Please report suspected vulnerabilities by opening a GitHub Security Advisory on the repo — not a public issue. We'll triage within one week.

claude-statusline is a single bash script that reads JSON on stdin, parses a handful of fields via jq, queries git for the current branch of the session's cwd (not the shell's PWD), and renders three lines to stdout. It does not read or write any credential, token, or network resource.

In scope:

• Command injection via malicious values in the JSON payload piped by Claude Code (cwd, model name, version, etc.).
• Path-traversal or git -C behavior against an attacker-controlled cwd.
• Any escalation from "can inject into the statusline JSON" to arbitrary command execution.

Out of scope:

• The Claude Code binary itself — report those to Anthropic.
• jq, bash, git, date upstream bugs — report to their respective projects.
• The contents of ~/.claude/settings.json, which Claude Code manages.

If you're writing a PR, a bug report, or sharing logs:

• The statusline prints nothing sensitive by default, but if you run it under a custom wrapper that injects additional fields, redact anything that looks like a token, API key, or email address before pasting output into an issue.
• Share the synthetic JSON payload you used to reproduce a bug, not a real Claude Code session dump — real dumps include your cwd path, model details, and session duration.

claude-statusline trusts:

• The user running it (owner of ~/.claude/, controls settings.json).
• The JSON payload piped in by Claude Code — all untrusted fields (cwd, model.*, version) are consumed via jq -r and never passed to eval, sh -c, or subshell command strings.
• The git binary on $PATH. git -C <cwd> is invoked only for rev-parse and symbolic-ref, which are read-only.

claude-statusline does not trust:

• The environment beyond its documented CLAUDE_STATUSLINE_* and NO_COLOR variables.
• Terminal escape sequences in the JSON payload — all string fields are interpolated via printf '%s', never via printf format strings, and never via echo -e.