🔒 Securely hash security PINs - #30
Conversation
🎯 What: The application previously stored the user's security PIN in plaintext in SharedPreferences. This has been updated to hash the PIN before storage.⚠️ Risk: A plaintext PIN stored in SharedPreferences can be extracted by an attacker with physical access to a rooted device, an ADB backup (if enabled), or any process running with root privileges, leading to unauthorized access to the application. 🛡️ Solution: The `getPin` method was removed and replaced with `hasPin` and `verifyPin`. The PIN is now securely hashed using `PBKDF2WithHmacSHA256` with 10,000 iterations and a securely generated, randomly-salted 16-byte array, preventing offline brute-force attacks. Additionally, backward compatibility logic was added to seamlessly migrate existing plaintext PINs to the new hashed format during the next login. Co-authored-by: apil-khadka <87198819+apil-khadka@users.noreply.github.com>
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
|
Warning Rate limit exceeded
⌛ How to resolve this issue?After the wait time has elapsed, a review can be triggered using the We recommend that you space out your commits to avoid hitting the rate limit. 🚦 How do rate limits work?CodeRabbit enforces hourly rate limits for each developer per organization. Our paid plans have higher rate limits than the trial, open-source and free plans. In all cases, we re-allow further reviews after a brief timeout. Please see our FAQ for further information. ℹ️ Review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (2)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment Tip You can disable poems in the walkthrough.Disable the |
1 participant
🎯 What: The vulnerability fixed
The application previously stored the user's security PIN in plaintext in SharedPreferences. This has been updated to hash the PIN before storage.
A plaintext PIN stored in SharedPreferences can be extracted by an attacker with physical access to a rooted device, an ADB backup (if enabled), or any process running with root privileges, leading to unauthorized access to the application. Given that a PIN is typically short (4-6 digits), an offline attacker could easily extract and brute force it.
🛡️ Solution: How the fix addresses the vulnerability
The vulnerable
getPinmethod was removed and replaced with safehasPinandverifyPinmethods.The PIN is now securely hashed using
PBKDF2WithHmacSHA256with 10,000 iterations and a securely generated, randomly-salted 16-byte array, preventing offline brute-force and dictionary attacks. The salt is uniquely generated per-PIN and stored alongside the hashed data.Additionally, backward compatibility logic was carefully added to transparently migrate existing plaintext PINs to the new hashed format upon a user's next successful login, preventing lockouts for legacy users.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 14822167893375426440 started by @apil-khadka