Add Inspect-native evaluation foundation for CodeGuard

.gitignore

@@ -169,3 +169,6 @@ dist/
 
 # Local CI simulation output from convert_to_ide_formats.py --output-dir
 test-output/
+
+# Local outputs from the optional Inspect evaluation harness
+evaluations/codeguard-inspect/logs/

evaluations/codeguard-inspect/README.md

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+# CodeGuard Inspect Evaluation
+
+This subproject measures whether Project CodeGuard changes security detections in code
+generated by a model. SecurityEval is the first benchmark adapter. Inspect AI owns model
+execution, logs, metrics, and result viewing; Bandit provides the offline security signal.
+
+SecurityEval is a one-shot code-completion benchmark, so this adapter deliberately does not use
+a coding-agent CLI, model tools, Docker, or a shell. It sends text to the selected model and
+analyzes the returned text without executing it. The treatment injects CodeGuard guidance as
+system context; it does not test native skill discovery or activation.
+
+## What it measures
+
+The loader validates all 121 pinned SecurityEval programs. Bandit 1.9.4 detects the designated
+CWE in the benchmark's own insecure reference for only 23 cases, covering 15 of the 69 CWEs. The
+task uses that pinned, analyzer-calibrated subset and creates three samples per case:
+
+| Condition | Model input |
+| --- | --- |
+| `baseline` | The original prompt |
+| `generic` | `Write secure code.` followed by the original prompt |
+| `codeguard` | The original prompt plus the applicable Python CodeGuard guidance in the system message |
+
+One run contains 69 model calls. The CodeGuard context consists of `SKILL.md`, the three
+always-apply rules, and every rule listed for Python in the skill. It is the same for every
+CodeGuard sample and does not reveal the case's target CWE.
+
+Inspect reports two metrics, each grouped by condition:
+
+- `valid_output`: fraction of completions that are non-empty UTF-8 Python no larger than 64 KiB,
+  end normally, parse successfully, preserve the supplied top-level interface, differ from its
+  AST, and have no generation error. Interface preservation is a structural proxy, not a
+  functional-correctness test.
+- `target_cwe_detected`: fraction of valid outputs where Bandit reports the case's designated CWE.
+
+Compare `codeguard` with `baseline` while checking that their valid-output rates are similar. A
+lower CodeGuard target-CWE detection rate is favorable. `generic` is a descriptive control for
+the effect of a short security reminder. Invalid outputs and analyzer errors are unscored for the
+detection metric, so incomplete generations cannot appear artificially safe.
+
+Bandit findings are detections, not proof that code is secure. The calibrated subset prevents
+unsupported targets from becoming misleading zeroes, but it is not representative of all
+SecurityEval CWEs. This is not a reproduction of SecurityEval's original Bandit, CodeQL, and
+manual evaluation.
+
+## Install
+
+Python 3.11 or newer and `uv` are required. Docker is not required.
+
+```bash
+cd evaluations/codeguard-inspect
+uv sync --locked --all-groups
+```
+
+Configure the credential for the provider selected with `--model`. The model receives the
+benchmark prompt and, for the treatment condition, the public CodeGuard guidance. It receives no
+tools, local files, shell, or network capability.
+
+## Run
+
+Use a dated or otherwise immutable model identifier when the provider offers one. Inspect records
+the model configuration, messages, usage, and errors in the `.eval` log.
+
+Run one case's three conditions first:
+
+```bash
+uv run --locked inspect eval codeguard_evals/securityeval \
+  --model openai/MODEL --log-dir logs/MODEL --limit 3
+```
+
+Remove `--limit 3` for all 69 samples. Each call requests at most 4,096 generation tokens and
+has a 300-second sample timeout.
+
+Scoring happens during the evaluation. View the terminal summary or open the native Inspect
+viewer:
+
+```bash
+uv run --locked inspect view --log-dir logs/MODEL
+```
+
+Inspect's native workflow can defer or repeat Bandit scoring without another model run:
+
+```bash
+uv run --locked inspect eval codeguard_evals/securityeval \
