PulseMonitor SaaS & Enterprise Transformation - #2
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- Implemented tiered subscription model (Free, Pro, Enterprise) - Integrated Stripe Checkout and Webhooks for automated billing - Refactored monitoring service into a scalable, multi-region architecture - Added premium alerting channels (Slack, Discord) - Enhanced UI with pricing plans, feature gating, and billing management - Improved monitoring worker sync logic and fixed interval parsing bugs Co-authored-by: elonerajeev <114682224+elonerajeev@users.noreply.github.com>
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WalkthroughThis PR integrates Stripe subscription billing with multi-tenant regional monitoring. The backend adds Stripe checkout sessions and webhook handlers for subscription lifecycle events. Both backend and service layers extend user and monitoring schemas to track subscription status and regional deployments. The frontend introduces a pricing page and gates premium features behind subscription tiers. A refactored multi-channel alert system routes notifications through email, Slack, and Discord. The monitoring job is restructured for region-aware scheduling. ChangesStripe Subscription Integration with Regional Monitoring and Multi-Channel Alerts
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant PricingUI as Pricing Page
participant CheckoutAPI as /stripe/create-checkout-session
participant StripeAPI as Stripe API
participant WebhookAPI as Stripe Webhook
participant WebhookHandler as stripeWebhook Handler
participant UserDB as User Document
User->>PricingUI: Click Subscribe (select priceId)
PricingUI->>CheckoutAPI: POST priceId
CheckoutAPI->>StripeAPI: Create/get customer (stripeCustomerId)
CheckoutAPI->>StripeAPI: Create checkout session (subscription mode)
CheckoutAPI->>PricingUI: Return session.url
PricingUI->>StripeAPI: Redirect to checkout URL
User->>StripeAPI: Complete payment in Stripe Checkout
StripeAPI->>WebhookAPI: POST checkout.session.completed event
WebhookAPI->>WebhookHandler: Invoke with raw body
WebhookHandler->>StripeAPI: Verify signature with STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET
WebhookHandler->>StripeAPI: Retrieve subscription details
WebhookHandler->>UserDB: Update plan, stripeSubscriptionId, subscriptionStatus
WebhookHandler->>WebhookAPI: Return HTTP 200 received
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~60 minutes Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings. ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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This PR introduces a comprehensive SaaS transformation with Stripe integration, multi-region monitoring, and premium alerting features. However, there are critical security vulnerabilities and logic errors that must be fixed before merge.
Critical Issues Found:
- Security: Price ID validation missing - allows arbitrary Stripe checkout sessions (CWE-20)
- Security: SSRF vulnerability in webhook URLs - no validation of Slack/Discord endpoints (CWE-918)
- Logic Error: Stripe webhook body handling conflicts with Express middleware configuration
- Crash Risk: Array access without bounds checking in multi-region logic
- Logic Error: Missing null checks for subscription retrieval
Required Actions:
- Add whitelist validation for Stripe price IDs
- Implement webhook URL validation for Slack/Discord to prevent SSRF
- Fix Stripe webhook raw body handling using proper Express middleware
- Add bounds checking for regions array access
- Add null checks for subscription operations
All findings have detailed comments with specific fixes. Please address these security and stability issues before merging.
You can now have the agent implement changes and create commits directly on your pull request's source branch. Simply comment with /q followed by your request in natural language to ask the agent to make changes.
| const { priceId } = req.body; | ||
| const user = req.user; | ||
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| if (!priceId) { | ||
| throw new ApiError(400, "Price ID is required"); | ||
| } |
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🛑 Security Vulnerability: The priceId parameter from user input is not validated against a whitelist of allowed Stripe price IDs. An attacker could potentially create checkout sessions for arbitrary price IDs, including creating subscriptions to unintended products or plans. Validate that the priceId matches one of your expected plan IDs (STRIPE_PRO_PLAN_ID or STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_PLAN_ID) before creating the checkout session.1
| const { priceId } = req.body; | |
| const user = req.user; | |
| if (!priceId) { | |
| throw new ApiError(400, "Price ID is required"); | |
| } | |
| const { priceId } = req.body; | |
| const user = req.user; | |
| if (!priceId) { | |
| throw new ApiError(400, "Price ID is required"); | |
| } | |
| // Validate priceId against allowed plans | |
| const allowedPriceIds = [process.env.STRIPE_PRO_PLAN_ID, process.env.STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_PLAN_ID]; | |
| if (!allowedPriceIds.includes(priceId)) { | |
| throw new ApiError(400, "Invalid price ID"); | |
| } |
Footnotes
-
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html ↩
| const stripeWebhook = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { | ||
| const sig = req.headers["stripe-signature"]; | ||
| let event; | ||
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||
| // We need the raw body for Stripe signature verification | ||
| const buffers = []; | ||
| for await (const chunk of req) { | ||
| buffers.push(chunk); | ||
| } | ||
| const rawBody = Buffer.concat(buffers); | ||
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||
| try { | ||
| event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent( | ||
| rawBody, | ||
| sig, | ||
| process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET | ||
| ); | ||
| } catch (err) { | ||
| console.error("Webhook Error:", err.message); | ||
| return res.status(400).send(`Webhook Error: ${err.message}`); | ||
| } |
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🛑 Logic Error: Reading the raw request body in the webhook handler creates a race condition with the conditional JSON middleware (lines 59-65 in app.js). Once the request stream is consumed here via for await (const chunk of req), the body becomes unavailable. If the middleware tries to parse it, or if the stream is already consumed, this will fail. The proper solution is to use express.raw() middleware specifically for the webhook route and access req.body directly, not manually consume the stream.1
| const stripeWebhook = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { | |
| const sig = req.headers["stripe-signature"]; | |
| let event; | |
| // We need the raw body for Stripe signature verification | |
| const buffers = []; | |
| for await (const chunk of req) { | |
| buffers.push(chunk); | |
| } | |
| const rawBody = Buffer.concat(buffers); | |
| try { | |
| event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent( | |
| rawBody, | |
| sig, | |
| process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET | |
| ); | |
| } catch (err) { | |
| console.error("Webhook Error:", err.message); | |
| return res.status(400).send(`Webhook Error: ${err.message}`); | |
| } | |
| const stripeWebhook = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { | |
| const sig = req.headers["stripe-signature"]; | |
| let event; | |
| try { | |
| event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent( | |
| req.body, | |
| sig, | |
| process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET | |
| ); | |
| } catch (err) { | |
| console.error("Webhook Error:", err.message); | |
| return res.status(400).send(`Webhook Error: ${err.message}`); | |
| } |
Footnotes
-
CWE-662: Improper Synchronization - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/662.html ↩
| // Middleware | ||
| app.use(express.json({ limit: "50kb" })); | ||
| app.use((req, res, next) => { | ||
| if (req.originalUrl === "/api/v1/stripe/webhook") { | ||
| next(); | ||
| } else { | ||
| express.json({ limit: "50kb" })(req, res, next); | ||
| } | ||
| }); |
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🛑 Logic Error: The middleware configuration doesn't properly handle the raw body requirement for Stripe webhooks. Replace this conditional middleware with proper route-specific middleware. You need to use express.raw({type: 'application/json'}) for the webhook route and express.json() for all other routes. Configure this in the route definition, not globally.
