fix(security): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in CI/publish workflows#120
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix(security): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in CI/publish workflows#120XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Mutable tag references (e.g. checkout@v2, setup-python@v1, pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@v1.4.2, astral-sh/setup-uv@v5) can be silently redirected to malicious code. If a tag-pinned action runs in a job that holds PYPI_TOKEN the attacker can publish a backdoored release, poisoning every downstream user of this package. Pin all action references to their immutable commit SHA. The original tag is preserved as a comment for human readability.
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Summary
This workflow uses mutable tag references for GitHub Actions. Tag-pinned actions can be silently redirected to malicious code (compromised maintainer, tag deletion + recreation, repo takeover). Any action running in a job that holds
PYPI_TOKEN/PYPI_API_TOKENcan exfiltrate that token and publish a backdoored release, poisoning every downstream user.Fix
All action references pinned to their immutable commit SHA (tag preserved as comment). Follows the GitHub security hardening guide.