TID — The Instant Destroyer

Independent security research in the field of protection against cache-based side-channel attacks.

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Overview

TID is a specialized protocol designed to eliminate sensitive data remnants (such as cryptographic keys) from CPU cache layers ($L1, L2, \text{ and } L3$) immediately after use. It addresses a critical security gap where data persists in hardware structures even after being wiped from system memory (RAM).

Key Achievements

• Verified Defense: Effectively mitigates Flush+Reload and similar microarchitectural side-channel attacks.
• Measurable Performance: * Unprotected Access: ~78 CPU cycles (Cache Hit).
  • TID Protected Access: ~286 CPU cycles (Cache Miss).
  • Security Margin: Provides a 3.7x latency barrier, successfully blinding potential attackers.
• Hardware-Level Precision: Utilizes optimized CPU instructions (CLFLUSHOPT, MFENCE) to ensure physical cache eviction.

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Support the Research

TID is an independent security research project. Bare-metal hardware testing on high-end enterprise processors is resource-intensive and costly. By sponsoring this project, you directly support the infrastructure costs required for ongoing validation and security research.

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Author & Identity

• Lead Researcher: Ahmad Qasim Mohammad Hassan
• ORCID: 0009-0001-4360-0802
• Professional Profile: LinkedIn Profile
• Academic Attestation:

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Documentation & License

• Detailed research papers and technical execution reports are located in the /research folder.
• This project is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPL-3.0).