| // Middleware | |
| app.use(express.json({ limit: "50kb" })); | |
| app.use((req, res, next) => { | |
| if (req.originalUrl === "/api/v1/stripe/webhook") { | |
| next(); | |
| } else { | |
| express.json({ limit: "50kb" })(req, res, next); | |
| } | |
| }); | |
| // Middleware | |
| app.use(express.json({ limit: "50kb" })); |
| // Webhook needs raw body, should be handled accordingly | ||
| router.route("/webhook").post(stripeWebhook); |
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Apply express.raw({type: 'application/json'}) middleware specifically to the webhook route to properly handle Stripe signature verification. The webhook requires the raw request body as a Buffer, not parsed JSON. This should be configured before the global JSON middleware is applied.
| // Webhook needs raw body, should be handled accordingly | |
| router.route("/webhook").post(stripeWebhook); | |
| // Webhook needs raw body, should be handled accordingly | |
| router.route("/webhook").post(express.raw({type: 'application/json'}), stripeWebhook); |
| // 2. Slack Alert (Premium) | ||
| if (alertChannels?.slack?.enabled && alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl) { | ||
| try { | ||
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | ||
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| const info = await transporter.sendMail({ | ||
| from: `"PulseMonitor" <${process.env.FROM_EMAIL}>`, | ||
| to, | ||
| subject, | ||
| html: htmlBody, | ||
| }); | ||
| logger.info(`Email sent to ${to}: ${info.messageId}`); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| logger.error(`Error sending email to ${to}:`, error); | ||
| throw error; // Re-throw to be handled by the caller | ||
| } | ||
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | ||
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | ||
| try { | ||
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | ||
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| console.error("Failed to send Discord alert:", error.message); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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🛑 Security Vulnerability: Webhook URLs for Slack and Discord are not validated before use, potentially enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. An attacker could configure these URLs to internal services (e.g., ` for AWS metadata) or localhost endpoints to scan internal networks or exfiltrate sensitive data. Validate webhook URLs against a whitelist of allowed domains or implement URL validation to block private IP ranges and localhost.1
| // 2. Slack Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.slack?.enabled && alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | |
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | |
| }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const info = await transporter.sendMail({ | |
| from: `"PulseMonitor" <${process.env.FROM_EMAIL}>`, | |
| to, | |
| subject, | |
| html: htmlBody, | |
| }); | |
| logger.info(`Email sent to ${to}: ${info.messageId}`); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| logger.error(`Error sending email to ${to}:`, error); | |
| throw error; // Re-throw to be handled by the caller | |
| } | |
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | |
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, | |
| }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Discord alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // 2. Slack Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.slack?.enabled && alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| const url = new URL(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl); | |
| if (!url.hostname.endsWith('.slack.com')) { | |
| throw new Error('Invalid Slack webhook URL'); | |
| } | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | |
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | |
| }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| const url = new URL(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl); | |
| if (!url.hostname.endsWith('.discord.com') && !url.hostname.endsWith('.discordapp.com')) { | |
| throw new Error('Invalid Discord webhook URL'); | |
| } | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | |
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, | |
| }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Discord alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } |
Footnotes
-
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html ↩
| // We only want ONE region to update the main status and trigger alerts | ||
| // to avoid duplicate alerts. Usually, the "primary" region or a central service does this. | ||
| // For now, let's say 'us-east-1' is the primary region for status updates and alerts. | ||
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | ||
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | ||
| } |
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🛑 Crash Risk: Array access service.regions[0] will throw an error if the regions array is empty. The filter on line 27 checks for service.regions existence but an empty array would pass this check. Add a length check before array access or provide a fallback.
| // We only want ONE region to update the main status and trigger alerts | |
| // to avoid duplicate alerts. Usually, the "primary" region or a central service does this. | |
| // For now, let's say 'us-east-1' is the primary region for status updates and alerts. | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | |
| } | |
| // We only want ONE region to update the main status and trigger alerts | |
| // to avoid duplicate alerts. Usually, the "primary" region or a central service does this. | |
| // For now, let's say 'us-east-1' is the primary region for status updates and alerts. | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions && service.regions.length > 0 && service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | |
| } |
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | ||
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | ||
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); | ||
| } |
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🛑 Crash Risk: Array access service.regions[0] will throw an error if the regions array is empty. Add a length check before array access to prevent runtime errors.
