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block: serialize a header with its AuxPoW (stacked on #393) - #394

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block: serialize a header with its AuxPoW (stacked on #393)#394
xanimo wants to merge 3 commits into
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xanimo:0.1.5-dev-auxpow-serialize

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@xanimo xanimo commented Aug 4, 2026

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Stacked on #393 (which is stacked on #392). Review only the top commit.

There was no way to write an AuxPoW proof back out. The tree could parse one
and, since #392, retain it — but nothing could emit it, so a header that
arrived over the wire could not be reproduced.

Adds:

  • dogecoin_auxpow_payload_serialize — the proof, in the wire order
    parse_dogecoin_auxpow_fields reads
  • dogecoin_block_header_serialize_full — the 80 base bytes, then the proof
    when the header carries one

dogecoin_block_header_serialize is untouched

It still emits exactly 80 bytes, deliberately. Its output is what four
things are computed over:

  • the block hash (dogecoin_block_header_hash)
  • the scrypt proof of work (headersdb_file.c:345)
  • check_auxpow's own hashing (validation.c:85,100)
  • the fixed-width headers.db record (headersdb_file.c:286)

Making it AuxPoW-aware would change all four. This is the same split Core draws
between CPureBlockHeader and CBlockHeader, for the same reason.

The full form keys off whether the proof is present rather than off version
bit 0x100 alone, so a header carrying the bit without a proof serializes as
the 80 bytes it actually has rather than emitting a truncated blob.

Test

Round-trips the height-371338 mainnet vector: parse it, write it back, require
byte-identity with the input. Emitting something merely well-formed is not
enough — the whole point is that hashes and short IDs computed over the output
match Core's, which only holds if the bytes match exactly. The pure form is
asserted to stay at 80 bytes and match the first 80 of the input.

The first bite-check was worthless and is worth recording. It swapped
parent_merkle_index with aux_merkle_index — both zero in this block — so the
output was identical and the test passed with the bug in place. Zeroing
parent_hash instead fails it at the memcmp. A mutation that does not change
the bytes proves nothing about a byte comparison.

WITH_NET=ON with -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1: 78/78. WITH_NET=OFF: 72/72.
ASAN+UBSAN with leak detection: 78/78, clean.

What it unblocks

The encode side of dogecoin_compact_block_serialize, which currently fails
rather than emit 80 bytes for a merge-mined header it has no proof for. With
this, libdogecoin can originate a cmpctblock for a block it assembled rather
than only relay one it received. Wiring that is a change on the BIP152 branch,
not here.

xanimo added 3 commits August 5, 2026 14:04
dogecoin_block_header carried an auxpow member holding only the validation
hook -- check, ctx and is -- never the proof itself. The proof was built
into a local dogecoin_auxpow_block inside dogecoin_block_header_deserialize
and freed at cleanup, so by the time the caller had its header the parent
coinbase, merkle branches and parent header were gone.

dogecoin_block_header_copy made that worse by looking complete: it copied
the three hook fields, so a copied merge-mined header was silently missing
its proof with nothing to indicate it.

Anything needing the proof after the parse therefore had to re-parse the
wire bytes, or retain them separately. That is why BIP152 keeps a
header_raw span on dogecoin_compact_block: not because a compact block
wants raw bytes, but because the parsed header could not answer for
itself.

Add dogecoin_auxpow_payload, owned by the header. The deserializer moves
the parsed fields onto it and nulls them on the scratch block, so ownership
transfers rather than duplicating; _free releases it; _copy deep-copies it.

The payload deliberately has no back-pointer to its header, unlike
dogecoin_auxpow_block, which owns both its header and its parent_header and
frees them. A header holding one of those would own the thing that owns it.
The payload owns only parent_header, a plain 80-byte header whose own
payload is NULL, so ownership terminates.

auxpow.check / auxpow.ctx are untouched. That is a validation hook whose
context the caller supplies at call time -- validation.c passes the block
directly -- not a reference to this data.

dogecoin_block_header_copy assigns the copied payload rather than freeing
what dest held. Every other field there is a plain overwrite: the function
treats dest as raw memory, and callers pass uninitialised stack headers to
it -- net_tests.c does, through dogecoin_block_header_deserialize. Freeing
dest->auxpow_payload dereferenced whatever the stack contained, which is a
SEGV on eight platforms and the reason ASAN caught this and a local build
did not: every local caller happened to use dogecoin_block_header_new,
where the pointer is NULL. A dest that already owns a payload is the
caller's to release, as with every other member.

