Out-of-band identity anchors for Attested After-Action Packets published at https://github.com/cjchanh/aaap-challenge.
Packets prove integrity internally. IDENTITY trust — that a pubkey belongs to the claimed operator — can only come from out-of-band publication. This repository IS that out-of-band surface, kept in a separate repository and history from the challenge artifacts so a same-origin rewrite cannot silently control trust.
Fetch anchors from BOTH origins and require agreement before trusting an anchor check:
git clone https://github.com/cjchanh/aaap-challenge # origin 1 (in-repo anchors.json)
git clone https://github.com/cjchanh/aaap-anchors # origin 2 (this mirror)
diff aaap-challenge/anchors.json aaap-anchors/anchors.json
If they disagree, trust NEITHER and treat every packet as unanchored.
aaap-id-2f28c662cb4b30c1— ACTIVE production identity, Ed25519, Keychain custody (never existed as a raw file).aaap-id-ef9eef6cb68a8850— REVOKED (S0 raw-file custody history; pubkey retained so third parties can positively reject its packets).- Registered packet:
packet/in the challenge repo, chain head recorded in anchors.json.
Revocations are rows, never deletions. The registry is append-only in practice: any history rewrite of THIS repository is itself detectable by comparing origins and commit hashes.
Both origins currently live under the same GitHub account. A compromised account could rewrite both. The cross-origin split defends against repository-level and single-history rewrite, not account compromise. A neutral third host is the documented future step (docs/AAAP_TRUST_ROOT.md in the challenge repo).
Integrity of this file set: see SHA256SUMS (signed into the challenge repository's release receipt).