TCK-00549: Bounded executor rewrite: replace bash bounded runner with Rust streaming executor (policy-driven env + caps)

[Anveio]

ticket_meta:
  schema_version: 2026-01-29
  template_version: 2026-01-29
  ticket:
    id: TCK-00549
    title: 'Bounded executor rewrite: replace bash bounded runner with Rust streaming executor (policy-driven env + caps)'
    status: OPEN
  binds:
    prd_id: PRD-PLACEHOLDER
    rfc_id: RFC-0019
    requirements: []
    evidence_artifacts: []
  custody:
    agent_roles:
    - AGENT_IMPLEMENTER
    responsibility_domains:
    - DOMAIN_RUNTIME
    - DOMAIN_SECURITY
  dependencies:
    tickets:
    - ticket_id: TCK-00520
      reason: Streaming logs/caps must exist.
    - ticket_id: TCK-00521
      reason: Policy-driven env allowlist/denylist required.
  scope:
    in_scope:
    - Implement Rust bounded executor that creates transient systemd units and streams logs with caps.
    - Replace `scripts/ci/run_bounded_tests.sh` usage in FAC paths (keep script as fallback only during transition).
    - Use FacPolicyV1 env_clear/allowlist/denylist to pass env; no ad-hoc allowlists.
    - Ensure timeouts/memory/pids are enforced by unit properties, not by shell timers.
    out_of_scope:
    - Replacing other CI scripts unrelated to execution.
  plan:
    steps:
    - Implement executor library used by gates/warm/pipeline.
    - Add feature flag for transition period.
    - Deprecate shell runner once stable.
  definition_of_done:
    evidence_ids: []
    criteria:
    - Bounded tests run with streaming logs and hard caps without relying on a brittle shell allowlist.
    - Failure modes produce receipts with actionable diagnostics.
  amendments:
  - amendment_id: AMD-2026-02-16-FAC-THROUGHPUT-PIVOT
    summary: Clarify that bounded executor requirements are containment-focused and do not prescribe low default CPU throughput.
    supersedes:
    - Implicit coupling of throughput defaults to conservative bounded caps.
    replacement:
    - Default throughput profile may use host-max queue-managed parallelism.
    - Bounded execution remains required for security containment and fail-closed behavior.
fac_push_metadata:
  commit_history:
  - short_sha: 2211d7ea
    message: TCK-00549 replace ad-hoc env allowlists with policy-driven setenv in bounded executor

FAC Gate Status

# apm2-gate-status:v2
sha: 2211d7ea6253b7ca88923ec726916be8144544b2
short_sha: 2211d7ea
timestamp: '2026-02-16T21:37:55Z'
all_passed: true
gates:
  - name: 'merge_conflict_main'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 0
  - name: 'rustfmt'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 3
  - name: 'clippy'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 0
  - name: 'doc'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 0
  - name: 'test_safety_guard'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 0
  - name: 'test'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 39
  - name: 'workspace_integrity'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 6
  - name: 'review_artifact_lint'
    status: PASS
    duration_secs: 0

[Anveio]

# apm2-review-verdict:v1
schema: apm2.review.verdict.v1
pr: 707
sha: 2211d7ea6253b7ca88923ec726916be8144544b2
updated_at: 2026-02-16T21:40:10Z
dimensions:
  code-quality:
    decision: approve
    reason: 'PASS: no blocker or major findings'
    set_by: ubuntu
    set_at: 2026-02-16T21:39:12Z
  security:
    decision: approve
    reason: 'PASS: Implements policy-driven environment filtering (TCK-00549) with defense-in-depth sccache stripping and resource limits. One MINOR finding regarding secret leakage via systemd-run args.'
    set_by: ubuntu
    set_at: 2026-02-16T21:40:10Z
findings:
- finding_id: f-707-security-1771278004084037-0
  type: security
  severity: MINOR
  summary: Missing defense-in-depth against secret leakage via systemd-run args
  risk: systemd-run exposes --setenv arguments in the process list. Removing the hardcoded allowlist increases the risk that a permissive FacPolicyV1 could accidentally forward secrets (e.g. GITHUB_TOKEN) to the transient unit, leaking them to local users via /proc.
  impact: Secrets could be scraped from the process list during test execution.
  location: crates/apm2-cli/src/commands/fac_review/bounded_test_runner.rs
  body: Implement defense-in-depth filtering in build_policy_setenv_pairs to unconditionally strip keys matching standard secret patterns (*_TOKEN, *_KEY, *_SECRET, *_PASSWORD, *_CREDENTIAL), similar to the existing RUSTC_WRAPPER strip. Alternatively, migrate to using the EnvironmentFile property with systemd-run to avoid CLI argument leakage entirely.
  evidence_digest: 896d7f1a0fc1965e512fc8390bac93e4ce90497cb32a9040ebfc10ecadede53d
  evidence_pointer: none
  timestamp: 2026-02-16T21:40:04Z