Guarded Continuation Checker is a research preview. Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories for this repository. Do not include confidential RTL, logs, traces, or credentials in a public issue.

Only the latest release on master, Rust 1.97, Linux synthesis containment, and artifact schema v4 receive security fixes. macOS is a development platform and does not provide the Linux address-space containment guarantee.

• RTL, include files, project configuration, assumptions, AIGER, and retained artifacts may be malformed or confidential.
• Yosys is an external parser and synthesizer. Local Linux runs receive process- group and resource bounds. The hostile-RTL profile additionally applies a probed, networkless, read-only, capability-free Docker boundary.
• The Guarded Continuation Checker process, selected Yosys binary, operating-system account, CI runner, and artifact destination are trusted in the current model.
• Artifact schema v4 detects evidence changes relative to its manifest. It does not sign or remotely attest the manifest.

• Run evaluations on an ephemeral, least-privilege Linux worker with no production credentials, no unnecessary network access, and a dedicated artifact directory. Treat RTL and all generated evidence as confidential.
• Pin Guarded Continuation Checker, Rust, Yosys, SymbiYosys, Z3, and CI actions to reviewed revisions or immutable image digests. Preserve Cargo.lock and build with --locked.
• Validate completed bundles before retention or consumption. Copy the manifest digest or a signed CI attestation into a separately trusted system when malicious artifact-store modification is in scope.
• Apply retention, access-control, backup, and deletion policies appropriate to the RTL owner. Unsafe traces can reveal internal state and environment inputs.

• Local Yosys execution remains inappropriate for untrusted third-party RTL. Isolation profile v1 supplies a container boundary; actively hostile or multi-tenant evaluations still require a disposable VM because containers share the host kernel.
• Releases are not yet accompanied by signed binaries, an SBOM, SLSA provenance, or reproducible-build attestations.
• The project has not completed an independent external security assessment.

These limitations keep the production security gate open. They must not be represented as certification or as safe processing of hostile RTL on a shared workstation.