security: harden the dependency and CI/CD supply chain#30
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Addresses the supply-chain findings from the dependency security review. - Dependabot auto-merge: gate on update-type so only patch/minor bumps are auto-approved+merged; never auto-merge GitHub Actions updates. A green CI run is no longer treated as evidence that a new dependency release is trustworthy. - Pin every GitHub Actions `uses:` to a full commit SHA (version in a trailing comment) instead of a mutable @vn tag, across all workflows. Most important for the third-party softprops/action-gh-release used in the privileged release job. - Enable Gradle dependency verification (gradle/verification-metadata.xml, sha256 for 633 components across the full build+test graph) so a swapped dependency, plugin, or build-script artifact fails resolution. Validated by a clean `build test` run with verification enforced. - Pin the Gradle distribution: add distributionSha256Sum to the wrapper, and add a gradle/actions/wrapper-validation step in CI to verify gradle-wrapper.jar. - Add actions/dependency-review-action as a PR gate (fail-on-severity: high) to block newly introduced dependencies with known high-severity advisories. - Extend Dependabot to the npm ecosystem (the published browser SDK and each demo's Playwright e2e suite), which were previously unmonitored. - Document the build/distribution trust boundary and these mitigations in docs/threat-model.md (new "Supply chain" section + 4th trust boundary). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses the supply-chain findings from the dependency security review. All six recommendations plus a threat-model update, in one commit.
Changes
uses:pinned to a full commit SHA (version in a trailing comment) instead of a mutable@vNtag, across all workflows. Most important for the third-partysoftprops/action-gh-releasein the privileged release job.gradle/verification-metadata.xmlpins sha256 for 633 components across the full build+test graph, so a swapped dependency/plugin/build-script artifact fails resolution.distributionSha256Sumon the wrapper + agradle/actions/wrapper-validationstep in CI.actions/dependency-review-actionwithfail-on-severity: high.Validation
clean build testtwice. The generation run wasBUILD SUCCESSFULend-to-end; the enforcement re-run wasBUILD SUCCESSFUL in 51swith zero dependency-verification failures (Postgres + DynamoDB integration tests executed, so their runtime deps are captured).NoClassDefFoundErrorflake (unrelated to these changes); the subsequent run passed.Requires repo-settings action (cannot be done in code)
SECURITY.md"Report a vulnerability" path.dependency-review-action(default on for public repos).🤖 Generated with Claude Code