The test extends the height-371338 vector: the proof survives the parse, a
copy owns an independent one, and freeing the source leaves the copy
intact, which it can only do if nothing is shared. Disabling just the deep
copy fails it at line 351.

WITH_NET=ON with -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1: 78/78. WITH_NET=OFF: 72/72.
ASAN+UBSAN: 78/78, no leaks.
check_auxpow ran inside dogecoin_block_header_deserialize, so every caller
that wanted a header's fields paid for scrypt work over the parent chain
during parsing, before any peer-level gating could decide whether the
message was worth the effort. Core defers this to CheckBlock.

Split into dogecoin_block_header_parse, which reads the base fields and,
when version bit 0x100 is set, the AuxPoW proof, and
dogecoin_block_header_validate, which runs check_auxpow and fills
chainwork.

The split is deliberately this way round. Making dogecoin_block_header_
deserialize the pure parse and adding a _checked variant would silently
stop verifying proof of work for every existing caller of the name, with
no compile error anywhere to catch it. Wrong direction for a symbol whose
job is validation. Instead the existing name keeps its signature and its
behaviour -- it is now parse followed by validate -- and the opt-out is
explicit at the call site.

deserialize_dogecoin_auxpow_block is split the same way and keeps its
signature: parse_dogecoin_auxpow_fields does the reading, the public
function adds the check.

Validation needs the proof to still exist after parsing, which is what the
preceding commit made possible. check_auxpow takes a dogecoin_auxpow_block,
so validate builds one that borrows from the header and its payload. It is
never freed: dogecoin_auxpow_block_free would take the header and
parent_header with it, which is the ownership tangle the payload type
exists to avoid.

A header with no AuxPoW validates trivially. Its proof of work is over the
80 base bytes and belongs to the caller -- headersdb_file.c already runs
check_pow itself for that case and fills chainwork. That asymmetry is
unchanged.

Verified by stubbing check_auxpow to always fail: dogecoin_block_header_
parse still succeeds, dogecoin_block_header_validate does not. A refactor
that merely moved the call would fail both. The test also asserts the
deferred chainwork equals what the parse-and-validate path computes, so
the split does not change the answer.

WITH_NET=ON with -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1: 78/78. WITH_NET=OFF: 72/72.
ASAN+UBSAN with leak detection: 78/78, clean.
There was no way to write an AuxPoW proof back out. The tree could parse
one and, since the preceding commits, retain it, but nothing could emit it,
so a header that arrived over the wire could not be reproduced.

Add dogecoin_auxpow_payload_serialize, in the wire order
parse_dogecoin_auxpow_fields reads, and dogecoin_block_header_serialize_full,
which writes the 80 base bytes and then the proof when the header carries
one.

dogecoin_block_header_serialize is untouched and still emits exactly 80
bytes. That is deliberate: its output is what the block hash, the scrypt
proof of work, check_auxpow's own hashing and the fixed-width headers.db
record are computed over. Making it AuxPoW-aware would change all four.
This is the same split Core draws between CPureBlockHeader and
CBlockHeader, and the same reason.

The full form keys off whether the proof is present rather than off version
bit 0x100 alone, so a header carrying the bit without a proof serializes as
the 80 bytes it actually has instead of emitting a truncated blob.

Tested by round-tripping the height-371338 mainnet vector: parse it, write
it back, and require the result to be byte-identical to the bytes it came
from. Emitting something merely well-formed is not enough -- the point of
this is that short IDs and hashes computed over the output match Core's,
which only holds if the bytes match exactly. The pure form is asserted to
stay at 80 bytes and to match the first 80 of the input.

The first attempt at checking that test had no bite: it swapped
parent_merkle_index with aux_merkle_index, which are both zero in this
block, so the output was identical and the test passed either way. Zeroing
parent_hash instead fails it at the memcmp, which is what a real
serialization bug would do.

WITH_NET=ON with -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1: 78/78. WITH_NET=OFF: 72/72.
ASAN+UBSAN with leak detection: 78/78, clean.
@xanimo
xanimo force-pushed the 0.1.5-dev-auxpow-serialize branch from 9fb3c10 to 236c1be Compare August 5, 2026 21:04
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