feat: supply chain security - trivy, sbom, cosign (epic #99)#111
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bgauduch wants to merge 4 commits into
Open
feat: supply chain security - trivy, sbom, cosign (epic #99)#111bgauduch wants to merge 4 commits into
bgauduch wants to merge 4 commits into
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Summary
Implements epic #99 — supply chain security hardening across the CI/CD pipeline.
Changes
Trivy vulnerability scanning (
build-test.yml): Adds a scan step after the Docker build (amd64 test image) usingaquasecurity/trivy-action@0.36.0. Scans OS and library packages, fails the build on unfixed CRITICAL vulnerabilities.SBOM generation (
release.yml): After each release image push, generates a SPDX-JSON Software Bill of Materials usinganchore/sbom-action@v0.24.0and uploads it as a release asset viaanchore/sbom-action/publish-sbom.Cosign keyless image signing (
release.yml): After each release image push, signs the image digest usingsigstore/cosign-installer@v4.1.1with keyless OIDC signing (Sigstore). No long-lived keys required.Least-privilege permissions (all workflows): Adds explicit
permissions:blocks at the workflow level to enforce minimum required permissions:lint-dockerfile.yml:contents: readbuild-test.yml:contents: readpush-latest.yml:contents: read,packages: writerelease.yml:contents: read,packages: write,id-token: write(required for cosign OIDC)dockerhub-description-update.yml:contents: readPR trigger (
build-test.yml): Addspull_requesttrigger targetingmasterso vulnerability scans run on PRs before merge.SECURITY.md: Responsible disclosure policy, supported versions, security measures overview, and instructions for verifying image signatures with cosign.
Verifying signed images
Test plan
build-testworkflow triggers via thepull_requestevent.spdx.jsonfiles are attached to the release assets, cosign signs the image digest without errorid-token: writepermission is present inrelease.yml(required for keyless OIDC signing)Closes #99
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