Update 03_p01_ch02_02.md

pcm/Economics and Ethics of Private Property Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy/03_p01_ch02_02.md

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-E no hard to show sey this conclusion them legit, if we consider the case of tax money wey everybody know. Such assets are only acquired and held because they can purchase other valuable assets at future dates. They have no own intrinsic use-value at all (as in the case of a fiat paper money), or such use-value is insignificant compared to the exchange-value (as in the case of the gold standard where money also has an—albeit small—commodity value). Rather, the value attached to them is due to their future purchasing power. Yet if the value of money consists of representing other future available assets, the effects of taxing money becomes clear immediately. Most importantly, along with increasing the marginal utility of leisure or consumption, such a tax increases the marginal utility of such future assets. This change in the constellation of incentives translates itself for an actor into increased attempts to obtain these assets more quickly, in less time-consuming production processes. The only production processes now that are systematically shorter than those of attaining future assets indirectly, via the earlier acquisition of money, are those of acquiring them through direct exchanges. Thus, taxation implies that barter trade will be substituted increasingly for the lengthier roundabout production method of monetary exchanges. But once again, resorting increasingly to barter is a regression to economic primitivism and barbarism. It was precisely because production for bartering purposes yielded an extremely low output that mankind actually outgrew this developmental stage and instead increasingly resorted to and expanded a system of production-forindirect-exchange purposes which, while requiring a longer waiting period, renders a far larger return of ever more and different assets drawn into the cash nexus. Every act of taxation means a coerced step backward in this process. It reduces output, decreases the extent of the division of labor, and leads to a reduction in social and economic integration (which, it may be noted, could never have become worldwide, were it not for the institution of indirect monetary exchanges).
+E no hard to show sey this conclusion them legit, if we consider the case of tax money wey everybody know.  Dem dey only acquire all dose kind assets and com keep am because say dem go fit buy oda assets wey get value for future. Dem no get dere own intrinsic use-value kaka (as e just be like fiat paper money), or all dose kind use-value nor dey significant if dem dey compare am to de exchange-value (as e just be like all dose gold standard for where money still get commodity value wey still small). Instead, de value wey dem attach give dem na because of de purchasing power wey dem go get for future. Yet if de value wey money get com be say e get other assets wey go dey valuable for future, de effects wey go come out if dem dey tax people money go come just dey clear immediately.  De one wey dey important pass, wey go still dey follow if you increase de marginal utility wey dey for leisure and to dey consume, all dose kain tax go dey increase de marginal utility wey all dose future assets get. To dey change all dis kain constellations wey dey for all dis incentives go com mean say e don change eself from actor wey e first be to plenty plenty attempts to tey get all dis assets fast fast, for short time wey dem tey dey produce. De only process wey dey inside production wey short pass systematically if you dey compare am with all dose ones wey dey get future assets indirectly, through de first way wey dem tey dey get money, na say dem dey get am thru exchanges wey dey direct. But once again, if we dey use barter well well, dat one mean say we dey fall come back to economic primitivism and barbarism. Na exactly because say if we dey produce because say we wan use am for barter purpose, dat one go com result to output wey dey low and say mankind com grow pass dis kind developmental stage and instad, e com dey go back to, and e com even increase de system wey e tey dey produce for exchange wey nor dey direct wey be say as e dey require long period wey dem tey dey wait, e go come dey give return wey big well well wey concern different assets wey dem drag enter cash nexus. Every way wey dem tey dey task person mean say na step wey dey go back wey dem use force for de process. E dey reduce output, e com still dey reduce de way wey dem tey dey share labour, and e com lead to make social and economic integration com dey reduce (wey e be say if dem note am, e nor go come be worldwide, if nor be say dem com dey use monetary exchange wey dey indirect).
 
