fix(core): prevent OS command injection via CI branch names (GHSA-4x45-gxvp-6283)#319
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…5-gxvp-6283) Attacker-controlled CI branch/ref strings were interpolated into execSync() template literals in the git CI-environment helpers. Since execSync runs the command through /bin/sh -c, shell metacharacters such as $() were evaluated before git ran, letting anyone who could influence a branch name (e.g. via a PR) execute arbitrary commands on the CI runner. Replace the shell-interpolating execSync calls with execFileSync using argument arrays, which spawn git directly and never invoke a shell. Covers all four injectable sinks: gitFetch, gitMergeBase, listShas and listParentCommits. Adds a regression test that feeds a $() payload through getMergeBaseCommitSha and asserts the injected command does not run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Fixes GHSA-4x45-gxvp-6283 — OS command injection (CWE-78, CVSS 7.5) in
@argos-ci/core.Attacker-controlled CI branch/ref strings flowed unsanitized into
execSync()template literals inpackages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts. BecauseexecSyncruns the command through/bin/sh -c, shell metacharacters such as$(), backticks, and;were evaluated beforegitran. An attacker who could influence a branch name (e.g. by opening a PR, or viaGITHUB_HEAD_REF/ARGOS_BRANCH) could execute arbitrary commands on the CI runner whenever a project hadhasRemoteContentAccess: false.Fix
Replaced every shell-interpolating
execSyncthat handles user data withexecFileSync("git", [...args]), which spawnsgitdirectly with an argument array and never invokes a shell. This covers all four injectable sinks (the advisory named two):gitFetch— the primary sinkgitMergeBase— the secondary sinklistShas— interpolated a ref/pathlistParentCommits— interpolatedinput.shaStatic, no-input calls (
rev-parse,config --get) were left as-is since they carry no injectable data.Test
Added a regression test in
git.test.tsmirroring the PoC: it sets up a temp git repo with a realorigin, callsgetMergeBaseCommitShawith a branch name containing$(touch <marker>), and asserts the marker file is not created.Verified the test is meaningful — it fails against the original vulnerable code (the marker gets created) and passes with the fix.
tscandprettierare clean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code