Feat/hash pinned source reads - #1364
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DylanVerstraete wants to merge 4 commits into
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-org.opencontainers.image.created=2026-06-27T04:19:04.617438+00:00
+org.opencontainers.image.created=2026-08-17T09:02:45.677319+00:00
org.opencontainers.image.description=The Ubuntu container image maintained by Canonical
Ubuntu is a Debian-based Linux operating system that runs from the desktop to the cloud, to all your internet connected things.
It is the world's most popular operating system across public clouds and OpenStack clouds.
It is the number one platform for containers; from Docker to Kubernetes to LXD, Ubuntu can run your containers at scale.
Fast, secure and simple, Ubuntu powers millions of PCs worldwide.
org.opencontainers.image.title=ubuntu
org.opencontainers.image.version=26.04Policies (2 improved, 0 worsened)
Packages and Vulnerabilities (47 package changes and 15 vulnerability changes)
Changes for packages of type
|
| Package | Versiongluwa/creditcoin3:latest |
Versiongluwa/creditcoin3:latest |
|
|---|---|---|---|
| ♾️ | base-files | 14ubuntu6.1 |
14ubuntu6.2 |
| ♾️ | bsdutils | 1:2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
1:2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | curl | 8.18.0-1ubuntu2.3 |
8.18.0-1ubuntu2.5 |
| ♾️ | diffutils | 1:3.12-1 |
1:3.12-1ubuntu0.1 |
| ♾️ | gnu-coreutils | 9.7-3ubuntu2 |
9.7-3ubuntu2.1 |
| ♾️ | gpgv | 2.4.8-4ubuntu3 |
2.4.8-4ubuntu3.1 |
| ♾️ | libattr1 | 1:2.5.2-4 |
1:2.5.2-4ubuntu0.1 |
| ♾️ | libaudit-common | 1:4.1.2-1build1 |
1:4.1.2-1ubuntu0.1 |
| ♾️ | libaudit1 | 1:4.1.2-1build1 |
1:4.1.2-1ubuntu0.1 |
| ♾️ | libblkid1 | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | libbz2-1.0 | 1.0.8-6build2 |
1.0.8-6ubuntu0.1 |
| ♾️ | libc-bin | 2.43-2ubuntu2.3 |
2.43-2ubuntu2.4 |
| ♾️ | libc-gconv-modules-extra | 2.43-2ubuntu2.3 |
2.43-2ubuntu2.4 |
| ♾️ | libc6 | 2.43-2ubuntu2.3 |
2.43-2ubuntu2.4 |
| ♾️ | libcurl4t64 | 8.18.0-1ubuntu2.3 |
8.18.0-1ubuntu2.5 |
| ♾️ | libgcrypt20 | 1.12.0-2ubuntu1 |
1.12.0-2ubuntu1.1 |
| ♾️ | libmount1 | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | libpam-modules | 1.7.0-5ubuntu3.1 |
1.7.0-5ubuntu3.2 |
| ♾️ | libpam-modules-bin | 1.7.0-5ubuntu3.1 |
1.7.0-5ubuntu3.2 |
| ♾️ | libpam-runtime | 1.7.0-5ubuntu3.1 |
1.7.0-5ubuntu3.2 |
| ♾️ | libpam0g | 1.7.0-5ubuntu3.1 |
1.7.0-5ubuntu3.2 |
| ♾️ | libpq5 | 18.4-0ubuntu0.26.04.1 |
18.6-0ubuntu0.26.04.1 |
| ♾️ | libsmartcols1 | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | libssh2-1t64 | 1.11.1-1ubuntu0.26.04.3 |
1.11.1-1ubuntu0.26.04.4 |
| ♾️ | libssl3t64 | 3.5.5-1ubuntu3.3 |
3.5.5-1ubuntu3.5 |
| ♾️ | libsystemd0 | 259.5-0ubuntu3.3 |
259.5-0ubuntu3.4 |
| ♾️ | libudev1 | 259.5-0ubuntu3.3 |
259.5-0ubuntu3.4 |
| ♾️ | libuuid1 | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | login | 1:4.16.0-2+really2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
1:4.16.0-2+really2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | mount | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | openssl | 3.5.5-1ubuntu3.3 |
3.5.5-1ubuntu3.5 |
| ♾️ | openssl-provider-legacy | 3.5.5-1ubuntu3.3 |
3.5.5-1ubuntu3.5 |
| ♾️ | perl-base | 5.40.1-7ubuntu0.1 |
5.40.1-7ubuntu0.3 |
| ♾️ | util-linux | 2.41.3-3ubuntu2 |
2.41.3-3ubuntu2.2 |
| ♾️ | zlib1g | 1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.1-1ubuntu3 |
1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.1-1ubuntu3.1 |
Changes for packages of type golang (6 changes)
Changes for packages of type npm (6 changes)
| Package | Versiongluwa/creditcoin3:latest |
Versiongluwa/creditcoin3:latest |
|
|---|---|---|---|
| ♾️ | @types/node | 26.1.2 |
22.7.5 |
| ♾️ | node-gyp | 13.0.1 |
13.0.2 |
| ♾️ | picomatch | 4.0.5 |
4.0.7 |
| ♾️ | undici | 8.10.0 |
8.10.2 |
| ♾️ | undici-types | 8.3.0 |
6.21.0 |
| ♾️ | ws | 8.21.2 |
8.21.3 |
… source node's block tags
The existing maturity strategies are all fixed block offsets: `EvmSafe` and
`EvmFinalized` are the Ethereum-epoch approximations (32 / 64 blocks) and mean
64 s / 128 s on a 2 s rollup, where they say nothing about L1 posting. A fixed
count also cannot follow a stalled batcher.