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); | |
| } | |
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions && service.regions.length > 0 && service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); | |
| } |
| async function handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session) { | ||
| const userId = session.metadata.userId; | ||
| const subscriptionId = session.subscription; | ||
| const customerId = session.customer; | ||
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| const subscription = await stripe.subscriptions.retrieve(subscriptionId); | ||
| const planId = subscription.items.data[0].plan.id; |
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🛑 Logic Error: Missing null check for subscription retrieval. If session.subscription is null (e.g., for one-time payments or failed sessions), this will cause stripe.subscriptions.retrieve() to fail. Verify that subscriptionId exists before attempting retrieval.
| async function handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session) { | |
| const userId = session.metadata.userId; | |
| const subscriptionId = session.subscription; | |
| const customerId = session.customer; | |
| const subscription = await stripe.subscriptions.retrieve(subscriptionId); | |
| const planId = subscription.items.data[0].plan.id; | |
| async function handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session) { | |
| const userId = session.metadata.userId; | |
| const subscriptionId = session.subscription; | |
| const customerId = session.customer; | |
| if (!subscriptionId) { | |
| console.error("No subscription ID found in checkout session"); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| const subscription = await stripe.subscriptions.retrieve(subscriptionId); | |
| const planId = subscription.items.data[0].plan.id; |
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| regions, | ||
| interval, | ||
| alertChannels: { | ||
| slack: { | ||
| enabled: slackEnabled, | ||
| webhookUrl: slackWebhook | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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When users select a premium region or enable Slack here, these values are sent to /monitoring, but the backend createMonitoring handler still only reads location and dependencies and never saves regions or alertChannels. In practice every new monitor falls back to the schema default us-east-1, and Slack webhooks are silently discarded, so the new paid multi-region/alerting controls do not work.
Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.
| required: [true, "Check interval is required"], | ||
| default: 5, // Default to 5 minutes | ||
| min: [5, "Interval must be at least 5 minutes"], | ||
| min: [0.5, "Interval must be at least 0.5 minutes (30 seconds)"], |
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Lowering the schema minimum to 0.5 minutes makes 30-second checks valid for any authenticated request, while the only free/pro/enterprise gating is the disabled frontend select. A free user can bypass the UI and POST interval: 0.5 directly to /api/v1/monitoring, which defeats the paid Enterprise limit and can multiply worker load.
Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.
| } else if (currentJob.interval !== intervalInMinutes) { | ||
| // Interval changed, restart the job | ||
| currentJob.job.stop(); | ||
| const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(service)); | ||
| activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes }); |
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This only restarts a running cron job when the interval changes, but the scheduled callback captures the old service object created at lines 57/63. If a user updates the target URL or alert settings without changing the interval, the worker keeps checking and alerting from the stale values indefinitely; before this refactor the service list was reloaded before every run, so these edits were picked up on the next cycle.
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it look nice to merge
…d security - Implemented tiered subscription model (Free, Pro, Enterprise) - Integrated Stripe Checkout and Webhooks for automated billing - Refactored monitoring service into a scalable, multi-region architecture - Added premium alerting channels (Slack, Discord) - Enhanced UI with pricing plans, feature gating, and billing management - Implemented global rate limiting and CSRF protection to address security vulnerabilities - Improved monitoring worker sync logic and fixed interval parsing bugs Co-authored-by: elonerajeev <114682224+elonerajeev@users.noreply.github.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 14
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
frontend/src/pages/AddMonitoringService.tsx (1)
29-35:⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick winRequire a valid webhook URL when Slack alerts are enabled.
With
slackEnabled=true, the form allows empty/invalid webhook values, resulting in saved-but-nonfunctional alert routing.Suggested submit guard
const handleSubmit = async (e: React.FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>) => { e.preventDefault(); if (interval === '' || interval <= 0) { toast.error('Please enter a valid interval.'); return; } + if (slackEnabled) { + try { + const u = new URL(slackWebhook); + if (!/^https:$/.test(u.protocol) || !u.hostname.endsWith("slack.com")) { + throw new Error("invalid"); + } + } catch { + toast.error('Please enter a valid Slack webhook URL.'); + return; + } + }Also applies to: 184-190
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@frontend/src/pages/AddMonitoringService.tsx` around lines 29 - 35, When submitting in handleSubmit, add a guard that if slackEnabled is true then the webhook state must be non-empty and a valid URL (e.g., validate with a simple regex or try new URL(webhook)); if invalid call toast.error('Please enter a valid Slack webhook URL.') and return so the form does not save a broken Slack destination; apply the same validation to the other Slack-related submit path in this file where Slack settings are processed.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@backend/src/app.js`:
- Around line 59-65: The anonymous app.use middleware currently checks
req.originalUrl exactly which is fragile; change it to detect the Stripe webhook
robustly by normalizing the URL and method before bypassing express.json: strip
any query string and trailing slashes from req.originalUrl (or use req.path
which excludes query), ensure req.method === 'POST', and only then call next()
to let the webhook route use express.raw for signature verification; update the
conditional around express.json (referencing app.use, req.originalUrl/req.path,
req.method, and express.json/express.raw) so webhook requests with trailing
slashes or query strings are correctly bypassed.
In `@backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js`:
- Around line 10-15: The controller currently trusts priceId from req.body
(variable priceId) and throws ApiError only when missing; instead validate
priceId against a server-side whitelist or mapping of allowed Stripe price IDs
(e.g., a constant map of plan -> priceId) and reject any client-supplied ID that
isn’t in that map, returning a 400/403 via ApiError; update the handler that
reads req.body.priceId (and the similar logic at lines 32-39) to look up the
canonical price ID for the user's intended plan (based on server-side plan
identifiers or user role) rather than using the raw priceId, and log or return a
clear error when the provided ID is not recognized.
- Around line 77-85: The switch on event.type declares block-scoped consts
directly in case clauses (const session, const subscription), which can trigger
no-case-declarations/TDZ issues; fix by wrapping each case body in its own block
(e.g., case "checkout.session.completed": { const session = event.data.object;
await handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session); break; } and similarly for the
subscription cases) or move the declarations above the switch or rename to
non-block-scoped vars; ensure you update the case handling that calls
handleCheckoutSessionCompleted and handleSubscriptionUpdated so each const is
declared inside a proper { } block to eliminate scope/fallthrough hazards.
In `@backend/src/models/monitoring.model.js`:
- Around line 42-50: The alertChannels schema currently allows arbitrary
webhookUrl values (alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and
alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl) which can enable SSRF; add server-side
validation on those fields to only accept safe HTTP(S) endpoints and reject
private/internal hosts and non-HTTP schemes. Implement a custom mongoose
validator (or use the validator package) for the webhookUrl fields that: 1)
requires url scheme https?; 2) resolves/parses the host and rejects IP addresses
in private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), localhost/127.0.0.0/8, and IPv6
loopback/link-local addresses; and 3) rejects non-URL schemes (file:, data:,
etc.) and empty values if enabled is true; return validation errors when checks
fail. Ensure the validator is applied on both alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and
alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl so invalid URLs are blocked at the model level.