-Furthermore, the general tendency towards increasingly adopting direct instead of indirect exchange mechanisms caused by every coercive seizure of money also has highly important consequences with regard to the methods of attaining money itself. Just as in the case of non-monetary assets, the increased marginal utility of money along with that of leisure-consumption also makes it relatively more attractive to acquire money in less time-consuming ways. Instead of acquiring it in return for value-productive efforts, i.e., within the framework of mutually beneficial exchanges, taxation raises the incentive to acquire it more quickly and directly, without having to go through such tediously roundabout methods as producing and contracting. On the one hand, this means that one will try more frequently to increase one’s money assets by simply hiding them from the tax collector. On the other hand, a growing tendency will emerge to come into the possession of money through coercive seizure—either in the illegal form called stealing, or legally, by participating in the game called politics.[^9]
+If we wan go further, de general tendency wey dey if we com dey use exchange mechanism wey dey direct pass de one wey nor dey direct wey to dey seize money by force dey cause com still get consequences wey dey very important wey concern de methods wey dem tey dey get de money sef. Just as e still dey for assets wey nor concern money, de marginality wey concern money wey dem increase wey still follow leisure consumption com make am dey more attractive to tey get money for ways wey nor dey consume time. Instead of to dey get am as returns for efforts wey dey produce value, dat is wey dey de framework of exchanges wey dey mutually beneficial, taxation go come dey increase de incentive wey dem go use to tey get am fast fast and directly, wey we nor go pass thru roundabout methods wey go hard well well wey go either dey produce or wey dey contract. For one side, dis one go come mean say person go need to dey try well well to tey increase de money assets wey e get if e just hide am from people wey dey collect tax. For de oda side, one kain tendency wey be dey grow before go con come out wey go com enter de possession of money wey dem use force tey seize – either for form wey dey illegal like thief thief, or form wey be say dey legal if you dey participate for one kain game wey dem dey call politics.[^9]
 
-Having completed this general economic analysis of the effects of taxation, which today’s economic textbook writers typically prefer not to deal with at all, let me now turn to what they typically do say about the effects of taxation under the heading of tax-incidence. In light of our previous analysis it will be easy to detect the fatal flaw in such accounts. Indeed, that one should fall headlong into error in dealing with specifics if one has not bothered to study the basics can hardly come as a complete surprise.
+As we don complete dis economic analysis wey dey general wey concern de effects of taxation, wey people wey dey write about economics nowadays choose say dem nor go talk about am kaka, make I com turn face wetin dem dey talk follow wetin be de effects wey taxation dey bring wey dey under de heading tax-incidence. Base on our analysis before, e go dey easy to tey catch accounts wey get complete mistake. Really say dat one go fall seriously inside error wey dey deal with wetin dey specifics if person nor dey bothered make e study de basics go hardly com as wetin be complete surprise.
 
-The standard account of the problem of tax-incidence most frequently exemplified by the case of an excise or sales tax goes like this:[^10] Suppose an excise or sales tax is imposed. Who must bear the burden of this? It is recognized—and I have of course no intention of disputing the validity of this—that in one sense there can be no question that consumers must take the brunt, and invariably do. For no matter what the specific consequences of such a tax are, it must either be the case that consumers will have to pay a higher price for the same goods and their standard of living will be impaired because of this, or it must be the case that the tax imposes higher costs on producers, and consumers will then be punished because of a lower output produced. However, and it is with this that we will have to disagree sharply, it is then argued that whether or not the imposition of a tax harms consumers in the former or in the latter way is an open empirical question, the answer to which depends on the elasticity of demand for the taxed products. If the demand is sufficiently inelastic, then producers will shift the entire burden onto consumers in the form of higher prices. If it is highly elastic, then producers will have to absorb the tax in the form of higher costs of production, and if some section of the demand curve is inelastic and another elastic (this allegedly being empirically the most frequent case), then the burden somehow will have to be shared, with part of it being shifted onto consumers and another falling on producers.
+De account wey be say dey standard wey concern de problem of tax-incidence wey be say dey show well well for excise or sales tax dey go like dis:[^10] Abysay dem com impose excise or sales tax. Who go com carry de load wey dis one go bring? Dem recognize am – and I nor get any intention to dey argue weda dis thing na true – say for one way, e nor fit get question wey consumers go take de brunt, and last last do. E nor get aw de specific consequences of all dose kain tax be, e go either be de case wey people wey dey consume am go pay big money for dat same goods and de way wey dem tey dey live go come dey low because of dis thing, or e go com be say de tax go come cause cost wey big well well for producers side and den na de consumers go come suffer am because de output wey  dem dey produce go com dey low. However, and na with dis kain thing we com gat disagree sharp sharp, and dem com dey argue am weda if dem force tax or if dem nor force tax, weda e dey harm consumers for de first way or de second na one empirical question wey dey open, and de answer dey depend on de elasticity of demand for all dose product wey dem dey tax. If de demand dey inelastically sufficient, den all dose producers go come shift de whole load give consumers for de price wey go high. If e dey highly elastic, den de producers go com swallow de tax for de way of say production cost go com dey high, and if some part of de demand curve dey inelastic and anoda one com be elastic (na dis one be de kain case wey always dey happen), den dem go com need to share de load, wey one part go dey for consumers side and de oda part go dey producers side.
 
