Date of Scan: 2026-04-07
Scope: antigravity_phone_chat core server, client, and transition logic.
Standard: OWASP Top 10
Status: Warning
- Observation:
server.jsrelies on.envforAPP_PASSWORD,AUTH_SALT, andSESSION_SECRET. - Finding: Hardcoded fallback values (
'antigravity','antigravity_default_salt_99', and'antigravity_secret_key_1337') exist inserver.js. - Note: The
launcher.pymitigates this by generating a random 6-digit passcode ifAPP_PASSWORDis missing, but the fallback remains in the JS code for manual runs. - Recommendation: Enforcement of
.envpresence inserver.jsor throwing an error if predictable defaults are used in non-local environments.
Status: Hardened
- Refactor (April 2026): We have implemented a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) in
index.html. - Finding: We have successfully removed 100% of inline
onclickhandlers and logic from the frontend DOM. - Resolution:
script-srcis now set to'self', explicitly disallowing'unsafe-inline'. This prevents the execution of malicious scripts injected into the mirrored snapshot, substantially mitigating the XSS risk.
Status: Secure
- Observation: The server automatically detects if default credentials (
APP_PASSWORD,AUTH_SALT, orSESSION_SECRET) are in use. - Finding: If predictable values are detected, high-visibility
β οΈ warnings are printed to the server console on startup. - Resolution: QR codes for magic links facilitate encrypted session handling. Signed
httpOnlysessions are enforced across all non-LAN interfaces.
Status: Passed
- Observation: Dependencies are minimal and versioned.
express,ws, andcookie-parserare kept up to date. - Finding: No known critical vulnerabilities in the current dependency tree.
Conclusion: The repository maintains a strong security posture with robust session management and signed cookies. The primary risks are localized to the LAN-trust model and potential XSS via mirrored DOM snapshots.