In `@backend/src/models/user.model.js`:
- Around line 41-47: The schema fields stripeCustomerId and stripeSubscriptionId
are not uniquely indexed, allowing duplicates that can mis-associate webhooks;
update the Mongoose User schema by adding unique sparse indexes for these fields
(either set { unique: true, sparse: true } on the stripeCustomerId and
stripeSubscriptionId field definitions or add schema.index({ stripeCustomerId: 1
}, { unique: true, sparse: true }) and similarly for stripeSubscriptionId) so
User.findOne({ stripeCustomerId: customerId }) reliably returns the correct
user; ensure index creation is handled safely for existing data (remove/clean
duplicates first or create the index with background handling as appropriate).
In `@backend/src/routes/stripe.routes.js`:
- Around line 15-16: Add a rate-limiter middleware to the subscription routes to
throttle abuse: create a subscriptionRateLimiter (e.g., using
express-rate-limit) with a reasonable window and max (and optional IP
whitelist/backoff) and import it into this file, then apply it to the two routes
so they read
router.route("/create-checkout-session").post(subscriptionRateLimiter,
verifyJWT, createCheckoutSession) and
router.route("/status").get(subscriptionRateLimiter, verifyJWT,
getSubscriptionStatus); ensure the limiter is exported/initialized (name
subscriptionRateLimiter) and configured before heavy DB/auth work so
createCheckoutSession and getSubscriptionStatus are protected.
In `@frontend/src/pages/AddMonitoringService.tsx`:
- Around line 44-49: The alertChannels payload and UI only include Slack; add
Discord fields and inputs so users can configure it: add state variables (e.g.,
discordEnabled, discordWebhook) alongside slackEnabled/slackWebhook in the
AddMonitoringService component, render a Discord toggle and webhook input in the
same section that renders Slack (mirror the Slack UI logic), and include a
discord object in the request payload under alertChannels (e.g., alertChannels:
{ slack: { enabled: slackEnabled, webhookUrl: slackWebhook }, discord: {
enabled: discordEnabled, webhookUrl: discordWebhook } }). Ensure form validation
and submission handlers (the same functions handling Slack) are updated to read
the new discord state variables.
- Around line 122-123: Add server-side plan/entitlement checks and strict
validation in the monitoring controller: in
backend/src/controllers/monitoring.controller.js, update the createMonitoring
and updateMonitoring handlers to read req.user.plan /
req.user.subscriptionStatus and reject or restrict premium-only fields
(interval, regions, alertChannels) when the user lacks entitlement; for updates
avoid unvalidated findByIdAndUpdate — either load the Monitoring via findById,
set allowed fields from req.body and call document.save() (or use
findByIdAndUpdate with {runValidators:true, context:'query'}) and enforce an
interval minimum (e.g., >= 60s) and whitelist regions/alertChannels; return 403
for unauthorized attempts and ensure persisted values come from req.body only
when permitted.
In `@frontend/src/pages/Pricing.tsx`:
- Line 25: Replace the hardcoded placeholder price ID fallbacks with null so
missing env vars don't enable broken checkout flows: change the priceId
assignments that currently use import.meta.env.VITE_STRIPE_PRO_PRICE_ID ||
"PRO_PRICE_ID" and import.meta.env.VITE_STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_PRICE_ID ||
"ENTERPRISE_PRICE_ID" (and any other similar priceId fallbacks in this file) to
use null as the fallback (e.g., import.meta.env.VITE_STRIPE_PRO_PRICE_ID ||
null), and ensure any UI or button logic that reads these priceId values (the
pricing item objects / checkout initiation code) treats null as "disabled" to
prevent attempting checkout when the price ID is not configured.
In `@service/src/jobs/monitorJob.js`:
- Around line 82-88: The current conditional (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" ||
(service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) can allow duplicate updates; change
both occurrences so only the service's primary region performs updates: compute
primaryRegion = service.regions[0] (or directly use service.regions[0]) and
replace the OR condition with a single equality check CURRENT_REGION ===
primaryRegion before calling updateMonitoringStatus (both the success call that
uses savedLog.status/result and the catch call that sets 'offline' with error
info).
- Around line 56-64: The scheduled callbacks capture the stale service object
(they pass `service` into cron.schedule) so runtime updates (target/regions)
aren’t picked up and the restart only checks `interval`; change the scheduled
callback to look up the latest service config by id at execution time (e.g.,
replace () => runServiceCheck(service) with () => { const latest =
getServiceById(serviceId); runServiceCheck(latest); }) so runServiceCheck always
receives current settings, and when evaluating whether to restart an existing
job (the logic around activeJobs and currentJob), compare or watch service
config changes (not just interval) or always recreate the job when the service
config object identity/fields differ so the activeJobs entry and its cron
handler remain in sync with the latest service state.
- Around line 47-49: The cronSchedule can become invalid when
Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60) yields 0 for tiny sub-minute intervals; in
monitorJob.js where cronSchedule is built from intervalInMinutes, ensure the
seconds part is at least 1 (e.g., compute seconds = Math.round(intervalInMinutes
* 60) and clamp with Math.max(1, seconds) before using in cronSchedule) to avoid
producing `*/0`; additionally, in the update path that uses findByIdAndUpdate
(the updateMonitoring operation), enable Mongoose validation by passing {
runValidators: true } (and any needed new: true) so the schema min constraint on
interval (0.5) is enforced on updates.
In `@service/src/services/alertService.js`:
- Around line 28-42: The code presently POSTs tenant-supplied webhookUrl
(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl / alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl) directly
which enables SSRF; before each axios.post in the Slack and Discord blocks in
alertService.js validate the webhook URL by parsing it (new URL(webhookUrl)) and
allow only trusted hostnames/patterns (e.g. Slack’s hook domains like
*.hooks.slack.com and Discord’s accepted domains such as discord.com or
discordapp.com or your configured enterprise webhook hosts) using a strict
allowlist; if the hostname does not match the allowlist, skip the post and
log/record a warning (include webhookUrl masked or hostname only), and ensure
the same validation is applied wherever alertChannels.*.webhookUrl is used to
prevent internal/private endpoint requests.
