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16 changes: 8 additions & 8 deletions pcm/Human Action/01_04_02.md
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### The Scale of Value

Acting man chooses between various opportunities offered for choice. He prefers one alternative to others.
Acting man come choose between different opportunities way dey offered for choice. He come prefers one alternative to de others.

It is customary to say that acting man has a scale of wants or values in his mind when he arranges his actions. On the basis of such a scale he satisfies what is of higher value, i.e., his more urgent wants, and leaves unsatisfied what is of lower value, i.e., what is a less urgent want. There is no objection to such a presentation of the state of affairs. However, one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man's acting.
Na customary to say dat acting man get a scale of wants or values inside his mind when he come arrange his action. On de basic of such a scale he come satisfies warin na of higher value, i.e., his more dey urgent wants, and come leaves unsatisfied warin na of lower value, i.e., warin come be less of urgent want. Dere na nor objection to such a presentation of de state of affairs. However, one no go fit come forget dat de scale of values or wants come manifests itself only in de reality of action. Dese scales nor get independent existence apart from de actual character of one persons. De only source from which our knowledge come concerning dese scales na derived na de observation of a mans actions. Every actions na always in perfect agreement with de scale of valves or wants becos dese scales na nothing but an instrument for de interpretation of warin a man’s dem acting.

Ethical doctrines are intent upon establishing scales of value according to which man should act but does not necessarily always act. They claim for themselves the vocation of telling right from wrong and of advising man concerning what he should aim at as the supreme good. They are normative disciplines aiming at the cognition of what ought to be. They are not neutral with regard to facts; they judge them from the point of view of freely adopted standards.
Ethical doctrines na intent upon establishing scale of valve according to which man go fit come dem act but no go fit necessary always come dem act. Dey come claim for dem self de vocation of telling warin dey right from wrong and of advising man concerning warin he go aim at as de supreme good. Dey na normative disciplines aiming at de congnition of warin ought to be. Dey na not neutral with regard to facts; dey come judge dem from de point of view of freely adopted standards.

This is not the attitude of praxeology and economics. They are fully aware of the fact that the ultimate ends of human action are not open to examination from any absolute standard. Ultimate ends are ultimately given, they are purely subjective, they differ with various people and with the same people at various moments in their lives. Praxeology and economics deal with the means for the attainment of ends chosen by the acting individuals. They do not express any opinion with regard to such problems as whether or not sybaritism is better than asceticism. They apply to the means only one yardstick, viz., whether or not they are suitable to attain the ends at which the acting individuals aim.
Dis na not de attitude of praxeology and economics. Dey na fully aware of de fact dat de ultimate ends of human action na not open to examination from any absolute standard. Ultimate ends na ultimately given, dey na purely subjective, dey come differ with different people and with de same people at different moments inside dire lives. Praxeology and economics come dey deal with de means for de attainment of ends chosen by de acting one persons. Dey no go fit express any opinion warin come get regard to such problems as whether or not sybaritism na better than asceticism. Dey come apply to de means only one yardstick, through., whether or not dey na suitable to attain de ends at which de acting of one person come aim.

The notions of abnormality and perversity therefore have no place in economics. It does not say that a man is perverse because he prefers the disagreeable, the detrimental, and the painful to the agreeable, the beneficial, and the pleasant. It says only that he is different from other people; that he likes what others detest; that he considers useful what others want to avoid; that he takes pleasure in enduring pain which others avoid because it hurts them. The polar notions normal and perverse can be used anthropologically for the distinction between those who behave as most people do and outsiders and atypical exceptions; they can be applied biologically for the distinction between those whose behavior preserves the vital forces and those whose behavior is self-destructive; they can be applied in an ethical sense for the distinction between those who behave correctly and those who act otherwise than they should. However, in the frame of a theoretical science of human action, there is no room for such a distinction. Any examination of ultimate ends turns out to be purely subjective and therefore arbitrary.
De notions of abnormality and perversity therefore nor come get place inside economics. E nor come say dat a man na perverse becos he prefers de disagreeable, de detrimental, and de painful to de agreeable, de beneficial, and de pleasant. It come say dat he na different from other people; dat he come likes warin others detect; dat he considers useful warin others people want come to avoid; dat he come takes pleasure in enduring pain which others come avoid becos e come hurt dem. De polar notions way de normal and perverse go fit be used anthropologically for de distinction between dose who come dey behave as most people do and outsiders and a typical exceptions; dey go fit come applied biologically for de distinction between dose people way dire behavior preserves de vital forces and dose whose behavior na self-destructive; dey go fit applied in an ethical sense for de distinction between dose who behave correctly and dose who come act otherwise than dey should. However, in de frame of a theoretical science way dey of dey human action, dere na nor room for such a distinction. Any examination way come dey ultimate ends go turns out to be purely subjective and therefore arbitrary.

Value is the importance that acting man attaches to ultimate ends. Only to ultimate ends is primary and original value assigned. Means are valued derivatively according to their serviceableness in contributing to the attainment of ultimate ends. Their valuation is derived from the valuation of the respective ends. They are important for man only as far as they make it possible for him to attain some ends.
Value na de importance dat acting man come attaches to ultimate ends. Only to ultimate ends na e be primary and original value assigned. Means na valued derivatively according to dire serviceableness come dey contributing to de attainment of ultimate ends. Dire valuation na derived from de valuation of de respective ends. Dey come become important for man only as far as dey come make am dey possible for him to come attain some ends.

Value is not intrinsic, it is not in things. It is within us; it is the way in which man reacts to the conditions of his environment.
Value na not intrinsic, nor be things. Dey come write am us; na dey way which man come react to de conditions of his environment.

Neither is value in words and doctrines. It is reflected in human conduct. It is not what a man or groups of men say about value that counts, but how they act. The oratory of moralists and the pompousness of party programs are significant as such. But they influence the course of human events only as far as they really determine the actions of men.
Neither na value in words and doctrines. Na reflected inside human being conduct. Nor be warin a man or groups of men talk about dat counts, but how dey act. De oratory of moralists and de pompousness of party programs na significant as such. But dey come influence de course of human events only as far as dey really come determine de action of men.