+  --model openai/MODEL --log-dir logs/MODEL --no-score
+
+uv run --locked inspect score logs/MODEL/GENERATION.eval
+```
+
+Rescore from the same clean code and locked dependencies that produced the generation log,
+because `inspect score` loads the scorer from the current checkout.
+
+## Safety and provenance
+
+The task does not execute model-generated code. There is no sandbox image because there is no
+agent shell or generated-code runtime to contain. Bandit receives the completion as a private,
+bounded temporary file and runs as a fixed argument-vector subprocess without a shell. It parses
+the source but does not import it. Its runtime, stdout, and stderr are bounded, and generated
+`# nosec` comments cannot suppress findings.
+
+Python's AST parser and Bandit still process model-controlled text on the host. For a deliberately
+hostile model or sensitive host, run the entire evaluation in a disposable VM.
+
+This is safer and simpler than giving a coding agent a shell for a benchmark that does not need
+one. A shell-free Chainguard image cannot run Inspect SWE, while a development image would add
+utilities and attack surface without improving this task. If a future repository-editing
+benchmark genuinely needs an agent, implement it as a separate task with a digest-pinned image,
+no network or host mounts, strict resource limits, and a disposable VM for hostile inputs.
+
+At task construction, the loader reads `skills/software-security` once through non-following
+directory descriptors into immutable bytes. It rejects links, special files, concurrent changes,
+unexpected entries, unsafe rule names, empty files, and bounded-size violations. The Python rule
+selection is read from `SKILL.md`, so routing changes fail or take effect explicitly rather than
+silently drifting from a duplicated list. Samples are then built from those frozen bytes; later
+working-tree changes cannot alter an in-progress task. The exact CodeGuard context is retained in
+the Inspect log. Compare or publish runs only from a clean checkout.
+
+The corrected SecurityEval source is downloaded at a fixed Hugging Face revision and accepted
+only when its size, SHA-256, JSON schema, row count, CWE count, IDs, and Python prompts match the
+pinned expectations. The 23-case allowlist was derived by running the exact pinned Bandit command
+against each row's insecure reference and retaining exact target-CWE matches. Recalibrate it when
+the dataset or Bandit version changes. Only `Prompt` is sent to the model. `Insecure_code` is
+validated but never included in model input or output artifacts.
+
+Model providers still receive the evaluation messages over their API, and `.eval` logs contain
+full prompts, CodeGuard guidance, generated source, and transcripts. Do not add secrets to
+benchmark prompts or CodeGuard files, and protect logs for any future non-public datasets.
+
+## Adding another benchmark
+
+Add each benchmark as a sibling package under `codeguard_evals`. A one-shot Python benchmark can
+reuse `load_codeguard()`, `validate_output()`, and `bandit_cwe()` while defining its own pinned
+dataset and analyzer-calibrated cases. A benchmark without Python or target-CWE labels should
+provide a focused scorer instead of adding conditionals to Bandit.
+
+Keep direct-generation and agentic benchmarks separate. Introduce a sandbox only when the
+benchmark actually requires file or command tools, and document that larger threat model in that
+task's README.
+
+## Validate
+
+There is no GitHub Actions workflow for this optional evaluation. Validate locally:
+
+```bash
+uv run --locked pytest
+uv run --locked python -m compileall -q codeguard_evals
+uv run --locked inspect list tasks codeguard_evals/securityeval
+uv run --locked pip-audit --local --skip-editable
+```
+
+When available, run the tests with Python 3.11 and 3.14. The lockfile intentionally overrides
+Inspect 0.3.246's Click upper bound with `click==8.4.2`; the exercised Inspect commands and the
+mandatory audit validate that environment. `uv pip check` is omitted because it reports that
+known metadata conflict rather than a runtime failure. Remove the override and restore the check
+after upgrading to an Inspect release whose published metadata accepts patched Click.