- Around line 30-42: Add request timeouts for outbound webhook calls in the
Slack and Discord alert blocks inside alertService.js: when calling axios.post
in the Slack block and the Discord block (the two places using axios.post with
alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl), pass a
timeout option (or switch to a shared axios instance with a default timeout) so
a hung webhook won't stall the alert pipeline; ensure the axios.post calls
include a timeout value and that the catch handlers will handle timeout errors
the same as other failures.
---
Outside diff comments:
In `@frontend/src/pages/AddMonitoringService.tsx`:
- Around line 29-35: When submitting in handleSubmit, add a guard that if
slackEnabled is true then the webhook state must be non-empty and a valid URL
(e.g., validate with a simple regex or try new URL(webhook)); if invalid call
toast.error('Please enter a valid Slack webhook URL.') and return so the form
does not save a broken Slack destination; apply the same validation to the other
Slack-related submit path in this file where Slack settings are processed.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: 55f19d58-5e4f-45d2-bb2b-4b40c1503a24
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (3)
backend/package-lock.jsonis excluded by!**/package-lock.jsonfrontend/package-lock.jsonis excluded by!**/package-lock.jsonservice/package-lock.jsonis excluded by!**/package-lock.json
📒 Files selected for processing (17)
backend/package.jsonbackend/src/app.jsbackend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.jsbackend/src/models/monitoring.model.jsbackend/src/models/user.model.jsbackend/src/routes/stripe.routes.jsfrontend/package.jsonfrontend/src/App.tsxfrontend/src/pages/AddMonitoringService.tsxfrontend/src/pages/Pricing.tsxfrontend/src/pages/dashboard/Profile.tsxservice/package.jsonservice/src/jobs/monitorJob.jsservice/src/models/monitoring.model.jsservice/src/models/user.model.jsservice/src/services/alertService.jsservice/src/services/monitoringService.js
| app.use((req, res, next) => { | ||
| if (req.originalUrl === "/api/v1/stripe/webhook") { | ||
| next(); | ||
| } else { | ||
| express.json({ limit: "50kb" })(req, res, next); | ||
| } | ||
| }); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Harden webhook raw-body bypass matching.
The exact req.originalUrl check is fragile; a trailing slash or query string can route webhook requests through express.json(), which breaks Stripe signature verification.
Suggested fix
+const jsonParser = express.json({ limit: "50kb" });
+
app.use((req, res, next) => {
- if (req.originalUrl === "/api/v1/stripe/webhook") {
+ const isStripeWebhook = req.method === "POST" && /^\/api\/v1\/stripe\/webhook\/?$/.test(req.path);
+ if (isStripeWebhook) {
next();
} else {
- express.json({ limit: "50kb" })(req, res, next);
+ jsonParser(req, res, next);
}
});🧰 Tools
🪛 GitHub Check: CodeQL
[failure] 64-64: Missing CSRF middleware
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
This cookie middleware is serving a request handler without CSRF protection.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@backend/src/app.js` around lines 59 - 65, The anonymous app.use middleware
currently checks req.originalUrl exactly which is fragile; change it to detect
the Stripe webhook robustly by normalizing the URL and method before bypassing
express.json: strip any query string and trailing slashes from req.originalUrl
(or use req.path which excludes query), ensure req.method === 'POST', and only
then call next() to let the webhook route use express.raw for signature
verification; update the conditional around express.json (referencing app.use,
req.originalUrl/req.path, req.method, and express.json/express.raw) so webhook
requests with trailing slashes or query strings are correctly bypassed.
| const { priceId } = req.body; | ||
| const user = req.user; | ||
|
|
||
| if (!priceId) { | ||
| throw new ApiError(400, "Price ID is required"); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Reject arbitrary client-supplied Stripe price IDs.
priceId from the request body is trusted directly. A client can submit any valid Stripe price under your account, bypassing intended plan gating.
Suggested fix
const createCheckoutSession = asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { priceId } = req.body;
const user = req.user;
+ const allowedPriceIds = new Set([
+ process.env.STRIPE_PRO_PLAN_ID,
+ process.env.STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_PLAN_ID,
+ ].filter(Boolean));
if (!priceId) {
throw new ApiError(400, "Price ID is required");
}
+ if (!allowedPriceIds.has(priceId)) {
+ throw new ApiError(400, "Invalid price ID");
+ }Also applies to: 32-39
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js` around lines 10 - 15, The
controller currently trusts priceId from req.body (variable priceId) and throws
ApiError only when missing; instead validate priceId against a server-side
whitelist or mapping of allowed Stripe price IDs (e.g., a constant map of plan
-> priceId) and reject any client-supplied ID that isn’t in that map, returning
a 400/403 via ApiError; update the handler that reads req.body.priceId (and the
similar logic at lines 32-39) to look up the canonical price ID for the user's
intended plan (based on server-side plan identifiers or user role) rather than
using the raw priceId, and log or return a clear error when the provided ID is
not recognized.
| switch (event.type) { | ||
| case "checkout.session.completed": | ||
| const session = event.data.object; | ||
| await handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session); | ||
| break; | ||
| case "customer.subscription.updated": | ||
| case "customer.subscription.deleted": | ||
| const subscription = event.data.object; | ||
| await handleSubscriptionUpdated(subscription); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🧩 Analysis chain
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#!/bin/bash
# Verify switch-case declarations that need block scoping
rg -nP 'case\s+"[^"]+"\s*:\s*$|^\s*const\s+\w+\s*=' backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js -n -C2Repository: elonerajeev/Pulse-Monitor
Length of output: 2563
Wrap switch case bodies in braces to avoid const scope hazards.
backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js declares const session / const subscription directly inside case clauses; wrap each case body in { ... } (or refactor declarations) to prevent no-case-declarations scoping/TDZ issues and reduce fallthrough-risk.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome (2.4.16)
[error] 79-79: Other switch clauses can erroneously access this declaration.
Wrap the declaration in a block to restrict its access to the switch clause.
(lint/correctness/noSwitchDeclarations)
[error] 84-84: Other switch clauses can erroneously access this declaration.
Wrap the declaration in a block to restrict its access to the switch clause.
