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Question: does #988's stance against brokering a downstream MCP server's own OAuth (CIMD) still stand?
Context
MCP servers that authenticate the real end user via their own IdP using Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD) — an increasingly common, spec-endorsed pattern (e.g. @backstage/plugin-mcp-actions-backend makes CIMD its primary path) — can currently only be onboarded to the registry in catalog mode. None of the egress modes broker a downstream's own IdP (oauth_user needs a pre-registered client_id/secret; obo_exchange needs the backend to accept a gateway-minted JWT), and caller auth headers are stripped before any non-internal upstream (_forward_headers, #1266), so a client-supplied backend token can't traverse the gateway either.
We found #988, which deliberately declines gateway-brokered downstream-IdP auth ("we'd be running a federated identity service") and designates catalog mode as the pattern for backends with their own IdP.
The concern (opinion)
For CIMD-authenticated servers, routing them to catalog mode is — in our view — a reduction of the product from (gateway + registry) down to (registry only): discovery still works, but everything the gateway adds on the data path (a single governed endpoint, centralized identity/entitlement enforcement, audit, egress control) is dropped. As CIMD adoption grows, the gateway half of the project quietly stops applying to a growing class of servers — which feels like it undercuts the reason the project is a gateway and not just a registry.
We also note work that looks adjacent to brokering such downstreams: public PKCE egress clients (#1613, merged), client-side DCR on egress (#1519), and publishing the registry's own CIMD document (#992).
Question: does #988's stance against brokering a downstream MCP server's own OAuth (CIMD) still stand?
Context
MCP servers that authenticate the real end user via their own IdP using Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD) — an increasingly common, spec-endorsed pattern (e.g.
@backstage/plugin-mcp-actions-backendmakes CIMD its primary path) — can currently only be onboarded to the registry in catalog mode. None of the egress modes broker a downstream's own IdP (oauth_userneeds a pre-registeredclient_id/secret;obo_exchangeneeds the backend to accept a gateway-minted JWT), and caller auth headers are stripped before any non-internal upstream (_forward_headers, #1266), so a client-supplied backend token can't traverse the gateway either.We found #988, which deliberately declines gateway-brokered downstream-IdP auth ("we'd be running a federated identity service") and designates catalog mode as the pattern for backends with their own IdP.
The concern (opinion)
For CIMD-authenticated servers, routing them to catalog mode is — in our view — a reduction of the product from (gateway + registry) down to (registry only): discovery still works, but everything the gateway adds on the data path (a single governed endpoint, centralized identity/entitlement enforcement, audit, egress control) is dropped. As CIMD adoption grows, the gateway half of the project quietly stops applying to a growing class of servers — which feels like it undercuts the reason the project is a gateway and not just a registry.
We also note work that looks adjacent to brokering such downstreams: public PKCE egress clients (#1613, merged), client-side DCR on egress (#1519), and publishing the registry's own CIMD document (#992).
Questions