Dev - #9
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Agent/user access modes
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| const body = scanBodySchema.parse(req.body); | ||
| try { | ||
| return { data: await scanSillyTavernImportRoot(body.rootPath) }; |
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In public multi-user deployments, any authenticated user can submit an arbitrary server path to this endpoint; the scanner enumerates recognized files under that root, and the companion import endpoint copies character, persona, world-info, and chat contents into the caller's account. A normal user who knows another user's SillyTavern installation path can therefore import that user's data. Restrict these endpoints to administrators/local mode and validate the root against an explicit allowlist.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L125-L125
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| const DEFAULT_CORS_ORIGINS = [ | ||
| "http://localhost:5173", | ||
| "http://127.0.0.1:5173", | ||
| ] as const; |
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When the production frontend is built into server/public and served by Express at http://localhost:5000, same-origin mutation requests carry an Origin of http://localhost:5000, but the default allowlist contains only the Vite development origins on port 5173. Consequently rejectDisallowedOrigin returns 403 before routing every POST/PATCH/DELETE in the default built deployment. Include the backend's local origins or accept an origin that matches the request host.
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| data: await resetUserPassword({ | ||
| userId: params.id, | ||
| ...body, | ||
| config, | ||
| }), |
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When an administrator resets their own password from the Users tab, this call revokes every session for the target, including the session authenticating the request, but returns only a user DTO and leaves the frontend marked authenticated. The model then immediately reloads the user list with the revoked cookie, receives 401, and leaves the application in a stale authenticated state even though the reset succeeded. Reject self-targeting here, route it through the own-password flow that issues a replacement session, or explicitly transition the client to logged out.
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