This adds two on-chain strategy strings, `RpcSafe` and `RpcFinalized`, that the
off-chain components resolve through `eth_getBlockByNumber("safe" | "finalized")`
on the source node. On Ethereum that tracks justification / finality; on OP-Stack
and Arbitrum rollups it tracks L1 batch inclusion / L1 finality. The existing
strategies keep their exact behaviour, so no live chain changes schedule.
- primitives: `MaturityStrategy::{RpcSafe, RpcFinalized}`, `RpcBlockTag`,
`rpc_tag()`; pallet validator accepts the new strings (runtime wasm changes,
no spec bump here).
- eth: `Maturity { FixedLag, Tag }` with `mature_height`, and
`Client::get_block_number_by_tag` walking fallback providers like block fetches.
- streams: tip and roots streams take `maturity` instead of `finalization_lag`
and resolve it per head; the roots stream fetches the whole newly mature range
so a `safe` head that jumps by a batch is handled.
- attestor / archiver: resolve the on-chain strategy via
`stream_eth::maturity_from_strategy`.
- continuity / proof-gen: `confirmation_tag` makes the prover confirm blocks on
the same boundary the attestors attest on; the not-confirmed error reports the
effective window.
Verified with mock-RPC tests and live on Base Sepolia (Chainstack): attested
heights stayed 2-12 blocks below the node's `safe` head and never above it,
advancing in bursts as batches posted to L1.
…d provider `ArchiverEthProvider` forwards every live-node call to its ETH fallback but inherited the erroring default for `get_block_number_by_tag`, so a proof server configured with an `archiver_url` on an `RpcSafe` / `RpcFinalized` chain would fail `get_confirmed_last_block`. Forward it like `get_last_block`, teach the mock provider fixed `safe` / `finalized` heights, and cover both the tag-based confirmed tip and the archiver forwarding with tests.
…econnect on an unserved tag Review follow-ups (#1330): - proof-gen: `block_confirmation_depth` pinned in config while the on-chain MaturityStrategy is RpcSafe/RpcFinalized now fails startup instead of warning. A fixed depth cannot reproduce a tag schedule, so the prover would confirm blocks the attestors have not attested. Depth-vs-depth disagreements keep the existing WARN. - continuity: `get_block_number_by_tag` preserves the typed `FailedToGetBlockByTag` cause (was stringified) and `run()` returns it without the reconnect-and-retry loop: a node answering `null` for a tag is a permanent property of that node, and reconnecting only churned the shared client for every other in-flight request. Classifier `eth::anyhow_chain_is_unsupported_block_tag` with tests.
…ne fetched First step of making the attestor the maturity authority: before anything starts following its boundary, its own source reads have to be internally consistent. get_block and get_block_receipts are two separate height-keyed calls, and a provider URL is commonly a load balancer over many nodes, so the pair can be answered by peers on opposite sides of a reorg. Today that is inferred indirectly, and only sometimes: try_from_fetched_block recomputes the transaction and receipt roots and compares them with the header, which detects the mismatch for blocks that have transactions but skips the check entirely for empty blocks, and reports it as BlockHeaderRootsMismatch, a root that failed to reproduce rather than the actual fault. Receipts already carry the hash of the block they belong to. Comparing it with the fetched block's hash is exact, costs no extra round trip, and names the real problem. New Error::ReceiptsBlockMismatch is classified with the other payload inconsistencies, so it walks to the next provider rather than triggering a reconnect, matching how the root mismatch is handled today. Receipts whose block_hash is absent are skipped rather than rejected: the field is optional in the RPC schema and some providers omit it, and those payloads still face the root check exactly as before. Tests: mismatched hashes are rejected and classify for the fallback walk; matching hashes get past the check; an absent block_hash is treated as unverifiable rather than a mismatch; the empty-block carve-out is unchanged.
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Description of proposed changes
When merging this PR:
usc-devuse the "Squash and merge" buttonusc-testnet/mainuse the "Create a merge commit" buttonusc-testnet/mainshould use the "Squash and merge" buttonPractical tips for PR review: