Security fixes are released for the latest published GPU Watchman minor version. Upgrade to the newest patch before reporting a suspected vulnerability.

Use the repository's private Security advisories → Report a vulnerability flow. Do not open a public issue for an unpatched vulnerability.

Include the affected version, operating system, deployment shape, minimal reproduction, impact, and whether the issue requires local GPU/driver access. Never attach production support bundles, history files, configuration, bearer tokens, API keys, prompts, model outputs, or raw process/cgroup data. Replace them with synthetic evidence.

GPU collection is read-only. The canary command is an explicit active request that can consume inference capacity and billable tokens. The embedded HTTP server does not terminate TLS; remote listeners require explicit opt-in and bearer authentication and should remain behind a bounded TLS proxy or service mesh. See the deployment and CLI references for the complete threat model and hardening controls.

The versioned installer, release archives, and checksum files have keyless GitHub artifact attestations; archives also have SHA-256 sidecars. Download and verify install.sh as shown in the installation guide instead of piping mutable branch content into a shell. The installer validates the exact checksum record and, when a compatible GitHub CLI is available, verifies the archive attestation before extracting the binary. Set GPU_WATCHMAN_VERIFY_ATTESTATION=required to refuse installation when attestation verification is unavailable; disabled is the explicit opt-out for trusted private mirrors.

Downloaded assets can also be verified directly:

sha256sum -c gpu-watchman_linux_amd64.tar.gz.sha256
gh attestation verify gpu-watchman_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
  --repo bas3line/watchman

Published container manifests include BuildKit provenance and an SBOM, plus a GitHub attestation bound to the pushed manifest-list digest:

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/bas3line/watchman:0.8.0 \
  --repo bas3line/watchman

The publication workflows gate on the shared tests and a RustSec advisory audit. Third-party actions and official container bases are pinned to immutable commits or OCI index digests; Dependabot proposes their scheduled updates for review.