(lint/correctness/noSwitchDeclarations)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js` around lines 77 - 85, The
switch on event.type declares block-scoped consts directly in case clauses
(const session, const subscription), which can trigger no-case-declarations/TDZ
issues; fix by wrapping each case body in its own block (e.g., case
"checkout.session.completed": { const session = event.data.object; await
handleCheckoutSessionCompleted(session); break; } and similarly for the
subscription cases) or move the declarations above the switch or rename to
non-block-scoped vars; ensure you update the case handling that calls
handleCheckoutSessionCompleted and handleSubscriptionUpdated so each const is
declared inside a proper { } block to eliminate scope/fallthrough hazards.
Source: Linters/SAST tools
| alertChannels: { | ||
| slack: { | ||
| enabled: { type: Boolean, default: false }, | ||
| webhookUrl: { type: String, trim: true }, | ||
| }, | ||
| discord: { | ||
| enabled: { type: Boolean, default: false }, | ||
| webhookUrl: { type: String, trim: true }, | ||
| }, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Validate webhook URLs server-side to block SSRF paths.
Line 45 and Line 49 accept arbitrary URLs. If the alert sender posts to them directly, tenants can target internal/private endpoints.
Suggested validation direction
slack: {
enabled: { type: Boolean, default: false },
- webhookUrl: { type: String, trim: true },
+ webhookUrl: {
+ type: String,
+ trim: true,
+ validate: {
+ validator: (v) => !v || /^https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/.+/.test(v),
+ message: "Invalid Slack webhook URL",
+ },
+ },
},
discord: {
enabled: { type: Boolean, default: false },
- webhookUrl: { type: String, trim: true },
+ webhookUrl: {
+ type: String,
+ trim: true,
+ validate: {
+ validator: (v) => !v || /^https:\/\/(discord\.com|canary\.discord\.com)\/api\/webhooks\/.+/.test(v),
+ message: "Invalid Discord webhook URL",
+ },
+ },
},🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@backend/src/models/monitoring.model.js` around lines 42 - 50, The
alertChannels schema currently allows arbitrary webhookUrl values
(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl) which can
enable SSRF; add server-side validation on those fields to only accept safe
HTTP(S) endpoints and reject private/internal hosts and non-HTTP schemes.
Implement a custom mongoose validator (or use the validator package) for the
webhookUrl fields that: 1) requires url scheme https?; 2) resolves/parses the
host and rejects IP addresses in private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16),
localhost/127.0.0.0/8, and IPv6 loopback/link-local addresses; and 3) rejects
non-URL schemes (file:, data:, etc.) and empty values if enabled is true; return
validation errors when checks fail. Ensure the validator is applied on both
alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl so invalid
URLs are blocked at the model level.
| stripeCustomerId: { | ||
| type: String, | ||
| }, | ||
|
|
||
| stripeSubscriptionId: { | ||
| type: String, | ||
| }, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
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set -euo pipefail
# Inspect the exact schema section in question
ls -la backend/src/models/user.model.js
sed -n '1,120p' backend/src/models/user.model.js
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rg -n "index|unique|sparse|stripeCustomerId|stripeSubscriptionId" backend/src/models/user.model.js
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rg -n "stripeCustomerId|stripeSubscriptionId" backend/src --glob='*.js' --glob='*.ts'
rg -n "ensureIndex|createIndex|mongoose\\.model\\(|schema\\.index\\(|indexes" backend/src --glob='*.js' --glob='*.ts'
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rg -n "schema\.index\\(|indexes\\s*:" backend/src/models/user.model.js
rg -n "createIndex|ensureIndex" backend/src/models/user.model.js
# Compare service copy if present
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ls -la service/src/models/user.model.js
sed -n '1,120p' service/src/models/user.model.js
# Search entire backend for any explicit index creation related to these fields
rg -n "createIndex|ensureIndex|schema\.index|indexes\s*:" backend/src --glob='*.js' --glob='*.ts'
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rg -n "stripeCustomerId|stripeSubscriptionId" backend/src --glob='*.js' --glob='*.ts'
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Add unique sparse indexes for stripeCustomerId / stripeSubscriptionId to prevent webhook mis-association.
backend/src/models/user.model.js defines stripeCustomerId and stripeSubscriptionId without uniqueness. In backend/src/controllers/stripe.controller.js, webhook handling uses User.findOne({ stripeCustomerId: customerId }), so duplicate stripeCustomerId values can cause subscription updates to be applied to the wrong user.
Suggested schema update
stripeCustomerId: {
type: String,
+ unique: true,
+ sparse: true,
+ index: true,
},
stripeSubscriptionId: {
type: String,
+ unique: true,
+ sparse: true,
+ index: true,
},🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@backend/src/models/user.model.js` around lines 41 - 47, The schema fields
stripeCustomerId and stripeSubscriptionId are not uniquely indexed, allowing
duplicates that can mis-associate webhooks; update the Mongoose User schema by
adding unique sparse indexes for these fields (either set { unique: true,
sparse: true } on the stripeCustomerId and stripeSubscriptionId field
definitions or add schema.index({ stripeCustomerId: 1 }, { unique: true, sparse:
true }) and similarly for stripeSubscriptionId) so User.findOne({
stripeCustomerId: customerId }) reliably returns the correct user; ensure index
creation is handled safely for existing data (remove/clean duplicates first or
create the index with background handling as appropriate).
| if (intervalInMinutes < 1) { | ||
| // e.g. 0.5 min = 30 seconds | ||
| cronSchedule = `*/${Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60)} * * * * *`; |
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🌐 Web query:
node-cron "*/0" cron expression invalid step value 0
💡 Result:
In node-cron, a step value of 0 is invalid because it represents a mathematical impossibility (division by zero or infinite frequency) [1]. Cron step syntax typically uses the format range/step, where the step defines the interval of execution [2][3]. Because a step of 0 does not define a valid repeating interval, it is logically inconsistent with cron scheduling [2][4]. Historically, passing 0 as a step in node-cron could cause the library to enter a blocking infinite loop [1]. This issue was addressed in version 3.1.5 of node-cron, which implemented detection for invalid step values—including multiple zeros—to prevent such loops [1]. To define valid intervals, you must use a positive integer as the step value [2]. For example: - /2 runs every 2 units [2][4]. - 1-59/5 runs every 5 units starting from 1 [2]. You can verify whether a cron expression is valid by using the built-in validation method provided by node-cron: cron.validate('/0 * * * '); // Returns false [5] cron.validate('/2 * * * *'); // Returns true [5]
Citations:
- 1: cron runs into infinite loop when providing two or more zeros as step kelektiv/node-cron#742
- 2: https://www.nodecron.com/cron-syntax.html
- 3: https://man.archlinux.org/man/crontab.5.en
- 4: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/27412483/how-do-cron-steps-work
- 5: zero hour node-cron/node-cron#448
Guard against invalid */0 cron schedules for sub-minute intervals (via rounded seconds).
service/src/jobs/monitorJob.js builds the sub-minute schedule with Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60); very small positive values can round to 0, producing */0 * * * * * (invalid cron, can prevent jobs from being scheduled). The Monitoring schema enforces min: 0.5 on create, but updateMonitoring uses findByIdAndUpdate without { runValidators: true }, so tiny intervals can bypass schema checks.
