, RELAYED, EXECUTED, and EXPOSED Does not detect arbitrary unmarked poison
Cognitive mutation Changes only bounded retrieval weight through a signed no-fork transition Does not rewrite canonical memory content
Governed graph-family selection Reconstructed Graph G2 contributes one bounded, principal-scoped structural vote; MAGMA is retained dormant with zero execution or rank influence Graph evidence owns neither candidate admission nor final disclosure
SABER-inspired campaigns Evaluates fixed attack/benign vectors and commits signed case/aggregate evidence Diagnostic evaluation, not certified robustness

The current signed operational campaign completed 27 attack cases and 28 benign controls: all attacks were blocked or retained-quarantined, no benign control was blocked, and no case was indeterminate. This is conformance evidence for the declared vector set. It is not a universal success rate, DARPA SABER equivalence, or a formal robustness certificate.

The public architecture and evidence boundaries are documented in Agent-security architecture and SABER-inspired operational evidence.

SABER has no runtime authority. Save, recall, ranking, quarantine, and disclosure remain owned by their native pipelines. Runtime errors, timeouts, missing decisions, and missing cases are indeterminate; none count as blocks.

Deployment boundary

The supported 1.0 deployment is single-machine macOS, bound to loopback or placed behind an operator-managed TLS boundary. AIMOS is not claimed as an internet-facing multi-tenant service and has not received an independent penetration test.

The first local embedding-model download requires network access. Both the npm runtime and model revision are pinned; subsequent inference is local. Operators should protect the PostgreSQL socket, Keychain session, agent key directory, and release checkout with normal host controls.

Supply-chain gates

  • npm ci installs the committed dependency lock.
  • CI rejects high or critical production dependency advisories.
  • GitHub Actions are pinned to immutable commit SHAs.
  • pgsodium source bytes, version, and installed artifacts are checksum-bound.
  • the embedding model is pinned to an immutable upstream commit.
  • public source packages carry SHA-256 checksums, a CycloneDX SBOM, and GitHub keyless build-provenance attestations bound to the repository and workflow;
  • GPG is not an installation, runtime, or release-verification dependency.

See RELEASE.md for the consumer verification procedure. A mutable checkout is not its own trust anchor.

There aren't any published security advisories