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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ Projects using **Linux** security primitives (and a few Mac exceptions) such as
| [yolo-cage](https://github.com/borenstein/yolo-cage) | Linux containers | Agents run in K8s pods inside a Vagrant VM, with a git dispatcher that classifies commands (LOCAL/BRANCH/MERGE/REMOTE_READ/REMOTE_WRITE/DENIED) and enforces per-branch isolation, a fail-closed mitmproxy egress proxy with LLM-Guard secret scanning and GitHub API operation blocking, TruffleHog pre-push hooks, and Kubernetes NetworkPolicy. |
| 🔥 [code-on-incus](https://github.com/mensfeld/code-on-incus) | Incus, nftables, seccomp, AppArmor | Incus system containers with active threat detection: kernel-level nftables monitoring for reverse shells/C2 connections, DNS tunneling, credential scanning and isolation, network isolation, JSONL audit logging. |
| [OpenShell](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell) | Docker, Podman, Kubernetes, libkrun, MicroVM, credential-injection | NVIDIA's agent sandbox runtime with pluggable compute backends including experimental per-sandbox libkrun MicroVM runtime for stronger isolation. See also [compute runtimes architecture](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/architecture/compute-runtimes.md). |
| [SandBase Harness](https://github.com/sandbaseai/sandbase-harness) | containers, Kubernetes, MCP, audit/replay | Local-first, self-hostable TypeScript agent runtime combining sandboxed tools, credential boundaries, policy controls, persistent sessions, audit logs, event replay, and an MCP bridge. Isolation and security posture depend on the selected deployment/backend. |
| [Omnigent (Omnibox)](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent) | credential-injection, policy | Databricks' open-source meta-harness with bundled sandbox: filesystem/network isolation + credential injection across local or cloud backends (Modal, Daytona, E2B, CoreWeave, Kubernetes, OpenShell). Cedar-style policies pause for approval before risky actions. |
| [MXC](https://github.com/microsoft/mxc) | ProcessContainer, Bubblewrap, LXC, Seatbelt, Hyperlight, MicroVM, Windows Sandbox | Unified sandbox abstraction that selects the strongest available containment backend per platform — from OS process sandboxes up to Hyperlight/NanVix microVMs — behind a single JSON policy schema. See also [Azure Container Apps Sandboxes](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/container-apps/sandboxes-overview). |
| [agentcage](https://github.com/agentcage/agentcage) | Podman, Lima/KVM, Apple Container, secrets-proxy | Defense-in-depth proxy sandbox: inspecting proxy scans every HTTP request/WebSocket/DNS query. Secret injection (placeholders in, real values swapped outbound, redacted inbound), Shannon-entropy+regex payload scanning. Three backends: rootless Podman, Lima/KVM VMs, Apple Container microVMs (macOS 26+). |
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