Suggested fix
let cronSchedule;
if (intervalInMinutes < 1) {
- // e.g. 0.5 min = 30 seconds
- cronSchedule = `*/${Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60)} * * * * *`;
+ const seconds = Math.max(1, Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60));
+ cronSchedule = `*/${seconds} * * * * * *`;
} else {
cronSchedule = `*/${Math.floor(intervalInMinutes)} * * * *`;
}Also enable Mongoose validation on update (runValidators: true) to keep interval constraints consistent.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@service/src/jobs/monitorJob.js` around lines 47 - 49, The cronSchedule can
become invalid when Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60) yields 0 for tiny
sub-minute intervals; in monitorJob.js where cronSchedule is built from
intervalInMinutes, ensure the seconds part is at least 1 (e.g., compute seconds
= Math.round(intervalInMinutes * 60) and clamp with Math.max(1, seconds) before
using in cronSchedule) to avoid producing `*/0`; additionally, in the update
path that uses findByIdAndUpdate (the updateMonitoring operation), enable
Mongoose validation by passing { runValidators: true } (and any needed new:
true) so the schema min constraint on interval (0.5) is enforced on updates.
| if (!currentJob) { | ||
| const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(service)); | ||
| activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes }); | ||
| console.log(`Started monitoring job for service: ${service.name} (${serviceId}) every ${intervalInMinutes} min in region ${CURRENT_REGION}`); | ||
| } else if (currentJob.interval !== intervalInMinutes) { | ||
| // Interval changed, restart the job | ||
| currentJob.job.stop(); | ||
| const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(service)); | ||
| activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes }); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Cron callbacks capture stale service config and miss runtime updates.
Line 57 and Line 63 pass the full service object into scheduled callbacks, and restart logic only checks interval. If target/regions change with same interval, jobs keep using old values.
Suggested fix
-const activeJobs = new Map();
+const activeJobs = new Map(); // key -> { job, interval, signature }
@@
- if (!currentJob) {
- const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(service));
- activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes });
+ const signature = JSON.stringify({
+ target: service.target,
+ regions: service.regions,
+ interval: intervalInMinutes,
+ });
+
+ if (!currentJob) {
+ const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(serviceId));
+ activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes, signature });
console.log(`Started monitoring job for service: ${service.name} (${serviceId}) every ${intervalInMinutes} min in region ${CURRENT_REGION}`);
- } else if (currentJob.interval !== intervalInMinutes) {
+ } else if (currentJob.interval !== intervalInMinutes || currentJob.signature !== signature) {
// Interval changed, restart the job
currentJob.job.stop();
- const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(service));
- activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes });
+ const job = cron.schedule(cronSchedule, () => runServiceCheck(serviceId));
+ activeJobs.set(serviceId, { job, interval: intervalInMinutes, signature });
console.log(`Updated monitoring interval for service: ${service.name} (${serviceId}) to ${intervalInMinutes} min`);
}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@service/src/jobs/monitorJob.js` around lines 56 - 64, The scheduled callbacks
capture the stale service object (they pass `service` into cron.schedule) so
runtime updates (target/regions) aren’t picked up and the restart only checks
`interval`; change the scheduled callback to look up the latest service config
by id at execution time (e.g., replace () => runServiceCheck(service) with () =>
{ const latest = getServiceById(serviceId); runServiceCheck(latest); }) so
runServiceCheck always receives current settings, and when evaluating whether to
restart an existing job (the logic around activeJobs and currentJob), compare or
watch service config changes (not just interval) or always recreate the job when
the service config object identity/fields differ so the activeJobs entry and its
cron handler remain in sync with the latest service state.
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | ||
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | ||
| } | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | ||
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | ||
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Primary-region condition can trigger duplicate status updates/alerts.
Line 82 and Line 87 allow updates when region is us-east-1 or first configured region. In multi-region services where first region is not us-east-1, both regions can still send updates.
Suggested fix
- if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) {
+ const primaryRegion = service.regions?.[0] || "us-east-1";
+ if (CURRENT_REGION === primaryRegion) {
await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result);
}
@@
- if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) {
+ const primaryRegion = service.regions?.[0] || "us-east-1";
+ if (CURRENT_REGION === primaryRegion) {
await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION });
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | |
| } | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); | |
| const primaryRegion = service.regions?.[0] || "us-east-1"; | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === primaryRegion) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, savedLog.status, result); | |
| } | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error(`Error monitoring service ${service.name} in ${CURRENT_REGION}:`, error); | |
| const primaryRegion = service.regions?.[0] || "us-east-1"; | |
| if (CURRENT_REGION === primaryRegion) { | |
| await updateMonitoringStatus(service._id, 'offline', { error: error.message, region: CURRENT_REGION }); | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@service/src/jobs/monitorJob.js` around lines 82 - 88, The current conditional
(CURRENT_REGION === "us-east-1" || (service.regions[0] === CURRENT_REGION)) can
allow duplicate updates; change both occurrences so only the service's primary
region performs updates: compute primaryRegion = service.regions[0] (or directly
use service.regions[0]) and replace the OR condition with a single equality
check CURRENT_REGION === primaryRegion before calling updateMonitoringStatus
(both the success call that uses savedLog.status/result and the catch call that
sets 'offline' with error info).
| if (alertChannels?.slack?.enabled && alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl) { | ||
| try { | ||
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | ||
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| const info = await transporter.sendMail({ | ||
| from: `"PulseMonitor" <${process.env.FROM_EMAIL}>`, | ||
| to, | ||
| subject, | ||
| html: htmlBody, | ||
| }); | ||
| logger.info(`Email sent to ${to}: ${info.messageId}`); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| logger.error(`Error sending email to ${to}:`, error); | ||
| throw error; // Re-throw to be handled by the caller | ||
| } | ||
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | ||
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | ||
| try { | ||
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | ||
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Restrict webhook destinations to trusted Slack/Discord hosts before posting.
