Small Fixes

Intros/1_FuzzThis.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # FuzzThis
 To win this challenge, you need `FuzzThis::dontHackMePlease()` to return `win`. 
 
-In very other challenge you want the test case to pass to win, but for this challenge you want the test case to fail. 
+In every other challenge you want the test case to pass to win, but for this challenge you want the test case to fail. 
 
 This challenge is meant to help you use basic fuzz testing in foundry. If you are unfamiliar with Fuzz testing in Foundry, check out their [docs](https://book.getfoundry.sh/forge/fuzz-testing). This should be the easiest challenge of the series so with that, good luck, and don't forget to read the writeup after!

src/3_IKnowYulNeverHackThis.sol

@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ contract IKnowYulNeverHackThis {
         uint256 shareOfPrize = address(this).balance / winners.length;
 
         uint256 i;
-        uint256 winnersLength = winners.length;
         for(i; i < winners.length; ++i) {
             (bool sent, bytes memory data) = winners[i].call{value: shareOfPrize}("");
         }

src/5_BuyMyTokens.sol

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ contract BuyMyTokens {
         tokenPrices[token3] = 0.3 ether;
     }
 
-    function _checkPurchasingPower(uint256 _amountOfEtherAvailable, uint256 _amount, uint256 _price) internal {
+    function _checkPurchasingPower(uint256 _amountOfEtherAvailable, uint256 _amount, uint256 _price) internal pure {
         uint256 cost = _price * _amount;
         require(cost >= _amountOfEtherAvailable, "dont be that guy; pay for your tokens");
     }

src/6_NotForTrusting.sol

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ contract Rewarder is IStaking{
     function claim(address _for) external guard {
         bool isStaking = staking.isStaking(_for);
         StakeData memory userStake = staking.getStakerData(msg.sender);
+        require(isStaking, "gotta stake to make money");
         require(msg.sender == address(staking), "not your rewards");
         require(block.number >= userStake.stakeStart + userStake.stakeDuration, "you know about vm.roll(), right?");
         require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "no double dipping");

src/7_CantStopMe.sol

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ contract TrustyOracle {
         auction.updatePriceDifferential(minPrice, maxPrice);
     }
 
-     // adds current price to  
+     // adds current price to the price history
     function addPriceToHistory() external {
         require(msg.sender == address(auction));
         uint256 lastPrice = auction.lastPrice();

write_ups/3_IKnowYulNeverHackThis.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ if (_isBlueTeam) {
             // loads the free memory pointer
             let freeMem := mload(0x40)
 
-            // gets the memory location of the the word after the free memory pointer
+            // gets the memory location of the word after the free memory pointer
             let newMsize := add( freeMem, 0x20 )
 
             /** 
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ Since the assembly block forgets to update the length of the array, the size is
 
 
 
-Bonus Points if you noticed that the game cannot function properly after the first time.
+Bonus Points if you noticed that the game cannot function properly after the first time.

write_ups/6_NotForTrusting.md

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ The actual vulnerability is a cross contract reentrancy attack. Nowadays, most d
 
 Since the two smart contracts do not share the same state for the reentrancy guard modifier, they are not aware when the other contract is locked. To fix this issue, I recommend that protocols with multiple smart contracts should share the state of the reentrancy guard modifier by creating a separate smart contract that they both read and write to the state of the contract.
 
-The basics of the rentrancey revolves around claiming twice, and taking advantage of an NFT's `safeTransforFrom()` function call to `onERC721Received()` in the receiving smart contract. We will go over the affected code in more depth later, but for now let's look into how we perform the exploit.
+The basics of the reentrancy revolves around claiming twice, and taking advantage of an NFT's `safeTransferFrom()` function call to `onERC721Received()` in the receiving smart contract. We will go over the affected code in more depth later, but for now let's look into how we perform the exploit.
 
-To exploit the vulnerability, we need a separate smart contract to perform the rentrancey. Let's take a look at my implementation of it:
+To exploit the vulnerability, we need a separate smart contract to perform the reentrancy. Let's take a look at my implementation of it:
 ```
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
 pragma solidity ^0.8.22;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ function unstake(uint256 _tokenId, bool claim) external guard {
         rewarder.claim(msg.sender);
     }
 
-    // we update the state before transfering the NFT out of the protocol
+    // we update the state before transferring the NFT out of the protocol
     isStaking[msg.sender] = false;
     userStake = StakeData(0, 0, 0);