-What is wrong with this sort of argument? While it is couched in terms different from those used in my earlier analysis, one can hardly fail to notice that it merely restates, on a somewhat more specific level of discussion, what has already been demonstrated as false on a more general level: the thesis that taxes may or may not reduce productive output; that there is no necessary connection between taxes and productive output; and that it must be considered empirically possible that a tax may affect consumption exclusively while production remains untouched. To assume, as the textbook-account of taxincidence does, that taxes can be shifted forward, either totally or partially, onto consumers is simply to say that a tax may not negatively affect production. For if it were possible to shift any amount of a tax forward onto consumers, that amount would represent a “nonproduction tax”, a tax exclusively on consumption.[^11]
+Wetin dey wrong with dis kain argument? As dem put am for place wey dey different from all dose ones wey dem use for de before analysis, person no go fit fail to notice am say e dey talk say, on one kain level of discussion, wetin dem don already show say nor be true for level wey dey general: de talk wey be say taxes go fit or e nor go fit reduce de output wey dem dey produce; say e nor get connection wey dey between taxes and output wey dem dey produce; and dem go must consider am say e dey possible say tax go fit affect consumption especially while e nor go touch production. If we wan assume, as wetin de textbook talk for tax –incidence matter, say make dem shift tax go front either everything or small for inside put for customers na say taxes nor go affect production negatively. Because if e dey possible to shift any amount of tax give customers, dat amount go com represent tax wey “nor dey productive,” tax wey just dey only on top consumption.[^11]
 
-In order to refute the typical textbook analysis, one could simply go back to our previous discussion that resulted in the conclusion that any tax imposed on people constrained by time preference must negatively affect production above and beyond any negative consequences that it implies for consumption. However, I will choose a somewhat different route of argument here in order to make essentially the same point and thereby establish the more specific thesis that no amount of any tax can be shifted onto consumers. To assume otherwise is to assume something manifestly impossible.
+Make we for fit dey reject all dose analysis wey all dis typical textbook dey talk person go fit easily go back to de discussion wey we don first get before wey com give us de conclusion wey talk say any tax wey dem put on top people wey be be say na time preference go fit constrain am e go must affect production for way wey nor good pass any kain negative consequences wey dey imply consumption. However, I go choose road wey dey different for dis argument make I for fit make dat same point wey dey essential and I go come fit show de kain talk wey be say e no get any kain amount of tax wey dem go fit shift put on top customers. If we com dey assume anoda tin, na say we go dey assume wetin nor go fit manifest.
 
 The absurdity of the tax-forward-shifting doctrine becomes clear as soon as one tries to apply it to the case of a single actor who continuously acts in both roles—that of a producer and a consumer. For such a producer-consumer, the doctrine amounts to this proposition: If he is faced with an increase in the costs of attaining some future good—an increase, that is, that he himself perceives as a cost-increasing event—then he shifts these higher costs onto himself in such a way that he responds by attaching a correspondingly higher value to the good to be obtained, thereby restoring his old profit-margin, thus leaving his role as producer unchanged and unimpaired, and requiring restrictive adjustments exclusively in his role as a consumer. Or, formulated even more drastically, insofar as his value-productive efforts are concerned, a tax does not make any difference for an individual, because he just starts liking the to-be-produced good correspondingly more.
 
@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ Yet if one is logically committed to assuming demand to be given whenever one tr
 
 [^14]: See on this point also Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, p. 809.
 
-[^15]: Should a tax not immediately affect supply at all, as can happen in the short run, then it follows from the above analysis that the price charged will not change at all. For to raise it in response to the tax would once again imply pushing it into an elastic region of the demand curve. In the long run the supply will have to be relatively reduced and prices must move into this region. In any case, no forward shifting takes place. See on this also Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 807ff.; idem, *Power and Market*, pp. 88ff.
+[^15]: Should a tax not immediately affect supply at all, as can happen in the short run, then it follows from the above analysis that the price charged will not change at all. For to raise it in response to the tax would once again imply pushing it into an elastic region of the demand curve. In the long run the supply will have to be relatively reduced and prices must move into this region. In any case, no forward shifting takes place. See on this also Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 807ff.; idem, *Power and Market*, pp. 88ff.