Gate the install. Record the action.
Forgeward is the trust boundary for autonomous code. When an AI coding agent runs npm install on its own, it decides what code enters your machine and runs that code's lifecycle scripts before you ever see them. Forgeward closes that gap from both sides: a gate on what an agent is allowed to install, and a tamper-evident record of what it did after that. The same install-time gate is being proposed upstream, into the agents themselves.
Every badge links to something you can open and read in one hop: a merged PR or a tagged release. No star counts, no download counters.
The source lives at github.com/AyoubTadlaoui/* so module paths and package metadata keep working. This org is the hub that points at it.
| Project | Language | Role | What it does |
|---|---|---|---|
| npmguard | Rust | Inbound gate | Scores every npm package against OSV malware data, typosquat / slopsquat heuristics, and install-script analysis, and returns a verdict before any lifecycle script runs. |
| GoLogX | Go | Outbound record | An append-only, hash-chained, optionally Ed25519-signed log/slog handler, with an offline logx verify that catches any edit, deletion, reorder, or forgery in the chain. |
An npm install firewall for AI coding agents. It runs in Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex over MCP, as a plain CLI, or as a deterministic Claude Code PreToolUse hook the model cannot skip. Every package is scored before lifecycle scripts fire, and a block verdict stops the install.
What you can verify: it refuses real OSV malware (for example lodahs, MAL-2025-25502), and it ships as one Rust binary deliberately off npm, so the gate cannot be poisoned by the registry it is guarding.
→ https://github.com/AyoubTadlaoui/npmguard
A tamper-evident audit core for Go. The log/slog handler writes an append-only, hash-chained, optionally Ed25519-signed log, and logx verify checks it offline and reports the first entry that was edited, deleted, reordered, or forged.
What you can verify: zero external dependencies. The integrity code is built on the Go standard library alone, and logx verify runs offline against the file with no service to trust.
→ https://github.com/AyoubTadlaoui/GoLogX
The same install-time check, ported into the AI agents themselves as a native security inspector. Merged work and open proposals are kept strictly separate. Nothing below is dressed up as more than it is.
| Work | Project | PR |
|---|---|---|
| npmguard listed in the awesome-software-supply-chain-security registry | bureado | #65 |
| GoLogX listed in awesome-go | avelino | #6389 |
These are open proposals. They are not adopted, not merged, and I am not claiming otherwise.
| Agent | Contribution | State | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continue | Supply-chain typosquat inspector | Idea adopted by a maintainer; implemented in an open PR (not yet merged, their commit) | #12727 |
| OpenHands | SupplyChainSecurityAnalyzer |
Open issue, triaged as enhancement | #3560 |
| Cline | Supply-chain inspector | Open issue, in backlog | #11340 |
| Crush (Charm) | Supply-chain inspector | Open issue | #3090 |
| Goose (Block) | Supply-chain typosquat inspector | Closed by a maintainer (work praised; asked for a smaller, design-aligned PR first) | #9642 |
Kept separate on purpose. These are not part of the trust-boundary tools above.
- atlas-ragnarok: a terminal color theme plus a storm-fire GLSL shader, accepted into the Zed extension registry.
- GoFunAndChallenges: a hands-on Go course with runnable lessons and challenges, every package tested.
Early, open source, built in the open. Two tools, one position: gate what an autonomous agent installs, and keep a record of what it did that you can verify yourself. No traction claims, no users to point at yet. The work and the position are the pitch.
Contact: atlas.kaisar@icloud.com
