If you think you've found a security issue in Klaudio Panels, email willywg@gmail.com with the details — please don't open a public issue. I aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and to coordinate a fix + disclosure timeline with you.

Please include:

• A minimal reproduction (commands, URLs, files — whatever applies).
• The Klaudio Panels version (macOS menu → About).
• Your OS + version (sw_vers on macOS).
• Any relevant log excerpt from ~/Library/Logs/Klaudio Panels/klaudio.log.

Klaudio Panels is a thin shell that embeds the claude CLI in a PTY and reads project files. The most relevant attack surfaces are:

• Path traversal in the file tree, the klaudio:// deep-link handler, or open_path_with — anything that takes a user-supplied path and acts on it.
• The klaudio:// URL scheme. It accepts an absolute path and opens it as a project. Malicious websites could fire this URL; the current worst case is the user sees an unexpected project in a fresh Claude tab (no writes, no code execution on the path itself). If you find a way to escalate past that, please report it.
• Bytes piped through the PTY. We explicitly don't parse PTY output, but anything we do consume (URLs via the WebLinksAddon, file paths via cmd-click) should resist injection.
• Shell install target: the klaudio wrapper script is symlinked into /usr/local/bin or ~/.local/bin. If the bundled script can be swapped at runtime to escalate, that's a bug.

In scope:

• The Klaudio Panels Tauri app (Rust + SolidJS).
• The bundled klaudio shell wrapper (src-tauri/scripts/klaudio).
• Our custom IPC commands (pty_*, fs::*, git::*, open_in::*, shell_install::*, cli_args::*).

Out of scope (please report to the respective upstreams):

• The claude CLI itself — report to Anthropic.
• xterm.js, Tauri core, portable-pty, notify, git2, etc. — their own security trackers.
• Third-party editors invoked via "Open in".
• Your shell's behavior after running klaudio.

• Gatekeeper warnings from running an unsigned .app. That's a code-signing gap we track separately (see the sprint plans); you can bypass it with xattr -cr "/Applications/Klaudio Panels.app".
• Bugs that require an attacker to already have write access to your home directory.