Use GitHub's private security advisory feature on this repository to report security issues. Do not open public issues for security problems.

We aim to triage within 7 days.

Robin runs locally and stores personal data in user-data/ (gitignored). Issues worth reporting:

• Secret leakage — anything that exposes contents of user-data/config/secrets/, OAuth tokens, or API keys in logs, telemetry, error messages, or external requests
• Capability escapes — integrations bypassing their declared permissions.network, permissions.fs, or permissions.memory.namespaces
• Path traversal — code or configs allowing reads/writes outside user-data/
• MCP tool surface leaks — tools that expose data the requesting client shouldn't have access to (e.g., reading content from a project that opted out of robin-extension)
• Migration tool writing to v2's data (the migration is read-only against v2 by design)

• Issues that require attacker-controlled access to your machine already (Robin trusts your local UID by design)
• Bugs in upstream dependencies (file with that project; we'll update once they patch)
• Theoretical attacks without a concrete impact path

• All native fetch in integration code is wrapped by a host-allowlisted proxy declared in integration.yaml
• secrets/secrets.age supports age-encrypted secrets; the daemon decrypts at boot
• gitleaks runs in CI on every push
• Telemetry payloads are zod-validated; user content is never written into events.payload, only into events_content.body (gated by audit-meta on reads)