Line 30 and Line 41 post directly to tenant-provided webhookUrl. With only string storage upstream (service/src/models/monitoring.model.js Lines 42-51), this is an SSRF path to internal/private endpoints.
Suggested fix
+const ALLOWED_WEBHOOK_HOSTS = {
+ slack: new Set(["hooks.slack.com"]),
+ discord: new Set(["discord.com", "discordapp.com", "canary.discord.com"]),
+};
+
+const isAllowedWebhook = (url, channel) => {
+ try {
+ const parsed = new URL(url);
+ return parsed.protocol === "https:" && ALLOWED_WEBHOOK_HOSTS[channel].has(parsed.hostname);
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+};
+
// 2. Slack Alert (Premium)
-if (alertChannels?.slack?.enabled && alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl) {
+if (
+ alertChannels?.slack?.enabled &&
+ alertChannels?.slack?.webhookUrl &&
+ isAllowedWebhook(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, "slack")
+) {
try {
await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, {
text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`,
@@
// 3. Discord Alert (Premium)
-if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) {
+if (
+ alertChannels?.discord?.enabled &&
+ alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl &&
+ isAllowedWebhook(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, "discord")
+) {
try {
await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, {
content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`,🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@service/src/services/alertService.js` around lines 28 - 42, The code
presently POSTs tenant-supplied webhookUrl (alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl /
alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl) directly which enables SSRF; before each
axios.post in the Slack and Discord blocks in alertService.js validate the
webhook URL by parsing it (new URL(webhookUrl)) and allow only trusted
hostnames/patterns (e.g. Slack’s hook domains like *.hooks.slack.com and
Discord’s accepted domains such as discord.com or discordapp.com or your
configured enterprise webhook hosts) using a strict allowlist; if the hostname
does not match the allowlist, skip the post and log/record a warning (include
webhookUrl masked or hostname only), and ensure the same validation is applied
wherever alertChannels.*.webhookUrl is used to prevent internal/private endpoint
requests.
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | ||
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| const info = await transporter.sendMail({ | ||
| from: `"PulseMonitor" <${process.env.FROM_EMAIL}>`, | ||
| to, | ||
| subject, | ||
| html: htmlBody, | ||
| }); | ||
| logger.info(`Email sent to ${to}: ${info.messageId}`); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| logger.error(`Error sending email to ${to}:`, error); | ||
| throw error; // Re-throw to be handled by the caller | ||
| } | ||
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | ||
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | ||
| try { | ||
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | ||
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
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# Verify outbound axios posts in service layer and whether timeout is consistently set
rg -nP --type=js 'axios\.post\(' service/src -C2
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rg -n --type=js --type=ts --type=mjs --type=cjs "axios\.defaults\.timeout|axios\.create\(\{[^}]*timeout|timeout\s*:\s*\d+" . -S
# Find shared axios instance usage in service layer
rg -n --type=js "axios\.post\(" service/src -C1
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sed -n '1,120p' service/src/services/alertService.jsRepository: elonerajeev/Pulse-Monitor
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rg -n --hidden --glob '!**/node_modules/**' \
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# Inspect alertService.js to see how axios is imported/instantiated
sed -n '1,200p' service/src/services/alertService.js
# Check for any shared axios instance exported/imported elsewhere
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rg -n --hidden --glob '!**/node_modules/**' "timeout\s*:\s*\d+" service/src/services || trueRepository: elonerajeev/Pulse-Monitor
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Add timeouts to outbound Slack/Discord webhook calls.
service/src/services/alertService.js lines 30 and 41 call axios.post(...) without timeout, and there’s no axios timeout defaults/instance configured in service/src, so a hung webhook can stall the alert pipeline.
Suggested fix
+const WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
@@
- await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, {
+ await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, {
text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`,
- });
+ }, { timeout: WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_MS });
@@
- await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, {
+ await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, {
content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`,
- });
+ }, { timeout: WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_MS });📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | |
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | |
| }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const info = await transporter.sendMail({ | |
| from: `"PulseMonitor" <${process.env.FROM_EMAIL}>`, | |
| to, | |
| subject, | |
| html: htmlBody, | |
| }); | |
| logger.info(`Email sent to ${to}: ${info.messageId}`); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| logger.error(`Error sending email to ${to}:`, error); | |
| throw error; // Re-throw to be handled by the caller | |
| } | |
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | |
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl, { | |
| text: `🚨 *PulseMonitor Alert* 🚨\n*Service:* ${name}\n*Target:* ${target}\n*Status:* ${status}\n*Region:* ${result.region}\n*Time:* ${timestamp}`, | |
| }, { timeout: WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_MS }); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| console.error("Failed to send Slack alert:", error.message); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // 3. Discord Alert (Premium) | |
| if (alertChannels?.discord?.enabled && alertChannels?.discord?.webhookUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| await axios.post(alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl, { | |
| content: `🚨 **PulseMonitor Alert** 🚨\n**Service:** ${name}\n**Target:** ${target}\n**Status:** ${status}\n**Region:** ${result.region}\n**Time:** ${timestamp}`, | |
| }, { timeout: WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT_MS }); |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@service/src/services/alertService.js` around lines 30 - 42, Add request
timeouts for outbound webhook calls in the Slack and Discord alert blocks inside
alertService.js: when calling axios.post in the Slack block and the Discord
block (the two places using axios.post with alertChannels.slack.webhookUrl and
alertChannels.discord.webhookUrl), pass a timeout option (or switch to a shared
axios instance with a default timeout) so a hung webhook won't stall the alert
pipeline; ensure the axios.post calls include a timeout value and that the catch
handlers will handle timeout errors the same as other failures.
3 participants
I have transformed PulseMonitor into a comprehensive, enterprise-ready SaaS platform. Key enhancements include:
PR created automatically by Jules for task 9852363616400443156 started by @elonerajeev
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
New Features
Dependencies