Skip to content
Merged
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions THREAT-MODEL.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ What to do:
need.
- Better: use a Telegram account that is logged in only on the phone.
- Turn on Telegram's two-step verification and a passcode on the app.

Risk that remains: real. nodkey cannot see which device pressed a button.
A passkey page is a possible later step.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -814,6 +815,7 @@ handshake.
clients, so other peers cannot crowd out the lines about the clients
(DESIGN.md section 10). So a peer cannot flood the journal, or write a
line into it that looks like an audit anchor.

Risk that remains: there is no limit on the number of connections. Any
peer that can reach the broker port, even without a key, can hold a
connection for up to 10 seconds, and makes the broker do a key exchange
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1159,6 +1161,7 @@ rule (DESIGN.md section 12, decision 3 B) again, but smaller.
as for `nodkey ssh-grant`, DESIGN.md section 13). The client says so,
and the ID is in the `grant_id` of the audit entries of the request. The grant is bounded by its
limits, and the person can cancel it.

Risk that remains: for the time of a grant, anything on the client can
use up to N uses of what it names. After a use, the secret stays on the
agent machine (section 5, item 1). Choose short spans, few uses and
Expand Down
Loading